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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the influence of structural knowledge on the individual
level and the influence of knowledge heterogeneity on the group level on
complex problem solving (CPS) performance. For the elicitation of structural
knowledge, a computer based method, the association structure test (AST), is
developed. Through term associations, measurement of thinking times, and
through pairwise concept comparisons, the AST elicits a knowledge graph
that can be described with graph-theoretical coefficients. The AST is put to
test in the domain of CPS.
As complex problems are usually addressed by groups in practice, a group
setting is chosen. Scholl’s model of team effectiveness postulates a curvilinear
n-shaped connection between the group’s knowledge heterogeneity and its
CPS performance.
In a laboratory experiment, 150 participants were divided into dyads.
The participants each received an instructional text with seven knowledge
elements on the control of a complex scenario. The overlap of knowledge ele-
ments inside a dyad was varied (small overlap, partial overlap, full overlap).
After learning, dyad members self-assessed their knowledge. This assessment
entered was fed into a computer-based knowledge management system (the
skillMap), for which an algorithm for knowledge similarity calculation had
been devised. The knowledge similarity was also used for performance pre-
diction. A discussion followed, during which dyad members taught each other
what they had learned. Their structural knowledge was then assessed with
the AST. In the following complex scenario task, dyads from the partially
shared condition exhibited a significant superior performance in comparison
with the other two conditions. Knowledge heterogeneity exhibited a curvilin-
ear relationship with the dyad’s CPS performance. The weighted density of
AST-elicited knowledge graphs weakly correlated with CPS performance and
explained a small but unique fraction of its variance. The skillMap similarity
measure correlated significantly with CPS performance.
Computer-based knowledge elicitation tools are thus potentially suited
for performance prediction. CPS performance of groups is partially deter-
mined by the way in which knowledge is distributed inside the group.
Keywords:
knowledge, complex problem solving, group performance, structural
knowledge
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit untersucht den Einfluss von strukturellem Wissen auf individu-
eller Ebene sowie den Einfluss der Wissensheterogenität auf Gruppenebe-
ne auf komplexes Problemlösen. Zur Erhebung von strukturellem Wissen
wird ein computerbasiertes Verfahren, der Assoziations- Strukturtest (AST),
entwickelt. Für die Berechnung der Wissensheterogenität in Gruppen wird
das Wissensmanagementsystem skillMap um einen entsprechenden Algorith-
mus erweitert. Der AST erhebt mittels freier Assoziation, Denkzeitmessung
und Paarvergleichen zu einer Wissensdomäne einen Graphen, der mit gra-
phentheoretischen Kennwerten beschreiben wird. Für Leistungsvorhersagen
mit dem AST werden komplexe Problemlöseaufgaben gewählt. Da komplexe
Probleme i.d.R. von Gruppen bearbeitet werden, wird ein Gruppensetting
gewählt. Scholls Modell der Teameffektivität postuliert einen umgekehrt-u-
förmigen Zusammenhang zwischen der Wissensheterogenität in der Gruppe
und ihrer Problemlöseleistung. In einem Laborexperiment wurden 150 Ver-
suchspersonen in Dyaden eingeteilt. Die Teilnehmer erhielten je einen Lern-
text mit sieben Wissenselementen zur Steuerung eines komplexen Problem-
löseszenarios. Die Heterogenität des Wissens der beiden Gruppenmitglieder
wurde variiert (geringe Heterogenität, mittlere Heterogenität, große Hete-
rogenität). Nach der Lernphase gaben die Dyadenmitglieder eine Einschät-
zung über ihr Wissen ab. Diese Einschätzungen wurden mittels des skillMap-
Algorithmus zu einem Ähnlichkeitskoeffizienten verrechnet, der auch zur Vor-
hersage der Gruppenleistung genutzt wird. Es folgte eine Diskussionsphase,
in der die Dyadenmitglieder sich gegenseitig das Erlernte beibrachten. Ihr
strukturelles Wissen wurde dann mit dem AST getestet. In der anschlie-
ßenden Bearbeitung des Szenarios waren die Dyaden mit mittlerer Hetero-
genität den beiden anderen signifikant überlegen: Die Wissensheterogenität
zeigt einen kurvenlinearen Zusammenhang mit der Gruppenleistung. Die ge-
wichtete Dichte der AST-erhobenen Wissensgraphen korreliert gering mit der
Problemlöseleistung und erklärt einen eigenständigen kleinen Anteil ihrer Ge-
samtvarianz. Das Ähnlichkeitsmaß korreliert signifikant mit der Problemlö-
seleistung. Computerbasierte Wissensdiagnoseverfahren sind somit potentiell
dazu geeignet, Leistungsvorhersagen zu treffen. Die Problemlöseleistung von
Gruppen ist zum Teil durch die Verteilung des Wissens innerhalb der Gruppe
determiniert.
Schlagwörter:
Wissen, Komplexes Problemlösen, Gruppenleistung, Strukturelles Wissen
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The May 2007 issue of e.conomy, the economics magazine published by the
German government, is entitled “Using knowledge as a resource” (Presse- und
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2007). The article implies that for
countries lacking substantial natural resources such as Germany, knowledge
is the most important resource, because it fuels innovation and economic
success. Similar claims have been put forward by several scholars (Davenport
& Prusak, 1998; Drucker, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Scholl, 2004).
Arguing along the same lines, Stehr (1994) has coined the term ‘knowledge
society’ for modern post-capitalist societies. The significance of knowledge
as a vital resource for the world’s economies has also been underlined by the
European Union in the Lisbon Process (European Council, 2000).
The importance being accredited to the construct of knowledge and its
role in the economy of the 21st century is contrasted by the blurred con-
ceptualizations of the term: The field of knowledge management, defined
as “the process of continuously creating new knowledge, disseminating it
widely through the organization, and embodying it quickly in new prod-
ucts/services, technologies and systems” (Takeuchi, Nonaka, & Hitotsubashi-
Daigaku, 2004, p. ix), is unstructured and scattered; Despres and Chauvel
(2000) refer to it as a “patchwork” (p. 57). The concept of tacit knowledge
(Polanyi, 1966) – credited with a key role in organizational performance
(Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Takeuchi et al., 2004) – is one of the most blurred
concepts in management literature (Busch, Richards, & Dampney, 2001) and
there is an argument whether Polanyi, who coined the concept of tacit knowl-
edge and Nonaka, who introduced it into knowledge management (Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995), are referring to the same thing (Li & Gao, 2003).
This uncertainty with regard to the definition of the construct is con-
trasted by the agreement that “an increased focus on the handling of non-
explicit knowledge might pose a considerable value-creating factor” (For-
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schungsinstitut für anwendungsorientierte Wissensverarbeitung (FAW), 2001,
p.7, own translation).
In order to close the gap between the assumed importance of the construct
on one side and its ambiguity on the other, a thorough investigation of the
concept of knowledge and its different forms and the development of a sound
conceptual framework appear necessary. Such a framework should allow the
derivation of hypotheses with regard to the connection between knowledge
and (economically relevant) performance, because one of the main claims of
the KM literature is that an increase of (non-explicit) knowledge improves
organizational performance.
Knowledge also plays an important part in modern forms of collaboration.
In today’s complex information environments, assigning tasks to groups is
seen as a possibility to overcome information processing limitations of indi-
viduals (J. H. Davis, 1980; Kahnemann, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Project-
oriented team work is one of the most common forms of collaboration in
today’s knowledge-intensive businesses (Scholl, 1997). However, “groups can
also fall prey to information processing biases and limitations” (Tindale &
Sheffey, 2002, p. 5). In order to investigate optimal conditions under which
groups can surpass individual limitations without falling prey to limiting
processes, the effect of knowledge distribution inside groups on their perfor-
mance has been the subject of extensive research, for example in the field of
cognitive diversity (Sauer, Felsing, Franke, & Rüttinger, 2006; Mohammed
& Dumville, 2001). Yet, many studies do not model an information-rich
environment or complex tasks, but employ rather simple and deterministic
problems (Endres & Putz-Osterloh, 1994). Only few studies deal with the
effect of knowledge distribution on group performance in complex problem
solving scenarios, which can be viewed as an operationalization of real-world
problems (Endres & Putz-Osterloh, 1994). The existing studies do not clearly
identify whether the amount of knowledge in complex problem solving groups
or the amount of knowledge overlap inside a group is the key determinant
for group complex problem solving performance. Based on Scholl’s theory
of team effectiveness, (Scholl, 1996, 2005), this thesis seeks to predict the
effect of knowledge (after the concept has been clarified) and its distribution
in groups on problem solving quality. The aim of this thesis is thus fourfold:
1. The development of a sound conceptual framework of knowledge on the
individual level combining conceptualizations of knowledge from busi-
ness with psychological findings and allowing psychometric approaches
for its measurement.
2. The establishment of a theory on how knowledge on the group level
influences complex and ill-structured tasks of today’s complex business
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3. The development of (computer-based) tools for operationalization of
the hypotheses derived from 1. and 2.
4. The test of the hypotheses from 1. and 2. with a set of empirical
laboratory experiments.
In order to achieve these aims, the second chapter will introduce and de-
fine the concept of knowledge and will present a model of knowledge types.
The model is developed by linking concepts from the field of individual im-
plicit, explicit and tacit knowledge with findings from memory, cognitive
and knowledge research. In this way, the concepts are not only sharpened
but possibilities for their measurement are discussed. The model introduces
structural knowledge as an important sub-category of human knowledge. The
third chapter critically reviews possibilities of assessing structural knowledge
and ends with the proposition for a new computer-based structural knowl-
edge elicitation tool which may be capable of eliciting a part of individual
implicit knowledge, unconscious access to structural knowledge, also referred
to as structural implicitness. The domain in which this knowledge elicitation
tool will be put to test, complex problem solving (CPS), is introduced in
the subsequent fourth chapter. It also explains the importance of knowledge
in today’s complex and ill-structured tasks, which belong to the category of
complex problems and develops hypotheses with regard to the connection
between structural knowledge and CPS performance.
Before these hypothesis are put to an empirical test, the fifth and sixth
chapter shift the focus from the individual level to the group level: A theory
on the influence of knowledge distribution in groups on the group’s complex
problem solving ability is devised in the fifth chapter. Based on this theory,
the sixth chapter introduces a possibility of augmenting a knowledge man-
agement system for the prediction of group performance. Thus, at the end
of the sixth chapter, two computer-based methods for knowledge elicitation
will have been introduced: A test for individual structural knowledge (from
chapter three) and a system for group performance prediction (from chapter
six). The research methodology that will put the developed hypotheses and
systems to test is reported in the seventh chapter, the eighth chapter reports
the results on the individual and on the group level. The thesis closes with
the ninth chapter that discusses the findings, summarizes the presented work
and provides an outlook on future research.
Chapter 2
The Concept of Knowledge
This chapter1 will present a general broad definition of the term knowledge
before introducing sub-categories of the concept, such as declarative, proce-
dural, and implicit knowledge. Viewpoints from different scientific fields such
as memory science, cognitive psychology, organizational psychology, and eco-
nomics will contribute to their discussion. It leads to a dimensional model
of knowledge types that encompasses all introduced concepts and leads to
certain hypotheses with regard to the role of a specific type of knowledge,
structural knowledge.
2.1 A Broad Definition of Knowledge
The difficulties that epistemology, the philosophy of the nature and scope of
knowledge, has with defining the term become visible in the discussion on
the definition of knowledge (compare Güldenberg, 1999, for an overview).
The classic definition of knowledge in western philosophy in Plato’s dialogue
Theaetetus 201 (Eigler, 1990) describes knowledge as justified true belief,
i. e. a subject knows something (referred to as P ) if the subject believes
in P , the subject is justified to believe in P and if P holds true. This
statement has been rephrased in various ways, e.g. by Chisholm (1957, p.
16, cited according to Gettier, 1963) who states that S knows that P if three
conditions are met:
1. S accepts P ,
2. S has adequate evidence for P , and
1An earlier version of this chapter has been published together with Kozo Sugiyama
(Meyer & Sugiyama, 2007). His contributions to that paper, namely the application of the
introduced model in the evaluation of a research project, are not included in this thesis.
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3. P is true.
Note that in both accounts, truth is a required feature of knowledge in order
to distinguish it from errors.
In his classic paper, Gettier (1963) constructs an example where all three
conditions are met without the subject knowing P : Smith and Jones apply
for a job and Smith has evidence for and strongly believes that Jones will get
the job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. This proposition entails
that the one who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket and Smith is
justified to believe that this proposition is true. If, unknown to him, Smith
gets the job and Smith has, unknown to him, ten coins in his pocket, the
proposition still is true, Smith is justified to believe in it and still Smith does
not know that he himself gets the job.
Cognitive psychology avoids those pitfalls of the requirements of truth as
a feature of knowledge by referring to it – simply speaking – as the content of
human long-term memory (Strube & Schlieder, 1998). This pragmatic view
appears too broad, because it des not distinguish knowledge from other forms
of memory content, e. g. errors and assumptions. One way of introducing
some form of assessment in order to distinguish knowledge from errors is to
combine the views from psychology and philosophy by including construc-
tivist aspects. Constructivism assumes that every individual mentally con-
structs his or her own environment based on his or her sensory input. Thus,
there is no such thing as objectivity or absolute truth, because there is no
objective depiction of reality (Forschungsinstitut für anwendungsorientierte
Wissensverarbeitung (FAW), 2001). If there is no such thing as an objective
truth, another characteristic of knowledge has to be introduced in order to
distinguish it from errors. Therefore, the constructivist term ‘viability’ is
introduced: “Actions, concepts and conceptual operations are viable if they
fit to the intentions or descriptions for which they are used” (Glasersfeld,
1996, p. 43, own translation). This allows the inclusion of an assessment
in the concept of knowledge that does not require objective truth: “Knowl-
edge is not a picture or representation of reality; it is much more a map of
those actions that reality permits. It is a repertoire of concepts, semantic
relationships and actions or operations that have proven to be viable for the
attainment of our goals” (Glasersfeld, 1997, p. 202, own translation).
From this perspective, knowledge contains an assessment in the way that
it contains maps of certain aspects of the world that proved to be viable.
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2.1.1 Data, information, and knowledge
According to Güldenberg (1999), knowledge is the product of a learning
processes during which data is perceived as information (p. 161). This view
requires a distinction between the three concepts. According to Aamodt
and Nygard (1995), data is observed, uninterpreted symbols, for example
characters. Information is interpreted symbols and symbol structures, and
knowledge is interpreted symbol structures used within a decision process
(compare Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Data-Information-Knowledge model (adapted with permission
from Aamodt & Nygard, 1995, p. 195) c© 2008 Elsevier B. V. All rights
reserved. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0169023X
This process of interpretation is understood as the process of embedding
information into existing knowledge, symbolized by the arrow pointing from
knowledge to the arrow between information and knowledge.
Güldenberg (1999) further states that in knowledge-based systems, knowl-
edge is stored in knowledge repositories as structural connectivity patterns.
He states: “Knowledge is the entirety of all products of learning, in which
data is perceived as information and is stored as structural connectivity pat-
terns” (Güldenberg, 1999, p. 161, own translation). The distintion between
data, information, and knowledge is also elaborated by the German Philoso-
pher Ulf von Rauchhaupt (2005). In his view, knowledge creation is an act
of information organization, which leads to the sometimes synonymous use
of the terms knowledge and information:
The interpretation of information that leads to knowledge by an
individual can be seen as an organization process: The process of
interpreting data as information is already an act of organization:
we perceive the data, order it and link it with other information
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from our previous knowledge (...). In this way, the new informa-
tion becomes a part of our knowledge for further acts of interpre-
tation. What we know then has a higher degree of organization
than the barely obtained information. [...]
Contrariwise, knowledge becomes information again if it is ex-
pressed. In order to express knowledge, an individual cannot
supply his or her entire network of previous knowledge, which
consists of his or her entire history of experiences, his or her
cognitive biography. In order to share and exchange knowledge,
humans have to partially reduce it to information. The possibil-
ity of such a reduction, the possibility to encode knowledge into
information, is the reason for the sometimes synonymous use of
the terms knowledge and information. Information is a condensed
form of knowledge, knowledge is information whose organization
exists only for the knowing person (Rauchhaupt, 2005, p. 98f,
own translation).
Note that in von Rauchhaupt’s view, knowledge is represented as a network
of organized information. This network view is in line with Güldenberg’s
perception of knowledge as structural connectivity pattern (see above).
2.1.2 Knowledge definition
Güldenberg’s definition mentions the aspect of assessment or viability only
indirectly by referring to the process of learning. Thus, the above-mentioned
constructivist view, von Rauchhaupts conceptualization of knowledge as net-
worked information and Güldenberg’s (1999) definition of knowledge as struc-
tural connectivity patterns are combined into a general definition of knowl-
edge that includes an aspect of assessment:
Knowledge is defined as a set of structural connectivity patterns.
Its contents have proven to be viable for the achievement of goals.
Based on constructivist assumptions, this definition avoids the term ‘rep-
resentation of reality’. It pays tribute to the fact that mental models of
an individual are the result of a construction of environment, which can be
very different from one individual to another (Opwis & Lüer, 1996). The
term ‘structural connectivity patterns’ includes von Rauchhaupt’s view on
knowledge as a network of organized information (see above) and allows
the inclusion of knowledge on different collective levels (individual and or-
ganizational), since organizational knowledge is embedded in the system or
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structure of the organization (see Chapter 6). The stress on the fact that
knowledge has proven to be viable underlines assessment as a feature of hu-
man knowledge.
2.2 Explicit and Non-explicit Knowledge
Individuals can perform actions without being able to explain them and
they can explain actions without being capable of performing them (Dick
& Wehner, 2002). A person can know something without being able to
articulate it. Consider Wittgenstein’s two famous expressions (Wittgenstein,
2001, section 78, quoted according to von Rauchhaupt, 2005, p. 91), as an
example:
- I know the height of the Montblanc.
- I know how a clarinet sounds.
Long descriptions of the sound of a clarinet cannot replace the actual ex-
perience of hearing it (Rauchhaupt, 2005, p. 91). From such observations,
Polanyi (1966) concluded the existence of a silent dimension of knowledge
that cannot be articulated: tacit knowledge. Spender (1996) uses a simi-
lar typology, differentiating between implicit (produced through action) and
explicit (produced through communication) knowledge. Polanyi himself dis-
tinguished between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge according to the
differentiation between Können (being able to do sth.) and Wissen (know-
ing) in the German language (Polanyi, 1983, p. 16). Similarly, articula-
ble knowledge is referred to as explicit knowledge by Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995), knowledge that is difficult to articulate or cannot be articulated at
all is referred to as tacit knowledge, too. However, Li and Gao (2003) ar-
gue that Nonaka’s understanding of tacit knowledge differs from Polanyi’s
concept and criticise their synonymous use in literature. The authors stress
that Nonaka and Takeuchi and Polanyi referred to two different observations
in two fundamentally different cultural contexts. Polanyi studied European
scientists, where Nonaka and Takeuchi studied factory workers in Japan. Li
and Gao state:
It is out of Polanyi’s argumentation for a careful differentiation
between tacitness and implicitness, but from his terminology, tac-
itness is evidently different from impicitness [sic]. Implicitness,
an other [sic] form of expressing knowing, does exist. It implies
that one can articulate it but is unwilling to do that [...]. [...]
When Nonaka and Takeuchi used Polanyi’s dichotomy [...] we
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can see that actually what they mean by ‘tacitness’ includes ‘im-
plicitness’ (Li & Gao, 2003, p. 8).
The fact that implicit and tacit knowledge are described as two separate
things and the hint at different levels of codifiability points towards a dimen-
sional character of non-explicit knowledge (see also Kogut & Zander, 1992).
The dimension spans between the poles explicit knowledge and tacit knowl-
edge. Following Li and Gao, implicit knowledge lies somewhere in between.
Knowledge elements can be classified into this continuum based on the degree
of their codifiability (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions, 2004), compare Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Dimensional classification of knowledge (based on European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2004;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Li & Gao, 2003)
In their theory of implicit and explicit knowledge, Dienes and Scott (1999)
also arrive at different levels of explicitness from a behavioral science perspec-
tive. They define knowledge as an attitude towards a proposition (predicating
a property to some entity) which is true. Despite the issue of introducing the
concept of truth to a knowledge definition (see above), their approach also
leads to different levels of knowledge explicitness:
The representation of a fact and its internal functional use constitute
knowledge. For example, the sentence “I know that this is a cat” consists of
a person (I), a proposition (this is a cat) and an attitude relation (knowing),
whereby the attitude results from how the proposition is used by the person
(Dienes & Perner, 1999, p. 737). Functional use of a proposition without its
representation, or, more precisely, without the representation of self and atti-
tude towards that proposition, constitutes implicit knowledge. Knowledge is
explicit if it is represented by analogies with explicit verbal communication,
i.e. if the functional use of a proposition is represented by representational
distinctions. “That is, there is an internal state whose function is to indi-
cate the content of the knowledge” (ibid, p. 737). This leads to three types
or stages of implicitness, depending on how many of the elements that con-
stitute knowledge are explicitly available: content, attitude, and self. For
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example, “under subliminal conditions only the properties of a stimulus (the
kind of stimulus) get explicitly represented (...), not the fact that there is a
particular stimulus event that is of that kind” (ibid, p. 738).
In summary, the notion of a dimensional transition from explicit knowl-
edge to implicit knowledge is supported by theories from different fields of
research. However, the inconsistencies in the usage of the terms implicit
and tacit knowledge and Li’s criticism of Nonaka underline the difficulties in
clearly defining the constructs implicit and tacit knowledge. The following
sections will therefore be used to elaborate on psychological and cognitive
findings from the fields of memory research and cognitive science. This ap-
pears appropriate as Li and Gao, Polanyi, and Dienes and Perner refer to
individual knowledge. These findings will then be integrated into the dimen-
sional classification of knowledge, allowing a clearer definition and specifica-
tion of non-explicit knowledge.
2.3 Models from Memory Research
In this section, findings from memory science are outlined that will each
be connected to the concepts of implicit and explicit knowledge. For the
following descriptions, the definition for memory employed by Sinz (1979) is
used:
The term memory describes the storage that depends on the
learning of ontogenetically acquired information that selectively
inserts itself into phylogenetical neuronal structures and can be
recalled at any given point in time, e.g. that can be made avail-
able for situationally appropriate behavior (Sinz, 1979, quoted
according to Markowitsch, 2002, p. 74, own translation).
It can thus be argued that individual knowledge is stored in memory (Strube
& Schlieder, 1998). Generally speaking, memory models either describe the
structure of memory or the processes that are active in memory (Tulving,
2002). In the following, two common and extensive memory models are pre-
sented: Tulving’s content-related memory model (Markowitsch, 1999, 2002;
Squire & Frambach, 1990; Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993; Tulving, 1972;
Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Tulving, 1995, 2002) and the multimodal theory
of memory (Engelkamp, 1991; Engelkamp & Pechmann, 1993; Engelkamp
& Zimmer, 1994; Engelkamp, 1998). The latter includes both structure and
processes; the former is a classification approach. After these two models are
laid out, knowledge representation models from the field of cognitive science
are described.
2.3 Models from Memory Research 11
2.3.1 Content-related memory model
This memory model is based primarily on work by Tulving (1972; 1990; 1995,
2002) and is also supported by neuroanatomical findings by Markowitsch
(1992, 1999, 2002), and Squire and his colleagues (1990; 1993).
Working memory
Firstly, the model postulates a memory with a short memory span of a few
minutes that all information needs to pass through in order to be permanently
stored in the long-term memory (Markowitsch, 2002, p. 85). It can be
understood as that part of memory that is active at a certain point of time
(ibid) and is therefore referred to as working memory.
Several findings indicate that the working memory is made up of several
modality-specific subsystems, e.g. for verbally and visually coded informa-
tion, that are coordinated by a central entity (see Squire et al., 1993, for an
overview). The capacity of the verbal working memory is five (plus/minus
two) informational units (chunks) (Markowitsch, 2002), the capacity of the
visual working memory is assumed to be four objects that can have up
to 16 memorable features (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). On a neural
level, network theories are most popular for describing memory processes
(Markowitsch, 1999, 2002).
Long-term memory
Within long-term memory, where the maximum length of storage is practi-
cally unlimited, several different memory systems can be differentiated ac-
cording to their content (long refers to a span beyond a minute, cf. Markow-
itsch, 1999). The youngest part of memory from an evolutional biological
point of view is episodic memory (Tulving, 2002). “It consists of singular
events that can be specified according to time and place” (Markowitsch,
2002, p. 88, own translation). Together with semantic memory that stores
general facts about the world, it belongs to the declarative memory system.
Episodic memory builds on semantic memory.
According to Squire et. al, “Declarative Memory is fast, it is not always
reliable (i.e. forgetting and retrieval failure can occur), and it is flexible in the
sense that it is accessible to multiple response systems” (Squire et al., 1993,
p. 458). The content-related memory model states that humans also possess
reflexive or non-declarative memory. “Non-declarative memory is slow [...]
reliable and inflexible” (ibid). Reflexive memory is differentiated into three
subsystems: procedural memory, the priming system, and the part of memory
that is responsible for conditioning. For the non-declarative memory systems,
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Squire synonymously employs the term “implicit memory” (Squire et al.,
1993, p. 471). The procedural memory system contains skills and habits:
“Skills are procedures (motor, perceptual and cognitive) for operating in the
world; habits are dispositions and tendencies that are specific to a set of
stimuli and guide behaviour” (ibid). Under certain conditions, these can be
acquired unconsciously. It should be noted that procedural memory does also
contain skills that are not on a motor level, but on a perceptive and/or a
cognitive level (Squire et al., 1993, p. 471). Non-declarative memory can be
acquired independently of declarative memory (Squire & Frambach, 1990).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the model.
Figure 2.3: Overview of the content-related memory system (based on Tulv-
ing, 1995)
Regarding the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, find-
ings from artificial grammar learning are of special importance. In these
experiments, participants receive lists of meaningless words, being told that
the syntax of these words does follow a set of rules, which remain undisclosed.
After the participants are presented with ‘valid’ meaningless words in a trial
period, they are asked to decide whether previously unknown meaningless
words obey the rules or not. Although participants are typically unable to
explain the grammatical rules on which their judgment is based, the number
of correct decisions is above coincidence (Squire et al., 1993, p. 473f). It has
been established that the knowledge base resulting from the trial period is
tacit in nature (Reber, Walkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991). In order to empiri-
cally test whether implicit memory processes have “phyletic primacy” (Reber
et al., 1991, p. 185) over explicit processes, Reber, Walkenfield, and Hern-
stadt (1991) conducted a laboratory experiment. If, they argued, implicit
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memory processes have “phyletic primacy”, they should be largely indepen-
dent of explicit memory processes, i.e. they should be (a) more robust against
insults, (b) they should display a tighter distribution and should (c) operate
largely independent of standard measures of cognitive capability, e.g. psy-
chometric IQ-tests. As assumption (a) appears to be established in clinical
literature, the authors attempted to validate hypotheses (b) and (c) in a
laboratory experiment. Therefore, they used an artificial grammar-learning
task and a series-solution task. The grammar-learning task was designed
as described above. In the series solution task, they presented participants
with sets of ordered sequences of letters. Participants had to determine the
correct continuation of the sequence. Although this task appears to be sim-
ilar to the grammar-learning task on a superficial level (strings of letters
that are made up by a complex set of rules), the necessary cognitive func-
tions for the series-completion tasks are different from the recognition-based
grammar-learning task, as explicit rule-identification and application is re-
quired. Participants also completed an IQ-Test (WAIS-R). In the result, the
mean percent of correct judgments for both grammar learning and series
solution was .61 and significantly above chance. The distribution of scores
from the explicit task showed greater variance than the implicit task, which
was also visible in the ranges of percentage correct: It ranged from .33 to
.92 in the explicit task and from .46 to .73 in the implicit task. Assump-
tion (b) thus receives support from this experiment. The same applies to
hypothesis (c): IQ correlated significantly with the percentage of correct an-
swers in the explicit series task (r = .69, p < .01), but non-significantly with
the artificial grammar well-formdness test (r = .32, p > .05). These results
support the proposed differentiation between implicit and explicit memory
processes. However, According to Squire et al. (1993), it is impossible to
determine whether participants employ implicit knowledge in terms of pro-
cedural knowledge, or whether they employ incomplete or weak declarative
knowledge in artificial grammar learning (1993, p. 474). This statement
implies that non-verbalizable knowledge can have two causes: It is either
procedural or weak declarative. Both have in common that knowledge ele-
ments are accessed subconsciously. For this reason, Markowitsch rejects the
synonymous use of procedural and implicit memory:
Implicit and explicit memory are not two different kinds of mem-
ory, they are different forms of expressing memory or phenomeno-
logically different ways of retrieving specific events or experiences.
Implicit means without making the actual content and its mean-
ing conscious, explicit means including the associated connota-
tions (time-spatial coordinate structure, the how, when and where
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of the encoding process). Explicit recall manifests the recalled in-
formation as an episode that can be personally experienced. The
neural structural combinations that are responsible for implicit
and explicit memory processing do differ (Markowitsch, 1999, p.
25, own translation).
Note the similarity between this statement and the different levels of explicit
knowledge as put forward by Dienes and Perner (1999, see above) in their
theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Implicit memory thus describes
an unconscious processing of memory contents, whereas the term explicit
memory refers to a conscious mode of processing. Kluwe (2006) arrives at
the same conclusion when he describes implicit knowledge as “superior per-
formance in cognitive tasks based on an unconscious use of previously per-
ceived and not intentionally stored information” (p. 40, own translation).
In an analogous way, Kluwe defines explicit knowledge as conscious recall of
previously encoded information.
In addition to conscious and unconscious use of memory contents, there
exists the phenomenon that previously acquired knowledge is not used at
all. This so-called inert knowledge (Renkl, 1996) is used to explain the
discrepancy between knowledge and behaviour in pedagogy.
The above discussion on different forms of memory usage illustrates that
a model needs to be presented that spans not only different types of mem-
ory but also different memory processes. The multimodal memory model
(Engelkamp, 1991; Engelkamp & Pechmann, 1993; Engelkamp & Zimmer,
1994; Engelkamp, 1998) is such a model and is introduced in the next section.
2.3.2 The multimodal memory model
This model includes both process and structural assumptions. In accordance
with Tulving’s differentiation between semantic and episodic memory, En-
gelkamp and colleagues introduce a multimodal memory model for episodic
memory processes.
The actual memory model is based on the assumption of the existence of
two orthogonal dimensions: sensory – motor and verbal – nonverbal. Within
these two dimensions, the authors postulate a conceptual system linked to
modality-specific entry and output systems (Engelkamp, 1998, p. 35), the so-
called sensory-motor systems. Throughout interaction between the systems,
information is represented on two different levels: the conceptual system
operates independently from the modality of the input; on the sensory motor
level, encoding is specific for the modality of input and output (see Figure
2.4).
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Figure 2.4: General architecture of the multimodal memory model (adapted
from Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1994, p. 35). Reproduced with permission from
The Human Memory: A Multimodal Approach by Johannes Engelkamp &
Hubert D. Zimmer, ISBN 0-88937-116-4 , p. 35 c© 1994 by Hogrefe & Huber
Publishers Seattle Toronto Bern Göttingen
Sensory motor systems are differentiated into sensor and motor systems.
For simple items such as single concepts or actions, the authors assume a
strict separation of memory content into different subsystems. Complex ma-
terial is based on several modalities and thus on several subsystems. Sensory
motor knowledge preserves experiences close to perception and behaviour.
Referent knowledge combines concepts into propositions (compare next sec-
tion).
One speciality of Engelkamp’s model is the assumed lack of connection
between verbal sensory motor system and nonverbal sensory motor systems.
The authors assume that an access from the verbal sensory motor system to
the nonverbal sensory motor system requires participation of the conceptual
system (Engelkamp, 1991, p. 8).
In order to make an action verbally explicit, a reference to a motor pro-
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gram must be present in the conceptual system that must be connected to a
word node in the verbal sensory-motor system. Only if this word node is con-
nected to a modality-specific verbal program, verbalization can take place.
Explicit knowledge about acting requires a connection of all three systems
with regard to a specific content. If someone is capable of performing an
action without being able to verbalize it, this can have two reasons:
The sensory nodes, e.g. visual nodes, are directly connected to motor
programs in the nonverbal sensory motor system. Such content that is related
to a single subsystem can only occur for simple stimuli and actions (see
above). An example would be turning the head towards a face we recognize in
a crowd. The face is the visual sensory node that was activated by perceiving
the face; it is directly connected to the motor program for turning the head.
Knowledge regarding face recognition is accessed without any use of the
conceptual system and is thus not codifiable. This type of knowledge can be
labeled embodied knowledge.
The performance of complex acquired tasks that are difficult to verbalize
includes both the nonverbal sensory-motor system and connected referent
knowledge within the conceptual system. Conceptual knowledge does not
include knowledge of words, or known words are not connected to the word
nodes in the verbal sensory-motor system. The connection between the con-
ceptual system and the verbal system, which was established during learning,
may have faded over time since the verbal sensory-motor system is no longer
required after learning in order to perform the action. Actual performance
of the action requires only the conceptual and the nonverbal sensory-motor
system. Due to the inclusion of actions and behaviour in the memory model,
the multimodal memory model is capable of explaining differing levels of
verbalization of behaviour that can be observed. Non-explicit knowledge
acquired over time that was compiled into automated actions, such as the
expert mastery of a musical instrument, can be explained as a disassociation
of the verbal sensory-motor system for that particular action or concept.
All in all, Tulving’s and Engelkamp’s models can explain the existence of
memory content which is not consciously accessible. In Tulving’s model, this
can either be procedural knowledge or unconscious access to (weak) declara-
tive knowledge. In Engelkamp and Zimmer’s model, sensory-motor systems
without connection to the conceptual system or to the verbal sensory-motor
system are active. The phenomenon of non-explicit knowledge thus finds
its correspondence in memory psychology. However, the cognitive dimension
of procedural knowledge and the reference to semantic network structures
in previous sections do require the introduction of higher-level concepts of
representation. These will be outlined in the following section, prior to in-
troducing the model of knowledge types.
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2.4 Cognitive Models for Knowledge Repre-
sentation
Until now, different memory structures and their relationships have been
described. Knowledge organization goes beyond this level; it deals with how
semantic structures and productions are actually organized. Two forms of
knowledge representations are propositional representation systems and rule-
based representation systems (Opwis & Lüer, 1996). They will be briefly
described in this section.
2.4.1 Propositional representation systems
Propositional representation systems represent “verbally articulable infor-
mation with the help of special symbol structures, so-called propositions”
(Opwis & Lüer, 1996, p. 349, own translation). Two famous propositional
systems are semantic networks and cognitive schemes. Semantic networks
are formally depicted as graphs in which nodes represent linguistic units and
edges represent linguistic relations (compare Definition 1 in Section 3.1).
This approach is primarily based on Quillian (1968, 1988), who assumed a
networked organization of individual semantic knowledge. A problem with
semantic networks is their limited expressiveness and the fact that they do not
include methods for dealing with objects in memory. This criticism can be
met with an advancement of semantic networks: cognitive schemata. They
refer to a heterogeneous group of pre-structured representational formats.
The two most popular types of cognitive schemata are frames and scripts
(Strube & Schlieder, 1998). Frames are data structures in which experiences
are generalized and that represent circumstances and expected coherences
from a certain realm of reality (Schnotz, 1994). These representations con-
tain constants and vacancies that store probabilities for other schemata that
can be inserted. In this way, a schema is an instantiable class of a situation.
A proposition is a structure that is created on instantiation of a schema.
A script is a frame for a situation involving several actions, much like a
film script for standard situations. The most famous example is the script for
a restaurant visit, in which certain behaviour such as waiting to be seated,
being seated, receiving the menu, ordering, eating, paying and leaving are
organized in a sequential manner. Scripts allow economic information pro-
cessing that is steered by expectations. Note that scripts and schemata do
not distinguish between declarative and procedural knowledge and extend
beyond the scope of semantic network models that are assumed to be valid
for semantic memory only
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2.4.2 Rule-based representational models: ACT-R
This form of knowledge representation assumes concurring processes within
a production system. Contrary to cognitive schemata, production systems
claim separate storages for declarative and procedural knowledge. A pro-
duction rule or production connects a condition to an action. Declarative
knowledge consists of data structures processed in working memory. Process-
ing takes place by applying production rules to the content of the working
memory (Schnotz, 1994). Declarative knowledge is represented as a seman-
tic network with edges and nodes and is stored in the declarative long-term
memory. The nodes of the network are knowledge units; the edges between
them correspond to certain relations between these units (Schnotz, 1994, p.
96).
A prominent rule-based representational model that has developed to-
wards a unified theory of the mind is Anderson’s Adaptive Control of Thought
- Rational model (ACT-R). It was first outlined in 1976 (J. R. Ander-
son, 1976), substantially altered to version 4.0 (J. R. Anderson & Lebiere,
1998) and was again altered significantly in its transition to the fifth ver-
sion (J. R. Anderson, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere, & Qin, 2004). It is now
a unified theory of cognition explaining the acquisition, representation, and
use of knowledge. It is also a cognitive architecture that has evolved into
a formal (computer) language for simulating human cognition. Because the
ACT-R theory encompasses many of the concepts already introduced and,
in its most recent form, combines research from a brain-region-level to the
level of cognitive models, it is presented in its two most recent forms as an
understanding of the model in the version 5.0 is difficult without knowledge
of the prior version.
ACT-R 4.0 (J. R. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) assumes two types of knowl-
edge: declarative and procedural knowledge. “Declarative knowledge corre-
sponds to things we are aware we know and can usually describe to others”
(J. R. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998, p. 5), while “procedural knowledge is
knowledge that we display in our behavior but that we are not conscious of.
Procedural knowledge basically specifies how to bring declarative memory to
bear in solving problems” (ibid). Declarative knowledge resides in declarative
memory and is represented as memory units called chunks, “configurations of
various things we know” (ibid). Chunks have been referred to as productions
in earlier versions of the model. Chunks have slots and associated values; a
chunk interassociates these values with certain associative strengths. For ex-
ample, the chunk representing the fact that the sum of three and four equals
seven can be textually represented as follows:
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Chunk
is a ADDITION FACT
addend1 Three
addend2 Four
sum Seven
In this case, the chunk has four slots (is a, addend1, addend2 and sum)
that hold the corresponding values.
Procedural knowledge resides in procedural memory and is represented
as production rules. Each production is an IF-THEN pair where the IF parts
specifies the condition in which the production becomes active and the THEN
part specifies what to do. Apart from declarative and procedural memory,
the ACT-R 4.0 model also includes a goal stack from which the current (sub-)
goal of the cognitive process can be obtained. This current goal directs the
actions of the procedural memory. The flow of information through the
modules is presented in Figure 2.5; compare Anderson and Lebiere (1998)
for further information.
Figure 2.5: Flow of information among the various modules of the ACT-R 4.0
model (adapted with permission from J. R. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998, p. 11).
Copyright 1998 From The atomic components of thought by John Robert
Anderson and Christian Lebiere. Reproduced by permission of Routledge,
Inc., a division of Informa plc.
While the fourth version of the model focuses on the cognitive processes,
the fifth version of the architecture (J. R. Anderson et al., 2004) is heavily
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linked to neurobiological findings and brain region activity. It is intended to
explain human cognition in general, i.e. knowledge acquisition, knowledge
application, goal setting, and acting. It postulates the visual module as the
key sensory module, although aural modules are also mentioned (note the
similarity to Engelkamp’s model in Section 2.3.2, which also assumes inde-
pendent sensory and motor modules). Sensory modules take in information
from the environment. Manual modules control hand movements and allow
interacting with the environment. Apart from these modules, there are two
other modules that interact with the environment without direct access to it:
the intentional module and the declarative module. The intentional module
or goal module keeps track of current goals and intentions; the declarative
module retrieves information from memory. The declarative module can thus
be seen as the long-term declarative memory. Each of the four introduced
modules possess a buffer that makes one informational unit from the module
(a chunk, see above) available to the central production system, which is at
the centre of the ACT-R 5.0 model. The interaction of these buffers through
application of production rules determines cognition (J. R. Anderson et al.,
2004, p. 1038). The central production system is where the production rules
reside and is thus the procedural memory of the suggested architecture. The
central production system holds the production rules and further consists of
three sub-sections or functions:
• Pattern matching: match the declarative chunks in the buffers with a
production rule in the central production system
• Action selection: A form of conflict resolution: a “winner-lose-all”-
system inhibits neurons representing the selected action, “which then
no longer inhibit the thalamus from producing the action” (J. R. An-
derson et al., 2004, p. 1038).
• Controlling the execution of production rules
All of the buffers, all of the components of the production system and all
modules except for the intentional module (so far unidentified) are mapped
to specific brain regions according to current neuroscientific findings: The
declarative module is located in the temporal regions of the hippocampus,
its buffer is associated with the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). The
goal buffer, responsible for keeping track of of the state of a problem solution,
is associated with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), whereas the
manual module and buffer are associated with the motor areas of the cerebel-
lum. The visual module is associated with the occipital areas of the brain, its
buffer with the parietal areas. “The basal ganglia and associated connections
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are thought to implement production rules in ACT-R” (J. R. Anderson et
al., 2004, p. 1038), pattern matching is associated with the striatum, action
selection with the pallidum and the control of execution with the thalamus.
Figure 2.6 presents an overview of ACT-R 5.0.
Figure 2.6: The organization of information in ACT-R 5.0 (adapted with
permission from J. R. Anderson et al., 2004, p. 1037). c© 2008 American
Psycholoical Association. DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, VLPFC
= ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
ACT-R 5.0 is capable of combining a unified theory of cognition with cur-
rent neurobiological findings with regard to brain functions. Furthermore, it
led to the improvement of the ACT-R framework formal computer computer
language that allows the creation of specific ACT-R models for specific cog-
nitive tasks and produces predictions which can than be compared to empiric
data. This has been successfully done for various domains (J. R. Anderson
et al., 2004), but the creation of such models is still restricted to tasks that
are clearly structured and have a predictable course of action.
One important aspect in the context of this thesis is the fact that in the
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ACT-R model, declarative knowledge elements (or the declrative chunks pro-
vided by the declarative buffer) are associated with other declarative knowl-
edge elements and goals through productions that fire on recognizing fitting
chunks. This leads to the assumption that a larger repertoire of production
rules or differing patterns of behaviour leads to a higher degree of connect-
edness between declarative knowledge elements.
All in all, propositional representation systems and rule-based representa-
tional models describe individual knowledge representations and knowledge
processes on a higher level than the models in the previous section. Note
that a network organization of knowledge is central to all models that have
been described so far.
2.5 Structural Knowledge
Since network organization is a central characteristic underlying the models
discussed, its organization is introduced as an independent characteristic of
knowledge: Structural Knowledge. It is “[...] the knowledge of how concepts
are interrelated” (Jonassen, Beissner, & Yacci, 1993, p. 4). It is a “[...]
hypothetical construct referring to the organization of the relationships of
concepts in long-term memory” (Shavelson, 1972, p. 226-227, quoted after
Jonassen et al., 1993). The authors further state:
“Structural Knowledge is also known as cognitive structure, the
pattern of relationships among concepts in memory (Preece, 1976)
[...]. Structural knowledge has also been referred to as internal
connectedness, integrative understanding or conceptual knowl-
edge” (Jonassen et al., 1993, p. 4f).
This conceptual structure facilitates between declarative and procedural knowl-
edge and thus conditions the acquisition of procedural knowledge. “Declara-
tive knowledge is comprised of the knowledge of the terms within a domain,
but does not imply understanding. Procedural knowledge is knowledge ap-
plication characterized by cognitive activities such as solving problems, for-
mulating plans, and making arguments. Structural knowledge provides the
integration and organization of declarative knowledge in such a manner to be
accessible to procedural knowledge applications” (Hoole, 2006, p. 2). Thus,
structural knowledge is seen as a link between knowing that (declarative
knowledge) and knowing how (procedural knowledge). It has also been re-
ferred to as knowing why (Hoole, 2006; Jonassen et al., 1993). “Structural
knowledge is thought to mediate the transition in learning from knowing
about a domain, to application of knowledge in the domain” (Hoole, 2006,
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p. 2). According to Jonassen et al. (1993), blanks within cognitive schemata
are references to other schemata. In this way, the interrelations between
cognitive schemata can be seen as a semantic network with schemata as
nodes. This view is consistent with Quillian’s concept of semantic memory
that represents concepts as nodes and the relationship between concepts as
links (Quillian, 1988). It is also consistent with the ACT-R theory that was
introduced in the previous section.
Jonassen et al. (1993) assume that structural knowledge is always ex-
plicit, i.e. the connections between concepts can always be expressed. How-
ever, there are empirical findings indicating structural knowledge can be
non-explicit. Rothe and Warning (1991) tried to elicitate the structural
knowledge of experts in a limited specified knowledge domain through the
structure-laying technique (Scheele & Groeben, 1984, compare Section 3.5.2).
It turned out that the number of nodes and their labels were similar among
participants while the labelling of the edges with Klix’s standard semantic
relations (Klix, 1984), differed to a great extent. Rothe and Warning con-
cluded that their participants generally had substantial difficulties in naming
the edges between knowledge nodes. This leads to the assumption that ac-
cess to structural knowledge can be implicit in Tulving’s sense, i.e. present
but not consciously accessed.
In their theory of implicit and explicit knowledge, Dienes and Perner
(1999) also support this notion by introducing the term “structure implic-
itness” (p. 740). It refers to a representation where “...concepts acquired
incidentally and nonstrategically may have nondecomposable atomic repre-
sentations in which the property structure is represented implicitly” (ibid, p.
740). “Explicit knowledge can be a representation of compounds (typically:
compound properties) that leaves the structure of its components implicit”
(ibid).
This assumption is supported by Davis, Curtis and Tschetter (2003) who
assume that the elicitation of structural knowledge (structural assessment)
also captures non-explicit knowledge. The authors state that tacit knowledge
is comprised of the subtle interrelations between concepts and explicitly in-
dicate the possibility of measuring at least a part of tacit knowledge by
structural assessment. Lee, Choi and Choe (2002) follow this approach by
attempting to capture the organizational members’ tacit knowledge through
knowledge structure elicitation techniques.
To sum up, the connections in semantic memory can be interpreted as an
independent type of knowledge (structural knowledge). They can be accessed
either consciously or unconsciously and can thus be non-explicit. Structural
knowledge can be elicited through several different methods, which are de-
scribed in detail in Chapter 3.
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2.6 Dimensional Model of Knowledge Types
After all different conceptions of implicit and explicit memory, and implicit,
explicit and tacit knowledge have been introduced, they are connected to each
other in a single model. In order to do so, the dimensional model of knowl-
edge codifiability presented earlier is replaced by a more detailed model by
the end of this section, which is based on Schindler (2002) who states that
the transition between explicit and non-explicit knowledge is fluid. In his
model (compare Figure 2.7), the right pole of the dimension is assigned to
non-articulable tacit knowledge that includes capabilities such as maintain-
ing balance and face recognition. This corresponds to purely sensory-motor
memory contents in Engelkamp and Zimmer’s model and some motor out-
puts in the ACT-R model (see above). Schindler takes the next two sections
of his dimension from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995):
“[...] tacit knowledge can be segmented into two dimensions. The
first is the technical dimension, which encompasses the kind of
informal and hard-to-pin-down skills or crafts captured in the
term ‘know-how’. [...] At the same time tacit knowledge contains
an important cognitive dimension. It consists of schemata, mental
models, beliefs, and perceptions so ingrained that we take them
for granted” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8).
Thus the technical dimension corresponds to procedural knowledge in the
non-reflexive memory system in Tulving’s model (compare Figure 2.3). It
is acquired through motor skill learning for which well-established theories
exist (Fitts & Posner, 1979). The third part of Schindler’s dimensional model
of non-explicit knowledge model corresponds to the cognitive dimension of
tacit knowledge (compare Figure 2.4), which can be associated with different
information flows in the ACT-R 4.0 and 5.0 models without actions into
the external world. This includes procedure compilation from declarative
to production memory, goal transformations, and retrieval requests to the
declarative memory module.
As noted earlier, implicit and explicit memory can be seen as different
ways of retreival: conscious and unconscious. This is also formulated in
the ACT-R model: “procedural knowledge is knowledge that we display in
our behavior but that we are not conscious of” (J. R. Anderson & Lebiere,
1998). At the same time, it was stated that knowledge can be articulated in
varying degrees (see above). Both features can be seen as dimensions that
span an area, onto which the different knowledge types can be mapped. This
knowledge map also allows the inclusion of Nonaka and Polanyi’s concepts
that span several knowledge types.
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Figure 2.7: Dimensional knowledge classification according to Schindler
(2002)
With reference to the different types of knowledge introduced in previous
sections, Polanyi’s tacit knowledge can be equated with embodied knowledge.
Polanyi made no reference to conscious or unconscious use; he only referred
to knowledge that cannot be articulated.
Li and Gao (2003) stress that Nonaka’s concept of tacit knowledge ex-
tends beyond Polanyi’s view (see above). It is thus assumed that it is Non-
aka’s cognitive part of tacit knowledge that surpasses Polanyi and that it
does include all unconscious uses of memory, independent of the fact that
they could possibly be verbalized. In this way, unconscious access to struc-
tural knowledge and weak declarative knowledge would be mapped to Non-
aka’s concept of tacit knowledge, but not to that of Polanyi. This assump-
tion is supported by the fact that Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) assume that
non-explicit knowledge elements can be made explicit through appropriate
techniques.
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), explicit knowledge can always
be verbalized. Since verbalization requires conscious access to memory con-
tents, declarative knowledge in Tulving’s model (both semantic and episodic),
declarative knowledge in the ACT-R model, and the conscious use of struc-
tural knowledge can be connected with this concept. The model is summa-
rized in Figure 2.8. It turns out that constructs from non-psychological fields
such as economics and organization theory literature are not contradictory
to findings from memory research and other fields of psychological research.
They integrate several constructs in a way that does seem suitable in prac-
tice. Both Nonaka and Takeuchi’s constructs of tacit and explicit knowledge
can be linked to an empirically founded basis.
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Figure 2.8: Extended dimensional model of knowledge types
2.7 Knowledge and Intelligence
As the terms knowledge and intelligence are used differently in this work, the
concepts of knowledge and intelligence need to be circumscribed. Because
intelligence is a debated construct (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), this section
does not and cannot claim to report the entirety of intelligence research but
will rather outline the mainstream findings, sketch a recent model and report
the interconnection between knowledge and intelligence.
A task force of the American Psychologists Association (APA) consisting
of eleven scholars from the field of intelligence research developed a definition
of intelligence that was intended to capture the common denominator of the
concept in science:
Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand
complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn
from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to over-
come obstacles by taking thought. Although these individual
differences can be substantial, they are never entirely consistent:
a given person’s intellectual performance will vary on different
occasions, in different domains, as judged by different criteria.
Concepts of “intelligence” are attempts to clarify and organize
2.7 Knowledge and Intelligence 27
this complex set of phenomena (Neisser et al., 1996, p. 77).
In a similar attempt, 52 scientists signed the definition of intelligence that
was published in Intelligence in 1997:
“A very general mental capability that, among other things, in-
volves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly,
comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experi-
ence. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or
test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capa-
bility for comprehending our surroundings – ‘catching on’, ‘mak-
ing sense’ of things, or ‘figuring out what to do’ ” (Gottfredson,
1997, p. 13).
Apart from these rather general specifications, the APA task force agrees
that there are different subtests or scales of different intelligence tests that
display different levels of positive intercorrelations. Spearman (1927) showed
that in such sets of positive correlations, some portion of the variance of
scores on each test can be mathematically attributed to a general factor
(g). However, there is disagreement on what this finding means: “It has
been described as a mere statistical regularity (Thomson, 1939), a kind of
mental energy (Spearman, 1927), a generalized abstract reasoning ability
(Gustafsson, 1984), or an index measure of neural processing speed (Reed &
Jensen, 1992)” (Neisser et al., 1996, p. 78).
Thus, different models of intelligence have postulated different kinds of
relationships among specific and general abilities that constitute intelligence.
Some models assume hierarchical relationship between them; others assume
multiple facets or factors of equal importance. An example for a hierarchi-
cal model is Vernon’s hierarchical group factor theory of the structure of
human intellectual abilities (Vernon, 1950). At the top of this hierarchy is
Spearman’s general factor (g), which accounts for the largest source of the
variance in intelligence. Below g, Vernon placed several major, minor and
specific group factors. Because Vernon’s theory accounted for a general fac-
tor and group factors, it was seen as a reconciliation between Spearman’s two
factor theory (1927), postulating a general factor g and other task-specific
factors (s) that did not have group factors, and Thurstone’s multiple factor
theory (1938) that did not have a general factor.
Based on the factor analysis method that he developed, Thurstone claimed
that g was an artefact resulting from the early factorial approaches that had
been used to study it by Spearman (Ruzgis, 1994) and claimed that intel-
ligent behaviour is not based on a general factor g, but on seven orthogo-
nal constructs that he referred to as primary abilities: word fluency, verbal
28 The Concept of Knowledge
comprehension, spatial visualization, number facility, associative memory,
reasoning, and perceptual speed.
Hierarchical and primary factor models can be integrated into models
conceptualizing intelligence as a hierarchy of different abilities on differing
levels of generality that can be mapped to different modalities (Süß, 1996).
According to Sternberg (1982), such models represent the highest state of
evolution in intelligence research. An example of such an integrated model is
the Berlin Intelligence Structure model as applied in the Berlin Intelligence
Structure (BIS) Test (Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997). The BIS is based on
three core assumptions:
1. Multifactorial determination: all intellectual capabilities are responsi-
ble for all intelligent performances but with varying levels of contribu-
tions.
2. Multiple modalities: Intelligent performances and abilities can be clas-
sified under certain aspects, referred to as modalities. So far, two
modalities are specified: Content and operations.
3. Hierarchy: Intelligence can be differentiated into abilities of different
degrees of generality.
At the most general level, general intelligence (GI) is postulated as an integral
of all ability components. Below, there are the two categories Operations and
Content. Operations are differentiated into four subcategories, Contents in
two. Ability constructs are classified as follows (The labeling capital letters
stem from the German titles of the scales, compare Jäger et al., 1997, p. 5):
K Reasoning: Computation of complex information in tasks that are not
solvable at first go, but require the creation of multiple connections
and analogies, exact logical thinking and appropriate assessment of
information
E Imaginativeness: flexible production of ideas, availability of diverse
information, a vast scope of imaginations and the conideration of many
different sides, aspects, reasons, and possibilities of objects or problems
M Retentiveness: active memorization and short-term reproduction or
recognition of material
B Processing speed: speed of mental processing, speed of comprehension
and power of concentration in the solution of simple structured tasks
of low difficulty
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These abilities can be applied to three different kinds of contents: Nu-
meric, verbal and pictographic. This could theoretically lead to twelve differ-
ent abilities, but at the current state of model development, the performances
in the four operations is assigned to the cells as some research issues are still
in progress (Süß, 1996). Figure 2.9 illustrates the model.
Figure 2.9: Berlin structural intelligence model (Jäger et al., 1997)
This model shows that intelligent mental operations require some form of
content to work on, and this content usually consists of things we know. In-
telligence and knowledge are thus intertwined: The fact that both abovemen-
tioned definitions of intelligence include references to knowledge acquisition
underlines the fact that intelligence conditions knowledge acquisition and
knowledge application (see also Süß, 1996). This assumption is also backed
by the finding that intellectual abilities do not directly influence the results of
problem solving, but are preconditions for the acquisition and application of
relevant knowledge and/or expertise. Schmidt (1992) reports a path model
that can be interpreted as a model of expertise acquisition (Süß, 1996) that
backs this assumption. It asserts that general intelligence does not directly
influence supervisory ratings of job performance, but influences the acqui-
sition of job knowledge (r = .46) which again correlates with supervisory
ratings at r = .34. According to the American Psychologists Association,
“across a wide range of occupations, intelligence test performance accounts
for some 29% of the variance in job performance” (Neisser et al., 1996, p.
83).
All in all, intelligence is very general mental capability that, among other
things, conditions the acquisition and application of knowledge and thus
accounts for a significant explanation of variance in job performance.
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2.8 Summary and Research Assumptions
In this chapter, the concepts of knowledge and different knowledge types have
been introduced. Knowledge in general has been defined as a set of structural
connectivity patters that have proven to be viable for the attainment of
certain goals. The terms explicit and tacit/implicit knowledge have been
introduced: explicit knowledge is produced through words, tacit, sometimes
used synonymously with implicit, through action that cannot be articulated
or is at least difficult to articulate.
Since individual knowledge resides in individual long-term memory, dif-
ferent memory models and the neurobiological foundation of memory were
introduced. Tulving’s content-related memory model distinguishes between
the declarative memory system that includes memory for facts and the own
biography, and the reflexive memory system that includes priming, condition-
ing and procedural memory for actions. Engelkamp’s multi-modal memory
model can explain how memories can be connected to motor programs with-
out conscious access to the memory, a phenomenon that is referred to as
embodied knowledge.
Experiments from the field of artificial grammar learning lead to the as-
sumption that implicit memory processes are phylogenetically older than ex-
plicit memory processes but have also led to the criticism that different forms
of knowledge can be made responsible for a dissociation between a (success-
ful) action and a subject’s inability to verbalize the cause and conditions for
these actions. Thus, implicit memory has been coined as unconscious ac-
cess to memory content, including non-verbalizable content, whereas explicit
memory refers to conscious access to memory regardless of the type of con-
tent. Further cognitive knowledge representation models such as chunks and
procedures were introduced in the Section on the ACT-R model. It assumes
that declarative chunks are associated with each other through productions.
Thus, the concept of structural knowledge was introduced, a type of
knowledge that refers to the internal connectedness of knowledge elements
in the cognitive system. Different concepts for memory and knowledge have
then been placed into a two-dimensional model with the dimensions “codi-
fiability” (from not codifiable to codifiable) and “consciousness of use” (no
use – unconscious use – conscious use). It has been shown that groups of
memory concepts that are placed into this system can be mapped to the
broader terms tacit, implicit, and explicit knowledge as employed by man-
agement science. In this view, Nonaka’s notion of the cognitive dimension
of tacit knowledge, synonymous with implicit knowledge, is mapped to un-
conscious access to structural and declarative knowledge. This classification
leads to the research assumption that a fraction of individual implicit knowl-
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edge – unconscious access to structural knowledge – can be psychometrically
assessed through structural knowledge elicitation techniques (this will be fur-
ther elaborated in the following chapters).
Apart from the memory model, intelligence has been introduced as a
mental capability responsible for acquisition and application of knowledge of
different forms.
Chapter 3
Elicitation and Representation
of Structural Knowledge
The promise of the dimensional framework outlined in Chapter 2 lies in its
inherent possibility to empirically evaluate knowledge-based activities that
target individual non-explicit knowledge through structural assessment, as an
increase in non-explicit knowledge should also lead to an increase in struc-
tural knowledge. This possibility justifies further investigations based on
the proposed framework. In this chapter, existing approaches for knowledge
elicitation are presented and evaluated, which leads to the development of
an own approach for structural knowledge elicitation. This approach, the
Association Structure Test, combines two existing techniques into one new
computer-based structural knowledge assessment tool. The chapter closes
with hypothesis on the connection between AST scores and knowledge-based
performance.
3.1 Graph Representations of Knowledge Net-
works
There are a number of empirical studies that try to assess, elicit and mea-
sure individual structural knowledge (M. A. Davis et al., 2003; Eckert, 1998a;
Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990; Goldsmith, Johnson, & Acton, 1991; Jonassen,
1993; Jonassen et al., 1993; Lee et al., 2002; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985; Schvan-
eveldt, 1990). In all of these studies, a different approach to knowledge elici-
tation is employed, but the semantic structure of individual knowledge within
a specified domain is always represented as a graph or network. Graphs have
been used to formalize network-theoretic models of knowledge organization
in the past (Rost, 1980; Sugiyama, 2002). In order to employ graph repre-
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sentations of structural knowledge in the further course of this thesis, the
following definitions from graph theory are introduced (based on Bonato,
1990):
Definition 1 A graph or undirected graph G is an ordered pair G := (V,E)
where V is a finite non-empty set of so-called vertices or nodes and E is a
finite non-empty set of unordered pairs of distinct vertices, called edges or
lines. The order of a graph is its number of vertices |V |. The size of a graph
is its number of edges |E|. The degree of a vertex is the number of other
vertices it is connected to by edges.
Definition 2 A directed graph or digraph G is an ordered pair G := (V,A)
where V is a finite non-empty set of vertices or nodes and A is a finite non-
empty set of ordered pairs of distinct vertices, called directed edges, arcs, or
arrows. An arc e = (x, y) is considered to be directed from x to y. The arc
(x, y) is called the inverse of the arc (y, x). The indegree δ−G(v) of a vertex v
in graph G is the number of arcs from other nodes to v, the outdegree δ+G(v)
is the number of arcs from v to other nodes.
Definition 3 A labeled graph G = (V,E, LV , LE) consists of a finite non-
empty set V of vertices, a finite non-empty set E of edges, a label function
LV that maps nodes to labels (LV : V → {labels}) and a label function LE
that maps edges to labels (LE : E → {labels}).
Definition 4 A path p in a graph is a sequence of pairwise different vertices
p = v1...vn such that vi, vi+1 ∈ E, i.e. from each of its vertices there is an
edge to the next vertex in the sequence. We say p connects v1 with vn. The
length of a path p is defined as its number vertices minus one.
Definition 5 The distance dG(u, v) between two (not necessary distinct)
vertices u and v in a graph G is the length of a shortest path between them.
If u and v are identical, their distance is 0. If no path connecting u and v
exists, dG(u, v) =∞.
Definition 6 The eccentricity εG(v) of a vertex v in a graph G is the maxi-
mum distance from v to any other vertex. The diameter diam(G) of a graph
G is the maximum eccentricity over all vertices in a graph; the radius rad(G),
the minimum.
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3.2 Knowledge Elicitation Techniques
According to Jonassen, Yacci and Beissner (1993), the assessment of struc-
tural knowledge leads to a structural representation of knowledge (e. g., a
graph) and consists of three stages which each have certain techniques asso-
ciated to them: Knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, and knowl-
edge comparison. In their view, the most effective and established techniques
for the first stage, structural knowledge elicitation, are word associations and
similarity ratings. In the second stage, knowledge representation, elicited
knowledge is represented in a structural way. According to Jonassen et al.,
tree construction, pathfinder networks, and dimensional representations have
proven to be viable measures for the performance of this task.
In the third stage, structural knowledge is assessed; “learners’ knowl-
edge representations are typically compared with the teacher’s, an expert’s,
or some content representation” (Jonassen et al., 1993, p. 23). However,
methods for eliciting, representing and assessing structural knowledge are
presented in the following without a strict difference between elicitation and
representation, because usually, certain elicitation techniques are inseper-
ably connecteed wth certain representational formats. For example, the
pathfinder approach combines a specific elicitation technique (similarity rat-
ings) with a specific representation (PFNETs) and a specific measure for
comparison (C). Accordingly, other researchers have not employed a strict
distinction between the above three steps, but have classified methods for
structural knowledge assessment in a holistic way. Bonato (1990) introduces
interview techniques, card-sorting tasks, MDS scaling procedures, and con-
cept grids as methods for conceptual structure assessment. Hoole (2006) lists
loud thinking, questionnaires, sorting and rating tasks, association tasks,
and mapping techniques, i.e. concept mapping, as methods for data gen-
eration on individual knowledge. The methods which are mentioned by all
three authors (Bonato, 1990; Hoole, 2006; Jonassen et al., 1993) are Card-
sorting tasks, Interview methods, word association techniques, and mapping
or scaling techniques. In the following sections, specific adaptions of these
techniques are presented and discussed. Each technique is classified accord-
ing to Hoole’s (2006) classification of structural assessment techniques. It
states that the methods for elicitation of structural knowledge differ with
regard to three dimensions: (1) The amount of required conscious processing
(card sorts and similarity ratings require more processing than word asso-
ciations and catigorial judgments), (2) the degrees of freedom in knowledge
element elicitation (limited or free) and (3) the amount of hierarchy inherit
in the structural representation of knowledge: Word association and category
judgments assume a hierarchical representation of knowledge (i.e., a directed
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graph), card sorts and similarity rating tasks do not assume a hierarchic
structure and allow a variety of representations.
Eckert (1998b, p. 66) classifies such procedures for graphical knowledge
representations on two dimensions: testform and content. Testform describes
the instruction and the media employed (e. g. paper vs. computer) while test
content indicates the degrees of freedom with reference to the assignment of
concepts and edge labels by a participant (compare table 3.1). This is similar
to the category “Cuedness of recall” in Hoole’s framework (compare section
3.2).
Table 3.1: Eckert’s classification of procedures for knowledge representation
(Eckert, 1998b, p. 66)
Relations
Free Given
Concepts Free I. Quadrant II. Quadrant
Given III. Quadrant IV. Quadrant
Combining both Eckert’s and Hoole’s classifications, one can basically
ask three questions with regard to elicitation techniques: How are knowledge
elements between which a structure is assumed elicited, how is the structure
between these elements elicited and how is the complete structure assessed?
Both elicitation of knowledge elements and structure can be assessed in terms
of the amount of required conscious processing, the available degrees of free-
dom (i.e. whether cued or free), and in terms of test form. Additionally, the
elicitation of structure can be classified in hierarchical and nonhierarchical
(see above). For the assessment of the overall structure, it can be determined
whether quantifiable coefficients are available for structural knowledge assess-
ment. The combined classification is presented in Table 3.2, along with the
techniques that will be presented in this chapter.
3.3 Knowledge Elicitation without Structural
Representation
Structural knowledge elicitation techniques aim at the representation of knowl-
edge structure (Jonassen et al., 1993). However, some of the abovementioned
techniques do not initially produce a structural representation in the sense
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Table 3.2: Classification of structural knowledge elicitation techniques.
Elicitation of Edges
Elicitation
method
Elicitation
of vertices
Labels Hier-
archy
Coefficients Test
form
Conscious
processing
Word as-
sociations
Free (associ-
ations)
– – # of associa-
tions
Paper
or Com-
puter
High
Free term
entry
Free (associ-
ations)
Binary
(Yes/No)
No # of Clusters Computer High
Card sort-
ing
None
(given)
Binary
(Yes/No)
No None Paper Low
Concept
Grids
Cued Weights No None Computer High
Concept
Maps
Free (associ-
ations)
Freely
labeled
Yes None Computer High
SLT Free (associ-
ations)
From
set
Yes Many
(Bonato,
1990)
Paper High
MaNET None
(given)
From
set
Yes Many
(Eckert,
1998b)
Computer High
Graph
Building
None
(given)
Weights Yes Euclidean
distances
Paper Low
PFNET None
(given)
Weights Yes Similarity C Computer Low
AST Free (associ-
ations)
Weights No Many (Sec-
tion 3.9)
Computer High/Low
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that they produce a network but produce a more coarse structural represen-
tation, e.g. clusters or groups. Since some of them provide basic or further
information to other measures, they are of importance in structural assess-
ment and are thus presented.
3.3.1 Word associations
Word associations belong to the set of recall techniques. “Recall techniques,
whether cued or free, allow knowledge structures to emerge without con-
straining the individuals to a fixed list of concepts.... [T]hese procedures
provide information such as the amount of organization as well as the depth
of given structure....” (M. A. Davis et al., 2003, p. 203). In a word asso-
ciation task, participants have to produce associations to a given stimulus
word representing the knowledge domain; the associated concepts have to
be related to that domain. In Hoole’s (2006) classification, word associa-
tion tasks require little conscious processing, they lead to a non-hierarchic
representation and the cuedness of recall is either fixed or free, depending
on the mode of the task: Strube (1985) differentiates between verbal and
written representation and recording of concepts and between cued or free
associations. In free associations, all concepts coming to the mind can be
associated spontaneously, while cued associations involve limits with regard
to certain semantic relations to the stimulus concept. Although the number
of association a participant produces for a given stimulus may indicate his
or her magnitude of knowledge (Ceglarek, forthcoming), the amount of ob-
tainable structural information from word association tasks is limited as the
sequence of words is a one-dimensional form of data.
Jonassen, Yacci and Beissner (1993) see word association tasks primar-
ily as a measure for elicitating concepts that are then subjected to further
methods in order to determine a structural information. As a single method,
word associations are unsuitable for the creation of knowledge structures, as
they do not produce enough information for the creation of a network rep-
resentation of knowledge; they can only represent knowledge structures as a
chain where the concepts are placed in a row after each other in accordance
to their occurrence in the flow of associations.
Free term entry
Strube (1984) suggested a mechanism to derive structural information from
word associations by analyzing the time sequence in which word associations
were uttered by experiment participants. He employed this information to
cluster the associated contecpts into groups. A more recent example of such
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a method was presented by Beatty and colleagues (Beatty, 2000; Beatty &
Gerace, 2002; Beatty, Gerace, & Dufresne, 2002). They employed Strube’s
technique in the following way: “Each response is recorded along with the
time spent thinking of and typing it, in an attempt to capture the flow of con-
cepts triggered in each participant’s mind” (Beatty & Gerace, 2002, p. 751).
Plotting the recorded thinking times between associations reveals typical
characteristics (Beatty & Gerace, 2002): Associated terms that are semanti-
cally close follow quickly after each other, while a long thinking time between
associations will typically indicate a smaller semantic similarity. This idea
is based on the theory of spreading activation (J. R. Anderson, 1983), which
again assumes a semantic network storage system for memory. The theory
of spreading activation states that in a semantic network, the activation of a
node (knowledge element or proposition) iteratively propagates out to adja-
cent nodes. Thus, activation of a concept will most likely activate an adjacent
(= semantically close) concept, while a long thinking time is associated with
a longer propagation of the spreading activity through the network. In his
experiments with physics students, Beatty (2002) reported that his partic-
ipants would typically provide him with clusters of terms that would come
very quickly, interrupted by longer thinking times. Over time, these peaks
in thinking times that separate terms that follow each other quickly would
increase in length, whereas intra-cluster thinking times also increase. Figure
3.1 displays a typical pattern of thinking times between associations over
time.
It is Beatty’s explicit aim to elicit “the structure of interconnections be-
tween knowledge elements.... the conceptual knowledge structure” (2002, p.
3) through this technique. They hope to achieve this task by assuming “that
the duration of pauses between term entries, and the grouping of term en-
tries into clusters separated by longer follow periods, can reveal information
about what terms a subject associates closely” (Beatty et al., 2002, p. 5).
In Hoole’s classification, the free term entry has the same characteristics as
uncued word association tasks.
Although this approach is appealing due to its closeness to the partic-
ipant’s actual state of knowledge and because it does not operate on pre-
specified concepts, but on the participants’ own associations, it is unable to
reveal a structure in the actual meaning of the word as the resulting data,
clusters of associated terms, is one-dimensional in nature (Beatty et al., 2002,
p. 5). Other approaches have attempted to represent elicited knowledge as
network structures in order to assess qualities of knowledge organization;
examples are presented in the next sections.
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Figure 3.1: Participant01’s thinking times between term associations in
Beatty’s first study (Beatty et al., 2002, p. 7). Reprinted with author’s
permission. The FTE approach would group the first 12 associated concepts
into one cluster. Reprinted with permission.
3.3.2 Card sorting
According to Jonassen, Yacci and Beissener (1993), card sorting techniques
“can be used to identify how concepts in a context are organized in a learner’s
knowledge structure” (p. 45). In card sorting, participants are presented with
a set of cards containing words and, optionally, a brief definition. Partici-
pants are then asked to sort the cards into stacks or groups according to
their similarity and to label these groups (Hirshman & Wallendorf, 1982).
The assessment of groups and their associated titles can reveal qualitative
features of a participant’s knowledge organization on group level. In Hoole’s
framework of structure elicitation techniques, card sorts require a high degree
of conscious processing, they are based on cued recall and do not lead to a
hierarchical representation of structural knowledge.
It is also possible to represent card sorting results as a graph by treating
concepts as nodes and by placing an edge between two nodes if they were
placed in the same group. However, this procedure will not lead to a con-
nected graph encompassing all concepts but to several undirected unweighted
graphs – one for each group – that each include the concepts from one group.
Thus, a graph representation in this case does not reveal more information
than the stacks of cards. This could be changed by altering the instructions
in such a way that participants form sub categories with their stack of cards
which would lead to a connected and hierarchical graph representations of
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the concepts.
3.3.3 Summary
The three abovementioned techniques – word associations, free term entry
and card sorting – are among the simpler techniques for knowledge elicitation.
The first two produce a serial flow of concepts that the participant assumes
to be related to a given knowledge domain. Except for card sorting, they
do not produce a structure in terms of a graph representation (other than a
line).
Card sort creates a graph-representation of knowledge structure but also
has its shortcomings, because the method does not account for different asso-
ciation strengths between two concepts (concepts are either related or not).
While the first two techniques might well serve as techniques for generating
concepts for structural assessment, neither of them appears to be adequate
for carrying out the complete task. However, the free term entry method has
one advantage that does deserve a special mention: It tries to derive struc-
tural information implicitly through reaction times, while card sorts rely on
explicit judgments of relatedness. The indirectness of the deduction of a
coarse structure through reaction times has undergone little further research
since its publication and seems promising for further evaluation.
3.4 Concept Grids
Concept grids or the Repertory Grid Interview is a procedure that combines
interview techniques with a structural approach and is used for knowledge
elicitation for expert system design (Bonato, 1990; Clases, 2007; Fromm,
2004). It is based on Kelly’s (1955) personal construct psychology (PCP),
which is used as a method for eliciting personal construct systems.
Construct systems are a set of bipolar dimensions used to classify subjec-
tive perception of the environment. According to Kelly (1955), every object
entering cognition is classified among a certain set of constructs (e. g. in-
tellectual/not intellectual or critical/accepting when assessing a co-worker).
Construct systems are used to make predictions about future events or states.
Kelly sees this anticipation and prediction of events as the main driver of the
mind in order to better predict actions of other people.
Kelly developed a technique for the elicitation of personal construct sys-
tems, the Repertory Grid Interview. A repertory grid is a matrix where rows
represent constructs (the opposing poles describing the construct are placed
on opposing sides of each row), and columns represent objects, typically other
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individuals, that are rated on each construct. The cells of the matrix indi-
cate the rating of an object on a particular construct. Ratings can be either
nominal (high/low) or ordinal (a number indicating the position of an object
on the construct).
In the repertory grid interview, constructs are elicited in an indirect way
by firstly asking the interviewee to name a set of important people he or
she considers of high importance to him or herself. The interviewee is then
presented with a triplet from this set and is asked to name a feature that only
two of the three persons possess. The shared feature is used as the construct
and the feature that differentiates the third person is used as its contrast. In
a final step, all other persons from the set are rated on the construct-contrast
dimension by the interviewee.
Kelly’s interest was primarily in the clinical field, but the repertory grid
interview has been recommended as knowledge elicitation tool by several
researchers (compare Gaines & Shaw, 1992). The computer-based AQUINAS
expertise transfer system (Boose, 1985; Boose & Bradshaw, 1987) uses the
Repertory Grid Interview to elicit expert knowledge; cluster analyses identify
construct hierarchies and are thus capable of delivering a knowledge structure
(Bonato, 1990, p. 23).
Accordingly, Repertory Grid Interviews have recently been suggested as
a method for implicit knowledge elicitation by Clases (2007). He argues that
implicit knowledge is “an integral part of symbolically mediated social prac-
tice thus seeing the implicit and the explicit as closely connected in human
discourse, bridging individual and social aspects of knowledge” (Clases, 2007,
p. 286). Since social practice is mediated by construct systems, he contin-
ues, repertory grids are capable of tapping into the implicit dimension of
knowledge.
In Hoole’s framework, the repertory grid interview can be classified in the
following way: it requires a high level of conscious processing, involves cued
recall and leads to a non-hierarchic structure.
Disadvantages
Construct grids refer to fundamental underlying constructs of an individual.
The theory of these constructs as put forward by Kelly (see above) is dif-
ficult to relate to the notion of structural knowledge, because it bears no
explicit reference to concepts such as declarative, procedural, or structural
knowledge. As constructs are thought to guide our assessment of objects
in cognition, an unconscious process according to Kelly (1955), constructs in
this sense appear to lie deeper in the cognitive system then memory contents,
or, in the wording of the dimensional model, are placed further towards un-
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codifiable on the codifiability axis than structural knowledge in Jonassen’s
sense (compare Section 2.5). According to the way Kelly (1955) put it, and
also in the sense employed by Clases (2007), constructs are more about views
of the world or views of objects than knowledge of fact and procedures. Fur-
thermore, construct systems are difficult to elicitate as they require an own
interview technique.
After their elicitation, individual construct systems are subjected to a
multidimensional scaling technique (for a example, see Clases, 2007). The
resulting form is not a graph, but a planar space on which constructs are
placed, and vicinity between constructs and objects indicates relatedness.
The aim of these representations is to identify meaningful dimensions that
can account for the differing distributions. Thus, the aim is not the elicitation
of structure itself, but the identification of factors that led to the identified
construct structure.
Because of its conceptual distance from the concept of structural knowl-
edge in the abovementioned sense, its elaborate elicitation technique and its
representational format, concept systems appear to be only marginally suited
for structural knowledge assessment.
3.5 Concept Mapping and Structure Laying
Techniques
Concept mapping techniques and structure-laying techniques are closely re-
lated to network models of human long-term memory (Bonato, 1990) and are
used for knowledge assessment or learning support (ibid). Due to their sim-
ilar assumptions and elicitation procedures, they are presented in the same
section. They both belong to the class of procedures for graphical knowledge
network representations that represent knowledge as a graph.
3.5.1 Concept maps
According to Novak and Cañas (2006),
Concept maps are graphical tools for organizing and represent-
ing knowledge. They include concepts, usually enclosed in circles
or boxes of some type, and relationships between concepts indi-
cated by a connecting line linking two concepts. Words on the
line, referred to as linking words or linking phrases, specify the
relationship between the two concepts. We define concept as a
perceived regularity in events or objects, or records of events or
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objects, designated by a label. The label for most concepts is a
word, although sometimes we use symbols such as + or %, and
sometimes more than one word is used (p. 1).
Concept maps are presented in a hierarchical fashion with the most general
concept at the top (ibid). However, their representation does not follow the
formalism of a directed graph with labeled edges and nodes, because edge
labels can further branch edges like in the case of the “are” label between con-
cepts and propositions in Figure 3.2 that illustrates an example of a concept
map.
Figure 3.2: Example of a concept map. From Wikipedia, the free encyclope-
dia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Conceptmap.gif)
Concept maps were developed by Shavelson in the 1970s (Shavelson, 1972,
1974; Shavelson & Stanton, 1975) and can be elicited in various ways, for
example with computer programs or by sticking post-its to a whiteboard
(Novak & Cañas, 2006, p. 10). Note that in concept maps, the person con-
structing the map labels concepts and relationships freely. Thus, according to
Hoole’s specification, concept maps employ free recall, require a high amount
of conscious processing and lead to a hierarchic form of representation. Ac-
44 Elicitation and Representation of Structural Knowledge
cording to Eckert’s classification (compare previous section), the users can
label both edges and concepts freely.
Concept maps are primarily employed for learning purposes (Novak &
Gowin, 1996). Novak and colleagues “believe one of the reasons concept
mapping is so powerful for the facilitation of meaningful learning is that it
serves as a kind of template or scaffold to help to organize knowledge and to
structure it (...)“ (Novak & Cañas, 2006, p. 7).
Criticism
Although Novak argues that concept maps resemble structures in human
memory (Novak & Cañas, 2006), the way he describes their construction and
use (Novak, 1998; Novak & Cañas, 2006; Novak & Gowin, 1996) makes it
clear that concept maps are not intended for psychometric elicitation of an
individual knowledge structure in terms of a test, but are intended either
for the acquisition of a formally agreed and validated knowledge structure
or teaching evaluation. For example, a teacher will present a set of con-
cepts to students and ask them to build a concept map from it; the resulting
map is then used to assess the student’s learning performance (Novak &
Cañas, 2006). Another example are several individuals working on a concept
map over a longer period of time in order to create a correct representation
of a formal knowledge structure for teaching and learning purposes. The
possibility to elicit students’ subjective knowledge structures with concept
map does point towards the possibility of their usage for structural assess-
ment purposes. However, the tool for concept mapping, CMapTools (Cañas
et al., 2004) does not include the possibility to analyze concept maps in
any quantifiable way (i.e. density, similarity measures, number of edges or
nodes etc). The idea of using concept-map-like structures for psychometric
knowledge elicitation has been pronounced by other researches; two exam-
ples, the Structure-Laying-Technique and its computer-based further devel-
opments are introduced in the next sections.
3.5.2 The structure laying technique (SLT)
The ‘Heidelberger Strukturlegetechnik’ SLT (Scheele & Groeben, 1984, 1988)
is a standardized manual concept mapping tool for structural knowledge elic-
itation which builds on Shavelson’s concept mapping techniques (compare
previous section). Originally, SLT has been developed for the elicitation of
subjective theories. In its original application as described by Scheele and
Groeben (1984), a semi-structured interview was employed for the identifi-
cation of relevant concepts in a certain domain, which are written on cards.
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In a second step, the participant has to determine the relationships between
concepts. In order to do so, he or she is trained in the application of a
set of different types of relations. These include semantic relations such as
‘equal’, ‘sub-category’, ‘superior category’, ‘and-relation’, ‘or-relation’, ‘man-
ifestation’, and ‘indicator’. The remaining relation types symbolize empiric
relations between variables as found in empiric psychology, e. g. negative
and positive causal relations, interaction effects with certain preconditions,
second-degree polynomial relationships, correlations etc (for further details,
see Scheele & Groeben, 1984). In Hoole’s specification, SLT employs free
recall, require a high amount of conscious processing and lead to a hierarchic
form of representation due to the directedness of available links. According
to Eckert’s classification (compare Table 3.1), SLT employs freely labeled
nodes and given edges.
Bonato (1990, p. 33) assets three main advantages of SLT, which also
apply to concept mapping: Firstly, the visualization of concepts and rela-
tions allows to easily reconstruct ideas and views of the world. Secondly,
the directness of the survey: In opposition to construct grids and word as-
sociation tasks, relations between concepts are directly elicited and are not
inferred based on complex calculations, which only indicate that there is a
relationship between two nodes, but not the type of relation. Due to the fact
that the relations are chosen from a fixed set, the researcher does not have to
interpret a freely labelled connection as is the case in concept mapping (see
above). Finally, Bonato argues that the easy manipulation of networks dur-
ing elicittion pays tribute to the fact that participants usually do not have a
complete knowledge network consciously available at the time of the survey,
but activate new concepts and relations during the elicitation process.
3.5.3 Graph theoretic description of SLT-elicited knowl-
edge networks
Bonato (1990) introduced the idea to treat SLT-elicited knowledge networks
as graphs in the mathematical sense and to use graph-theoretic concepts for
their description and for performance assessment. This delivers variables of
metric scale that can be used for describing several features of a participant’s
knowledge network and are thus thought to give a numeric representation of
the scope and complexity of a participant’s structural knowledge. Based on
White’s (1985) dimensions describing the cognitive structure of a person’s
cognitive structure, Bonato suggests a number of graph-theoretic measures
describing the structure of an SLT-elicited knowledge network (represented
as directed graph) on graph level.
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In order to determine the quantity or perimeter of structural knowledge,
the number of vertices (also referred to as graph order, compare Section 3.1)
and the number of edges (also referred to as graph degree) are used to describe
the perimeter of the knowledge graph. Bonato further suggested using the
number of unconnected subgraphs, where a number larger 1 represents a less
well-integrated knowledge structure, as a measure for knowledge integrity
and the density of the graph as a measure of complexity. The density of a
graph is calculated by dividing the number of present edges by the number
of all possible edges inside a given graph. West (1985) refers to the same
measure as Integrated Propositional Knowledge (IPK) in the description of
complexity of cognitive structure.
The diameter of a knowledge graph (compare Definition 6 in Section 3.1)
is seen as a further valid description for the magnitude of a knowledge graph
(Eckert, 1998a). In accordance with Strube (1985), Bonato (1990) suggests a
further metric relying on the diameter measure, the Relative Maximal Path
Length (RMPL). It is defined as the longest path length inside a knowledge
network divided by the maximum possible path length inside a given knowl-
edge network with n nodes. This equals the diameter divided by n - 1. “If
RMPL = 1, the knowledge network consists of a single chain. The minimal
value of RMPL is 1/(n−1). In this case, the diameter is 1 and the knowledge
network has a star-shaped structure. Thus, RMPL allows a statement with
regard to the compactness of a knowledge network: The smaller the value
of RMPL, the more compact the knowledge network” (Bonato, 1990, p. 96,
own translation).
The median and mean of distances between all vertices inside a graph
are used as a further measure to determine the compactness of a graph. In
an empiric study on classroom learning, Bonato elicited students’ structural
knowledge on genetics and a teacher’s reference network with an SLT accord-
ing to Ballstaedt and Mandl (1985). He then had the teacher assign grades
to the student’s networks and grouped students’ networks into four clusters
based on their structural features. A discriminant analysis with the above
coefficients and a coefficient based on network similarity between student
and teacher network was able to deliver a correct classification percentage
of 93.2. Bonato then analyzed whether the clusters differed with regard to
the average grade of the cluster and found significant differences in grades
between two clusters. His results can be seen as a support for the notion
that performance prediction based on graph-theoretic coefficients of struc-
tural knowledge graphs is possible. However, methodological criticism can
be directed at his way of calculating results. Despite the fact that he had
an outside criterion available that captured knowledge in the same domain
as his networks intended to (a multiple choice questionnaire), he refrained
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from correlating the graph-theoretic network scores he obtained with them,
which casts doubts on the validity of his measures. Furthermore, he did
not correlate the graph-theoretic coefficients with the grade of the networks,
depriving himself of another opportunity to establish internal validity.
3.5.4 Computer-based structural assessment of con-
cept maps with MaNET
Partly based on Bonato’s findings, Eckert (1998b, 1998a) developed a computer-
supported structure laying technique which explicitly assumes that certain
graph-theoretic variables can be used for individual performance assessment
and prediction. His method, the Mannheimer Netzwerk-Elaborierungstechnik
MaNET (Mannheim network elaboration technique) combines computer-
based tools for expert-based generation of concepts and edge relations, for
reference network generation, for computer-based participant network gener-
ation, and for graph-theoretic quantitative analysis of knowledge networks.
With MaNET, Eckert hopes to improve economy and feasibility of ex-
ecution and analysis of the structure laying technique and to overcome the
shortcomings of traditional concept mapping, e.g. the pen-and-paper format.
Its main feature is the integrated automatic quantitative analysis. From a
participant’s perspective, the MaNET test belongs to the class of procedures
for graphical knowledge representations where both concepts and edges be-
tween concepts cannot be labeled freely, but have to be chosen from a fixed
set (Quadrant IV in table 3.1). In Hoole’s specification, SLT employs free re-
call, requires a high amount of conscious processing and leads to a hierarchic
form of representation due to the directedness of available links.
Since the set of general semantic edge types in SLT procedures as out-
lined above proved to be difficult and costly to handle and required extensive
amount of training on the side of the participants, Eckert replaced the stan-
dard set of semantic relations with a specific set for each knowledge domain.
Therefore, prior to testing, a team of experts (domain experts, diagnostics
and cognitive psychologists) identifies relevant concepts from a certain do-
main and appropriate relation types for the domain. This procedure takes
place on screen in a special configuration module of the MaNET system.
These concepts and edges are then presented to the participant. Thus, in
Hoole’s specification, MaNET employs no recall as participants are presented
with the complete set of concepts and edges, requires a high amount of con-
scious processing, and leads to a hierarchic form of representation due to the
directedness of available links.
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MaNET coefficients
In the actual test module, concepts and relations are presented to the par-
ticipants who then assemble a concept map representing their knowledge
from the provided elements on screen. The semantic meaning of a relation
is chosen from the available set, and direction and association strength are
entered. For each participant, an analysis module automatically computes
five graph-theoretic coefficients: The number of edges (the number of links
in the graph), the density (the number of edges divided by the number of
edges possible in the participant’s network;), ruggedness (the number of un-
connected subgraphs), the diameter (the longest path in a network) and the
node centrality for each node (see below).
According to Eckert (1998b), a higher density hints at high degree of
knowledge interconnectedness and a low ruggedness indicates a less rugged,
highly integrated knowledge structure. The diameter is treated as an indi-
cator for the quantity of structural knowledge. The centrality of a node is
supposed to indicate the centrality of the meaning of that node in a given
knowledge structure. Two centrality measures are calculated: The indegree
and outdegree (compare Definition 2 in Section 3.1). The degree D of a node
u specifies to how many other nodes in the network a direct relationship
exists. D is specified as indegree ID (the number of directed edges pointing
towards u) and outdegree OD (the number of edges originating from u). For
undirected graphs, OD equals ID.
Between all networks that have been elicited with MaNET, similarity can
be calculated based on edge similarities between two networks. This compar-
ision can be made between participants’ networks or between a participant’s
network and a MaNET-elicited expert network. The employed comparison
analysis requires that both networks consist of the same concepts (nodes) and
the same types of edges, which is the case for two MaNET-elicited networks
that have been constructed in the same knowledge domains, as relations and
concepts are pre-specified in the configuration module (see above). The simi-
larity between two networks, also referred to as correspondence is given in the
correspondence index C which is dissimilar to the similarity measure C used
in Pathfinder networks (compare next section). MaNET’s C is based on com-
paring all possible node pairs between two networks. It is thus a similarity
measure based on path features and not on structural features as Pathfinder’s
C. MaNET’s C is calculated by adding the number of occurrences where two
nodes have the same edge between them in both networks and the number of
occurrences where the same two nodes have no connection between them in
both networks. From this sum, the number of mismatches for both categories
is subtracted. The result is divided by the number of possible connections.
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This calculation is adjusted for edge weights, resulting in a coefficient referred
to as Cw. Eckert also suggests a significance measure u for Cw which is based
on the null hypothesis that the sum of correct matches between two networks
is equal to the sum of incorrect matches. However, the author states that
such a measure will most likely overestimate significance and refrains from
using it in his further analyses. Eckert also suggests a method for aggregating
a network from several individual networks, so-called modal networks. This
is done by including those edges in the modal network that occur above a
certain threshold in all the included networks. The threshold is based on the
average number of links in the included networks (see Eckert, 1998b, p. 96
for details).
Although Eckert (1998b) conducted an experiment in whih he obtained
students’ MaNET scores, he does not correlate them with outside perfor-
mance criteria such as the students’ grades although they were available to
him. The validity of these measures for performance prediction is thus ques-
tionable.
Criticism
Some of the aspects Bonato (1990) mentions as advantages can also be seen
as disadvantages of the SLT technique. First of all, learning the 18 different
relation types is a demanding and extensive task and a study shows significant
variance in label type choice between participants that are experts in the same
domain and have to construct a concept map of a small sub-domain of their
expertise (Rothe & Warning, 1991). Rothe and Warning showed that their
study participants were able to use relations between concepts consistently
(by being able to employ analogies correctly), but were unable to name the
edges. If an edge is placed in SLT by a participant that appears to be wrong
to a domain expert, it is thus impossible to determine whether the participant
has wrong knowledge or whether the participant uses a relation correctly, but
is unable to label it. This finding is a particularly strong indicator for the
implicit aspect of structural knowledge and justifies the assumptions made
in Chapter 2.
The fact that participants do not have a complete knowledge network
consciously available but construct one as an interactive process during the
elicitation procedure casts doubts on the suitability of SLT as a test in a
psychometric understanding of the word. An assessment technique is sup-
posed to elicit a construct, and is not supposed to construct and measure a
construct in one process.
Despite the above criticism, SLT is seen as a reliable and valid tool
for knowledge assessment and performance prediction (Ballsteadt & Mandl,
50 Elicitation and Representation of Structural Knowledge
1985; Bonato, 1990), because a change in learning is reflected by a change in
SLT-elicited networks in terms of the number of concepts and a difference in
structure of the networks.
Despite the advantages of a computer-based structure laying technique
with regard to its economy of the actual test process, a few aspects of the
method can be criticized. First of all, the demands for the creation of test
items (concepts and relation types) and the reference network are high; Eck-
ert suggests an entire group of specialists for performing these tasks. This
demand is likely to counteract the saving in complexity that is achieved due
to the modularized computer-based set-up of the method.
Secondly, in the development of his correspondence coefficient Cw, Eckert
ignores the wide body of graph-theoretic research on graph similarity algo-
rithms. Goldsmith and Davenport (1990) explicitly suggest a correspondence
coefficient based on structural methods for knowledge network comparison
and discourage the use of path-based similarity measures. Today’s algorithms
are able to determine graph similarity based on the structural comparison of
subgraphs (Le, Ho, & Phan, 2003), whereas Eckert’s measure does not take
any structural information beyond dyads of nodes into account. Finally, Eck-
ert’s prime measure for performance prediction Cw is not an absolute measure
based on norms, but a relative measure with reference to an expert network.
This means that for every structural assessment, an expert and his or her
reference network must be available and experts themselves cannot be tested
at all. Furthermore, the requirement for a specific expert network for com-
parison makes it impossible to compare MaNET’s Cw scores across domains,
because each knowledge domain has its own frame of reference (its expert
network), and the validity of the expert network is largely unaddressed. Fur-
thermore, the test implicitly assumes that all participants are familiar with
the concepts and edge relations presented to them, which cannot necessarily
be taken for granted. In the case where a participant does not know what
a concept or an edge means he or she will place these elements in a arbi-
trary way which again casts doubts on the validity of the resulting network.
Finally, the central criticism that applies to concept mapping and structure
lying techniques can also be applied to MaNET: Presenting a participant
with the task of constructing an entire network is likely to initiate a process
whose result is unknown to the participant at its onset. This process adds
an unnecessary amount of variance to the aim of psychometric knowledge
diagnosis. Other methods try to address this issue by dissecting the task of
network construction in several less complex and demanding subtasks. These
methods are presented in the following sections.
3.6 Graph Building and Multidimensional Scaling 51
3.6 Graph Building and Multidimensional
Scaling
The graph building method is based on Rapoport, Livant and Boyd (1966)
and on Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971). In this approach, participants are
presented with an alphabetic list of expert-defined stimulus concepts and are
asked to construct a graph out of the stimulus concepts by drawing lines
between those they see as similar. Note that the main difference to SLT
and concept mapping techniques is two-fold: Edges between concepts are
not labeled but only have a connection strength attributed to them, and
edge construction only occurs locally between two concepts at a time; the
participants do not construct an entire graph but perform similarity ratings
between two words. In Hoole’s classification, graph building involves no
recall except for edge relations, which are cued. The process involves a
smaller degree of conscious processing than SLT, and the resulting network
representation is hierarchic. The resulting raw data of graph building is a
concept × concept matrix that is the starting point for factor analyses or
multidimensional scaling. These procedures aim at discovering structures
within the set of stimulus concepts.
“Metric multidimensional scaling (MDS) transforms a distance matrix
into a set of coordinates such that the (Eucledian) distances derived from
these coordinates approximate as well as possible the original distances”
(Abdi, 2007, p. 598). It is often used for visualizing dissimilarities in data,
as it can extract the latent structure within empirical similarity judgments
(Schvaneveldt et al., 1985, p. 705). In order to obtain such a representation,
the similarity data is submitted to a MDS algorithm. Analogous to principal
components analysis, MDS detects the locations that minimize distortions
to the distance matrix. Its goal is to find a Euclidean distance approximat-
ing a given distance (Eigenvector problem). For more information on MDS
calculations, refer to Abdi (2007). Figure 3.3 shows the result of a two-
dimensional MDS scaling procedure on similarity ratings performed by 16
students between 16 natural concepts (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985 p. 707)1.
A problem with MDS representations of similarity data is the fact that
these are very global in nature and difficult to compare and to describe
in a metric way. Schvaneveldt (1985) thus suggested to employ a method
that “extracts the latent structure rather than transforming the data” in
1This article was published in the International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, Vol
23, Roger W. Schvaneveldt and Francis T. Durso and Timothy E. Goldsmith and Tomothy
J. Breen and Nancy J. Cooke and Richard G. Tucker and Joseph C. De Maio, Measuring
the structure of expertise, 699–728, Copyright Elsevier (1985).
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Figure 3.3: Two-dimensional MDS solution for 16 natural concepts, assessed
for their similarity by 16 students (adapted with permission from Schvan-
eveldt et al., 1985, p. 707). The horizontal dimension reflects a living-non-
living dimension; the vertical dimension captures a difference between plants
and animals for living concepts.
order to “specify the local relations and structure present in a conceptual
organization” (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985, p. 709). The method he suggested
for doing so is outlined in the following section.
3.7 Structural Assessment with Pathfinder
Pathfinder is a method for arriving at a network representation of empiri-
cal proximity data (Schvaneveldt, 1990, p. ix). It was created to transform
subjective pairwise ratings of concept-relatedness (similar to graph building,
compare previous section) into graph-representations of knowledge networks
for psychometric assessment. In order to transform proximity data into net-
work representations, proximities between elements are considered as path
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lengths in a graph-theoretic point of view (compare Section 3.1). The prox-
imity data supplied to the pathfinder procedure typically stems from “...a
participant’s estimate of the similarity of each pair of entities in the set”
(Dearholt & Schvaneveldt, 1990, p. 2), where set refers to a set of concepts
from a certain knowledge domain that has been identified as crucial and
representative for that domain by one or more domain experts. The similar-
ity rating between two concepts is interpreted as an edge between the two
concepts that are treated as graph nodes. If the participant rates a pair of
concepts as dissimilar, there is no edge between the concepts. If the par-
ticipant can rate the degree of similarity between the concepts, the rating
is transformed into a distance label for the edge between the two nodes: A
high similarity results in a short distance, a low similarity rating results in a
longer edge.
Graphs constructed in this way typically violate the triangle inequality
which states that for any subgraph with triangular structure, the measure of
a given edge between two nodes must be less than the sum of the other two
edges but greater than the difference between the two paths. The shortest
path between two nodes inside a graph (spanning several individual edges)
is called a geodesic path. A triangle inequality violation is never part of
a geodesic path, because there is always a shorter path available. “The
omission of the edges which violate some triangle inequality in a network
assures the preservation of the (geodetic) distances between all pairs of nodes
and provides a simpler structure which possesses precisely those edges which
are responsible for the most economical paths” (Dearholt & Schvaneveldt,
1990, p. 2). The Pathfinder method generates a class of networks (PFNETS)
from distances between pairs of entities that omit links that violate a triangle
inequality for at least a specified number of links (usually two). Distances
between entities in a PFNET that are not connected in the original proximity
data are calculated on the bases of path lengths between them. PFNETs can
either be directed or undirected. For PFNET generation, Pathfinder uses two
parameters, q and r. q limits the number of indirect proximities investigated
during network generation. q is a value between 2 and n − 1 where n is
the number of nodes in the network. The r parameter defines the metric on
which the computation of the distance of paths is based. r is a real number
between 1 and infinity, inclusive. A network generated with particular values
of q and r is called a PFNET(q, r). A PFNET(n − 1,∞) will be a minimal
spanning tree for the edges supplied by the proximity data. For a given
graph, its minimum spanning tree is a spanning tree with weight less than or
equal to the weight of every subgraph which connects all the vertices in the
graph together. If not specified differently, PFNETs generated in the course
of this work will have the q, r parameters n− 1, ∞ by default.
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In the practical generation of PFNETs for a certain knowledge domain,
domain experts identify a set of concepts that are of high relevance to the
knowledge domain in question (similar to MaNET, see above). Two concepts
from this set are presented at a time, and participants have to make similarity
ratings between them, usually on a five- or seven-point likert scale (Goldsmith
& Johnson, 1990). Since these similarity ratings are treated as undirected
edges, a participant has to perform n(n− 1)/2 ratings for a set of n concepts
in order to compare each concept to all other concepts in the set. The
data generated in this way is then subjected to the pathfinder algorithm for
adjustment, which again results in the PFNETs.
A central aspect in Pathfinder-based approaches to structural assessment
is the assessment of structural similarity between PFNETs, as performance
prediction is based on the similarity between a participant’s PFNET’s sim-
ilarity to a reference PFNET elicited from a domain expert. The idea be-
hind this comparison is that the more similar the knowledge structure of
a participant to the one of an expert, the more likely this participant will
display a similarily high performance than the expert in the particular do-
main. For the comparison of PFNETs, Goldsmith and Davenport (1990)
suggest a range of similarity measures C (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990). In a
subsequent analysis of prediction performance, a specific similarity measure
C1 was identified as possessing the best predictive validity. it “employs a
set-theoretic method to compare corresponding neighborhood regions of two
networks. The method computes for any two networks a single quantita-
tive index of closeness called C” (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990, p. 246). “A
neighborhood about some node, v, is defined to be the set of nodes that are
within distance one from v, excluding v itself” (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990,
p. 77). When comparing two graphs G and G′ with the same number and
type of nodes such as PFNETs, the neighborhood similarity between v ∈ G
and v′ ∈ G′ is calculated by dividing the cardinality of the intersection of the
node neighborhoods by the cardinality of the union of the neighborhoods.
Simply speaking, the number of nodes that both v and v′ link to in G and
G′ is devided by the total number of nodes that v and v′ link to. The mean
of all node-level neighborhood similarities between G and G′ is the measure
of overall graph similarity C. In a study predicting final course points of 40
college students in a college course on psychological research techniques, C1
similarity measures between students’ PFNETS(n − 1,∞) and the instruc-
tor’s PFNET correlated at r = .74 (Goldsmith & Johnson, 1990).
PFNETs (n − 1,∞) applied to subjective similarity ratings of expert-
identified concepts have been used in a wide range of studies for the assess-
ment of structral knowledge. In an early application of the Pathfinder method
(Schvaneveldt et al., 1985), the structure of PFNETs was able to differentiate
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between novice and expert pilots. Pathfinder networks have been identified
as predective of performance in problem solving (Rowe & Cooke, 1995), they
have been used successfully to assess training outcomes (M. A. Davis et al.,
2003), and to assess individual and team mental models in computer envi-
ronments (McDougall, Curry, & Brujin, 2001). Generally, the C coefficient
between participants’ and experts’ PFNETs has been successfully applied for
performance prediction in a wide range of studies (Acton, Johnson, & Gold-
smith, 1994; Goldsmith et al., 1991; Day, Jr, & Gettman, 2001; Goldsmith
& Johnson, 1990; Johnson, Goldsmith, & Teague, 1995; Wyman & Randel,
1998). According to Hoole’s (2006) classification, PFNETs require no recall
except for edges, require a low level of conscious processing and result in
a non-hierarchical representation due to the fact that edges are undirected.
Despite their usefulness, two issues of PFNET-based structural assessment
can be identified: the need for a reference network and the demand for a
fixed set of concepts that represent the knowledge domain.
Because Pathfinder is based on fixed concepts that are presented to all
study participants, there is no way to determine whether the participants
know anything about the identified concepts. It is simply assumed that the
concepts have a meaning for the participants, but this assumption is never
tested and has so far remained unchallenged. Thus, it cannot be taken for
granted that the similarity ratings between presented concepts have any ref-
erence to the presented words because the familiarity of the participant with
the words remains unclear and is thus questionable. The reliance on expert-
identified concepts presents a trade off in comparison with free recall tech-
niques, as they allow a deeper understanding of a participant’s knowledge,
as Davis and colleagues point out:
Recall techniques, whether cued or free, allow knowledge struc-
tures to emerge without constraining the individuals to a fixed
list of concepts...these procedures provide information such as the
amount of organization as well as the depth of given structure,
features of structural knowledge that cannot be captured by sim-
ilarity judgments alone (M. A. Davis et al., 2003, p. 203-204).
Secondly, the C measure requires an expert network for reference. However,
situations in which no such network is available appear plausible. Further-
more, the validity of expert networks is widely unaddressed. What qualifies
an expert to provide his or her similarity ratings and what happens if net-
works among several experts in one domain differ? In their study, Davis
and colleagues (2003) had two different expert networks available that had
been generated by two domain experts. One was based on the consensus
of the two experts while the other one was an average-connection structure
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statistically derived from the two different networks. The PFNETs of 50
participants were compared to both networks individually, and the statisti-
cally averaged referent structure provided the best predictive values for C.
This finding underlines the validity issue of single expert networks as referent
structures. Accordingly, a structural assessment technique that operates on
norms instead of expert referent structures appears desirable (Bonato, 1990).
3.8 Discussion of Methods and Requirement
for a New Technique
In order to assess structural knowledge in a psychometric way, only those
methods that deliver numeric descriptors of a knowledge graph are appropri-
ate for structural knowledge elicitation because such variables can be used
for performance prediction and correlation with outside criteria. Thus, four
of the presented methods are suitable: SLT, MaNET, Graph Building, and
PFNET (compare Table 3.2). However, all of these methods have their weak-
nesses (compare according sections): SLT is cumbersome to perform due to
its exclusive availability in paper-and-pencil form, it is a complex procedure
prone to high variance, the set of available relation types is difficult to learn,
and it possesses only limited validity. MaNET possesses too many restric-
tions by presenting the participants with a fixed set of concepts and relations
without any means of assuring whether the participants actually know the
material they are supposed to use for graph construction. MaNET also re-
lies on expert networks as referent structures with questionable validity and
challenge the participant with the task of constructing an entire network in
a single process. Graph building produces MDS representations of semantic
concept proximity which are difficult to compare and to describe.
Pathfinder Networks reduce the cognitive workload by constructing a
graph based on the participants’ responses to a series of items (similarity
comparisons between expert-identified concepts). It thus reduces complexity
and explicitness of the graph construction procedure. The latter feature is
of particular importance. In the dimensional model of memory types (com-
pare Figure 2.8), it was stated that implicit access to structural knowledge
is part of individual implicit knowledge. Unconsciously available relations
between concepts do most probably not carry a readily available explicit la-
bel: If a structural knowledge assessment technique is supposed to capture
at least a part of unconscious access to structural knowledge, it must feature
quick and intuitive similarity comparisons that neither require an explicit
label, nor a complex process for their elicitation that involves a high degree
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of conscious processing. Thus, only the pathfinder methods seems to have a
(limited) capability to tap into relations that cannot nessessarily be labelled
by a person: Participants are asked to make single quick and intuitive (‘gut-
feeling’) judgements on the strength of relatedness between two presented
concepts. The fact that pathfinder networks have been employed in domains
where implicit knowledge is likely to influence performance, such as aircraft
piloting (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985), underlines this assumption. However,
Pathfinder networks do possess two characterisics that limit their use: they
rely on expert networks for network assessment and they rely on a set of
specified constructs. There is no way of validating whether a participant
actually knows the constructs presented to him or her, and the validity of
expert structures is widely unadressed, as outlined above.
These issues require a new technique for structural knowledge elicitation
that overcomes the abovementioned issues. It should possess the following
features: In order to enable a high level of ease-of-use, it should b computer-
based. It should involve pathfinder-scaling of structural knowledge networks,
as pathfinder-scaled networks have been successfully apllied for performance
prediction in a variety of uses (see above). It should be based on concepts that
the participant knows and associates with the knowledge domain in question.
It should further reduce the amount of required cognitive processing by dis-
secting the procedure of graph construction into a set of response items as
in graph building. It should further exploit multiple sources of information
for data generation, i.e. explicit measures supplied by the user, and, if pos-
sible, indirect measures such as response time as outlined in Section 3.3.1.
Finally, it should deliver graph-theoretic values that quantify the structure
of an elicited knowledge graph for performance-prediction purposes. Such
values should be obtained without the necessity of expert structures due to
their validity issue. That such general coefficients are available and are of
value for performance prediction has already been demonstrated by Bonato
(1990), compare Section 3.5.3.
In summary, the elicitation of structural knowledge in such a way that
edges are elicited that a participant cannot label but assumes present. re-
quires a computer-based test that reduces the elicitation of a knowledge
structure into subtasks. The test should also allow implicitness (i.e. un-
labeled edges), should employ a mixture of indirect (time) and direct mea-
sures, should produce coefficients, and should not require an expert network
for their creation. Such a knowledge elicitation technique is presented in the
next section.
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3.9 The Association Structure Test (AST)
The newly proposed method integrates an association task and pathfinder
network similarity ratings into one IT-based test system2. Association tech-
niques can measure some aspects of individual’s structural knowledge that
are potentially missed if only similarity ratings are adopted. An association
task assures that the concepts from which a structure is built actually stem
from the memory of the specific participant. In this association task, the
participant is asked to associate concepts that he or she thinks belong to a
specified knowledge domain analogue to the FTE technique (compare Section
3.3.1). These associated concepts are then fed into a pathfinder structural
assessment technique based on pairwise concept similarities to which the
PFNET (n−1,∞) algorithm is applied (compare Section 3.7). The concepts
that enter the comparison section are those that were freely associated to a
stimulus concept by the participant. In this way, the benefits of pathfinder
networks are preserved, and the issue of determining whether a participant
actually knows a concept presented during pairwise comparisons is solved.
This design also offers the advantage of deducting several quantitative mea-
sures for knowledge organization (see Section 3.9.3) that can be used for
correlation or prediction purposes. By using quick and intuitive judgements
of concept relatedness as employed in Pathfinder on concepts provided by the
participant, the AST aims at capturing the structural implicitness (compare
Section 2.5).
Just saying what comes to mind first “gives leave to treat the direct
test like an indirect test” (Dienes & Perner, 1999, p. 738). At least some
of these associations, which are no doubt explicitely available because they
have been articulated, are seen as a “representation of compounds (typically:
compound properties) that leaves the structure of its components implicit”
(Dienes & Perner, 1999, p. 740). By asking participants to perform quick
intuitive similarity ratings between these associations without labeling the
relationship, associations between compounds that have no explicitly avail-
able label might be captured. This assumption is based on the fact that pair
associations are one of the fundamental levels of learning: Boucher and Di-
enes (2003) state that artificial grammar learning, one of the key paradigms
of implicit knowledge (compare Section 2.3.1), is based on the detection of
2I am very grateful to Tobias Lattke, who programmed the system. I am also grateful to
Lutz Lippke, Henryk Plötz, and Sebastin Ssmoller for their participation in programming
the appliction. Apart from the programming, no other external assistance or support for
the design of the AST system was used. The AST has been used in experiments together
with other researchers who tested their own hypothesis with the tool (Ceglarek, Meyer,
Kermas, & Rothe, 2006; Meyer, Ceglarek, Kermas, Lattke, & Rothe, 2006)
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frequency regularities on bigram level. According to the authors, participants
exposed to bigrams classified new artificial grammar-based test items very
similarly to participants exposed to complete grammatical strings. Thus, the
detection of associations between tuples is central to implicit learning, and
thus a nonverbal feeling of association between known tuples might serve as
a measure of this process.
In summary, the AST combines the free term entry task, term association
task, and Pathfinder algorithm techniques, which are the available structural
assessment techniques that have proved to be valid and reliable respectively
in various research studies (Beatty & Gerace, 2002; M. A. Davis et al., 2003;
Jonassen et al., 1993), into one test system that might be able to elicit at
least a portion of the structural knowledge that is primarily accessed in an
unconscious way.
3.9.1 AST configuration module
The AST test is an internet-based client/server application. It is programmed
in the JAVA programming language. The server module contains the admin-
istration module that allows configuration of test series and resides on a web
server. The server module also distributes tests, collects the data, and per-
forms the conversion from the participant’s relatedness matrix into a PFNET
(n−1,∞) based in the algorithms supplied by Schvaneveldt (1990). The con-
figuration module consists of a web-interface to the AST’s data base and can
be accessed from any Web browser over the Internet. It is currently available
at http://abulifa.wiwi.hu-berlin.de:8080/ast/admin. It allows the creation of
new AST test series, the generation of new participant codes for an existing
test series, and the analysis of collected results.
If a new test series is created, the administrator specifies its parameters
(compare Figure 3.4): The name of the test series, up to ten stimulus concepts
that require free term associations, the stimulus concept whose associated
terms enter pairwise concept comparison, the maximum number of concepts
that are selected for pairwise comparisons, the mode of the test (explained in
Section 7.1.1), its language (German or English), and its presentation form:
In the standard AST (undivided) mode, the pairwise concept comparison
take place immediately after term associations. In the split mode, free term
entry and pairwise concept comparisons of associated concepts are split into
two separate tests that can be performed at different points in time. This
latter feature will play a role in some of the validation experiments. The
possibility to supply more than one concept for free term entry is designed
to allow participants to familiarize with the association task before collect-
ing the vital associations used for pairwise comparisons. Also, it allows for
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association experiments outside the scope of this thesis.
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of the German AST configuration module
The maximum number of concepts that are selected for pairwise compar-
isons requires the specification of a maximum value because of the following
reason: The total number of comparisons (n(n− 1)/2) that the participants
need to make depends on the number (N) of the terms they have typed into
the system during the first stage of the test. For example, if the participant
entered 20 terms during the first stage of the test, she or he would have
to perform 190 (20(20 − 1)/2) comparisons in the second stage of the test.
In order to limit the total number of similarity ratings a participant has
to perform in the second sub-task, the maximum number of terms for the
participants to compare is specified during the configuration. If the number
of terms entered within a knowledge domain during the first stage exceeds
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the specified maximum number, the total number of terms selected into the
second stage would be equal to the maximum number. The sample of terms
would be chosen from clusters formed in the first stage according to the fol-
lowing principle: The AST classifies the terms entered during the first stage
into different clusters according to the measured thinking times. As in the
FTE tasks presented in Section 3.3.1, a time series cluster analysis identifies
peaks of thinking times between clusters of fast-paced concept associations
(compare Figure 3.1). These clusters are thought to represent different sets of
individual cognitive structures in the same knowledge domain. If the number
of terms the participant entered exceeds the specified number for pairwise
similarity comparison, the very first term in each cluster enters the second
stage, the rest of the terms is selected from each of the clusters in proportion
to the cluster size in order to assure that the selected terms represent the
overall aspects of the terms entered in the first stage of the test. In this way,
a certain level of preservation of cognitive structure is maintained despite
sampling of a limited number of items. Davis, Curtis and Tschetter (2003)
determined that there is a tradeoff between reasonableness of the length of
a comparison task and its predictive validity. They established that a value
of 15 concepts entering pairwise comparisons still delivers an adequate pre-
diction at a reasonable length of the comparison task.
In another section of the administration module, the administrator can
generate participant codes at his discretion. These codes are always associ-
ated with the test series from which they are created, i.e. when a participant
enters his or her code, the AST system is aware of the corresponding test
series and serves it. The final section of the administration module is for
result analysis. It will be outlined after explaining the test module.
3.9.2 AST test module
The test can be accessed from any JAVA-enabled computer over the Inter-
net using a standard Internet Browser. The test is started by entering the
URL of the test (currently, http://abuluifa.wiwi.hu-berlin.de:8080/ast) in the
browser. This starts a JAVA applet that displays the test environment and
prompts the participant for his or her code. Participant codes are generated
in the AST administration module by the administrator (compare previous
section). After entering his or her code, the following instruction is presented
to the participant:
Dear Participant,
The AST test system tests your knowledge on a specific topic
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area within a domain you are most likely familiar with. The
test consists of two parts.
At the beginning of the first part, you will see the name of
the topic area that is being tested. Your task is to type in
any terms you can think of spontaneously, which you think
belong to the presented topic (i. e. that are associated with
it). For instance, if the topic area is ‘‘bicycle’’, you may
have the terms ‘‘Chain’’, ‘‘Pedal’’, ‘‘Saddle’’, ‘‘Tire’’,
‘‘patching a tire’’, ‘‘holding balance’’, and ‘‘Dynamo’’ in
mind (note that each term can consist of several
words and may describe an item or an action as well).
You are asked to type these terms into the provided textbox
and press the <enter> or <return> key immediately after
the last letter of each term, e.g.
Chain <return>
Pedal <return>
Saddle <return>
Tire <return>
Patching a tire <return>
You should type as many terms as you consider being related
to the topic area. The pause time between two terms will be
recorded. If you do not have any other terms to enter, please
click on the ‘‘Done’’ button. Please note that you will
receive only one topic area for entering your associated
terms, so please do not spare things that come to your mind
for later topics. Enter everything that comes to your mind
when you see the topic area in large letters on the top of the
next screen.
The last two sentences (“Please note...”) are omitted if more than one stimu-
lus concept is specified in the configuration module. After the participant has
indicated his or her understanding of the instructions by clicking on a button
labeled “understood” below the explanation, the free term entry (FTE) part
of the AST is displayed as depicted in Figure 3.5. The participants type
one term into the textbox on the left-hand upper side and press enter before
typing in another term. The terms they entered would appear in the text
area on the right-hand side. Only when the participants believe that they
do not have any more terms to associate, they click on the “Done” button
on the left-hand lower side.
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Figure 3.5: AST interface in the free term entry (FTE) task
After the participant clicks the “Done”- button, a second instruction is
presented:
In the second part of the test, some of the terms that you
have typed in previously will be presented to you as pairs.
You will have to indicate the strength of the relationship
between the two terms with regard to their content. Please
rate the strength of the relationship between the two terms
with regard to their content on a scale from 0 to 4.
0 indicates that there exists no or only a very weak relation-
ship between the two terms. The relationship becomes
stronger with increasing numbers. That is to say, if you
choose 4, it implies that you think that the two terms are
strongly related to each other. Please make spontaneous
and quick judgments without long considerations. You do
not have to specify the nature or type of the relationship, nor
do you need to be fully aware of it. A ‘‘gut-feeling’’ of
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relatedness is sufficient for placing a relation between two
concepts.
After confirming their understanding of the instructions, the pairwise com-
parison task is presented as shown in Figure 3.6. On the top of the screen, a
part of the instructions remains visible. Below the instructions, two terms are
presented for the participants to determine their interrelatedness by clicking
on the appropriate number below the two terms.
Figure 3.6: AST interface in the pairwise similarity rating task
After a participant has completed an AST test run, the server modules
provides several files in the comma-separated format (CSV) that contain the
participant’s input for further analysis. For each participant, two files are
generated for each stimulus concept:
1. A cluster matrix displaying the results of the time series variance anal-
ysis of thinking times between concepts. It consists of one line per
identified cluster beginning with the number of the cluster that is fol-
lowed by the associated concepts grouped into that cluster
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2. A time matrix containing four lines. The first line holds all associated
concepts, the second line displays the number of associated concepts,
the third line shows the thinking period prior to the entry of the first
letter of each concept in seconds, and the fourth line displays the typing
time for each concept.
For the concept whose associated terms entered pairwise comparisons, two
additional files are generated:
1. A data matrix containing the raw association strengths as specified by
the participants in a term × term format. Those terms that were not
selected for pairwise comparison are marked with a ‘-’ in the appropri-
ate cells.
2. A pathfinder matrix containing the PFNET(n− 1,∞) of the data ma-
trix. Association strengths are recoded into distances with 1 indicating
shortest distance and 4 indicating the longest distance.
The AST administration module delivers only two basic values per partic-
ipant: The number of associated concepts and the number of edges in the
graph. For obtaining further graph-theoretic metrics for further analyses
purposes, external graph analysis software has to be used. In the context of
this study, two software packages that can import AST’s pathfinder matrices
were employed for this task: UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002)
and AGNA (Benta, 2003).
3.9.3 AST coefficients and their relationship
The AST delivers an individual PFNET graph per participant with node
labels that have been generated by the participant herself through term as-
sociations. Thus, these graphs cannot be compared to each other or to a
referent graph as suggested by Schvaneveldt (1990) and Eckert (1998a), be-
cause these comparisons require graphs with the same nodes. Thus, global
values that describe the graphs are used to quantify AST-generated knowl-
edge networks, based on the suggestions by Bonato (1990, compare section
3.5.3) and Eckert (1998a, compare section 3.5.4). These are:
• Number of associated concepts
• Number of nodes (graph order, equals the number of associated con-
cepts; if a threshold for maximum association is specified and more con-
cepts than the threshold value are associated, this equals the threshold
value)
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• Number of edges (graph size)
• Graph density
• Graph diameter and
• Relative maximum path length (RMPL)
Furthermore, with reference to the FTE method, AST reports the number
of clusters (compare Section 3.3.1). If the coefficients that the AST delivers
represent different aspects of structural knowledge, they must correlate with
certain outside criteria. Also, different coefficients are assumed to correspond
to different knowledge types.
Number of nodes (graph order)
The number of associated concepts is seen as a measure of declarative knowl-
edge. As stated in the model of dimensional knowledge types (compare Fig-
ure 2.8), declarative knowledge is knowledge that can be codified; it consists
of verbalizable chunks in the terms of the ACT-R model. According to the
theory of implicit and explicit knowledge by Dienes and Perner (1999) as pre-
sented in Chapter 2, the ability to verbalize a proposition indicates a certain
level of explicitness. Tulving’s memory model also assumes that declarative
knowledge, whether episodic or semantic in nature, is consciously available
and thus verbalizable. Thus, the number of concepts that a participant asso-
ciates verbally to a stimulus indicate the magnitude of available declarative
knowledge in the given subject domain.
Number of edges (graph size)
The number of edges is assumed to refer more closely to structural knowledge
and to structural implicitness (compare Chapter 2). As they are set by the
participant in a quick and intuitive way and do not have to be explicitly la-
beled, they do not necessarily encompass verbalizable forms of knowledge. In
Engelkamp’s multimodal memory model (compare Figure 2.4), they refer to
connections in the conceptual system. Those can consist of word knowledge,
but those can also consist of referent knowledge which is not articulable if not
connected to word knowledge. In the ACT-R model (compare Section 2.4.2),
edges can refer to productions that link declarative knowledge elements. In
Tulving’s model (compare Figure 2.3) however, edges linking declarative el-
ements to each other are part of the semantic memory system, which is part
of the declarative system. If these edges are accessed in an unconscious way,
they can be seen as a part of implicit memory processes (compare p. 13).
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The differing characteristics that are attributed to concept-linking edges by
the different memory models outline the heterogeneity of the concept: edges
are not purely implicit in nature, but combine implicit and explicit aspects,
which is also visible by their assignment to both categories in the model of
knowledge types (Figure 2.8).
Another reason for the heterogeneity of the edge concept is the fact that
edges are always connected to nodes. In fact, an edge is a set of two nodes.
Edges thus cannot be seen as independent of nodes, which in turn consist of
the associated concepts (which fits into the conceptualization of structural
knowledge as something that links certain entities). The simple number
of edges is thus seen as an operationalization of what Dienes and Perner
describe as explicit knowledge that “can be a representation of compounds
(typically: compound properties) that leaves the structure of its components
implicit” (1999, p. 740). This leads to the fact that the number of edges
depends heavily on the number of associated concepts. Note that despite
their interconnection and the resulting positive correlation between edges and
nodes, they are not mathematically deductible from each other: Participants
specify nodes prior to specifying whether there is a connection between two
nodes, which do not necessarily have to be connected. The number of edges
inside a graph will thus correlate with the number of nodes, but it will not
be deductible from the number of nodes.
Density and weighted density
Another measure capturing the number of edges inside a graph is the density
(compare Section 3.5.3). It specifies the ratio of present edges in relation to
possible edges inside the graph. The density is calculated by
l
1
2n(n− 1)
(3.1)
where l is the number of lines in the graph and n is the number of nodes.
Note that the density measure is logically connected to the number of nodes
and edges in such a way that it will quickly approach values close to 0 if
both the number of edges and the number of nodes increase, as Figure 3.7
illustrates. The density measure is thus logically dependent on the number
of edges and nodes and will display a negative correlation with these two
values.
The same applies to the weighted density measure, which takes the edge
weights as delivered by the AST into account. Therefore, instead of the (bi-
nary) density, the weighted density is employed as proposed by Benta (2003).
It is the sum of all edge values devided by the number of all possible edges
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between the graph density measure, the number of
nodes, and the number of edges inside a graph. White areas are undefined as
the density rises above 1 in those areas. It becomes evident that the density
measure approaches 0 for an increasing number of nodes and only visibly
increases for a high number of edges at low numbers of nodes; most values
will be below 0.2.
in that network. The density of a weighted undirected graph (as supplied by
the AST) is calculated by
2
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1;j=i+1
xij (3.2)
where n is the number of nodes in the network and xij denotes the value of
an undirected edge between nodes ni and nj. Because the weighted density
is the primary indicator of the amount of edges and their strength inside
a graph, it is seen as the primary indicator for structural knowledge, and,
if applied to those edges that a participant cannot label, for structural im-
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plicitness. The weighted density of a knowledge graph is seen as the closest
quantification of the heterogeneous edge construct as discussed above. It is
mathematically connected to the number of edges and nodes similarly to the
regular density measure and will thus also exhibit negative correlations with
the number of edges and nodes as shown in Figure 3.7. This will lead to the
situation that a high number of associations, which are seen as an indicator
of declarative knowledge (see above) will most probably lead to low values of
structural implicitness, indicated by the weighted density. As such a negative
correlation is not justified by the underlying constructs (there is no argument
that justifies the fact that a high amount of declarative knowledge on a sub-
ject conditions a low amount of structural implicitness and vice versa), the
coefficients delivered by the AST cannot be considered as operationalizations
of different knowledge types in the strict sense, but more as an indicator or
correlate.
Diameter
Eckert (1998a) treated the diameter (compare Definition 6 in Section 3.1) as
a measure for the amount of structural knowledge (compare Section 3.5.4).
However, his networks were directed whereas undirected networks as pro-
duced by the AST will more likely display short diameter values with less
variance. The relationship between the diameter and knowledge types re-
mains open at this point, but it has to be treated as a somewhat meaningful
measure for knowledge because it is correlated with outside criteria such as
grades in SLT-elicited knowledge graphs (Ceglarek, forthcoming). The di-
ameter is not independent of the number of nodes and the number of edges;
larger graphs in terms of number of nodes and edges will increase the prob-
ability for larger diameters, as the distances between nodes increase with
graph size. The diameter will thus exhibit positive correlations with the
number of nodes and the number of edges.
Relative maximum path length (RMPL)
The relative maximum path length denotes the relationship between a graph’s
diameter and the longest possible path inside that graph (compare Section
3.5.3). Bonato (1990) established it as a measure for compactness of knowl-
edge graphs; an RMPL of 1 occurs if all nodes are aligned on one path while
a RMPL of 0 indicates a star-shaped graph with one node in the center and
all other nodes connected to it with a path distance of 1. Bonato (1990)
argued that smaller RMPL values indicate a more favorable integration of
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knowledge elements (compare Section 3.5.3). RMPL is calculated by
d
(n− 1) (3.3)
where d is the diameter of a given graph and n is its number of nodes (graph
degree). Figure 3.8 visualizes the relationship between the number of nodes
in a graph, its diameter and its RMPL value. It becomes clear that the
RMPL will exhibit positive correlations with the number of nodes in a graph
and its diameter.
Figure 3.8: Relationship between the graph RMPL measure, the number of
nodes, and the graph diameter. It becomes evident that the RMPL measure
approaches the favorable 0 for an increasing number of nodes under short
diameter values.
Due to the fact that Equation 3.3 involves the diameter, which already
includes edges and nodes for calculation in the nominator, and the number
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of nodes in the denominator, it is by definition more closely linked to the
number of associated concepts (explicit knowledge, see above) than to the
number of edges (explicit structural knowledge and structural implicitness).
It is thus seen as indicator of the organization of explicit knowledge.
Number of clusters
The number of clusters is primarily dependent on the number of verbal asso-
ciations made by a participant and by their speed. It will thus correlate with
the number of associated concepts. The number of clusters is supposed to
probe into the conceptual knowledge structure of expert declarative knowl-
edge (Beatty & Gerace, 2002) and thus belongs to the explicit domain.
Conclusion
Not all AST coefficients can be derived from each other mathematically, but
all of them will correlate to differing extents due to their dependence on nodes
and edges, which are again correlated. For example, both the diameter and
the number of clusters in a graph correlate positively with its degree, which
also leads to a positive correlation between the diameter and the number of
clusters. The correlational structure of all AST-coefficients is presented in
Table 3.3. This dependency leads to to the question whether all measures
should be combined to a single measure, as it will probably lead to a single-
factor structure of AST coefficients.
There are however subtle differences among the concepts. For example,
the weighted density contains not only the number of edges with reference
to the possible number of edges, but is also the only coefficient that contains
the edge strength. All measures will correlate, but a combination of all mea-
sures into one coefficient, e. g. through factor analysis, will most probably
annihilate such subtleties. The individual measures are thus retained for the
time being. The internal consistency of the AST coefficients will have to be
determined through correlation and oblique factor analysis.
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Table 3.3: Dependency and correlational structure of AST coefficients. +
indicates a positive correlation, – a negative correlation, ++ a positive formal
mathematical dependency, and −− a negative one.
Degree Order W. Density Diameter RMPL Cluster
Degree + −− + −− +
Order −− + - +
W. Density – + –
Diameter ++ +
RMPL –
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To conclude this section, Figure 3.9 shows an AST-elicited PFNET of a
cleaning apprentice from Experiment 7.1.4.
Figure 3.9: AST-elicited knowledge graph. This participant was a cleaning
apprentice who completed the AST with the stimulus “carpet cleaning”
3.9.4 Hypotheses
It is assumed that the different AST-elicited coefficients number of associ-
ated concepts (graph order), the number of links (graph size), the weighted
density, the diameter, and the relative maximum path length have subtly dif-
ferent relations to different types of knowledge, i.e. that they operationalize
differing underlying concepts – declarative knowledge and structural knowl-
edge – which are correlated but not the same (see above). At the same time,
the mathematical and logical dependencies between the coefficients render
the use of a factor analysis over AST coefficients questionable as items are
mathematically related. A factor analysis can only serve as a representation
of the dependencies summarized in Table 3.3, but an oblique factor rotation
might conserve the assumed subtle differences among constructs. It will thus
be performed prior to testing the following hypothesis in order to illuminate
the AST’s internal consistency.
The elicitation of explicit and implicit knowledge structures that are un-
consciously accessed and are part of individual non-explicit knowledge as
outlined in Chapter 2 is the prime attempt of the AST system. First of all,
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the fundamental claim, namely the assumption that the AST elicits connec-
tions between knowledge elements that are implicit, needs to be tested. This
hypothesis is thus the main AST-related hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.9.1 If test participants working on the AST are asked to place
unlabeled edges between two concepts in a quick and intuitive way, they place
more edges than in a condition where edges have to be labeled.
If the AST does measure knowledge, it should display sensitivity to learn-
ing, the process of knowledge acquisition. This is being put forward in the
second AST-related hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.9.2 AST coefficients show change in their respective direc-
tion towards more knowledge if learning occurs in a field that targets the
specific knowledge types.
Although the AST is not a test in the classical sense as participants create
their own items during the test under certain constraints, its construct valid-
ity has to be investigated, as it claims to measure a construct (knowledge).
Construct validity refers to the degree to which inferences can be made from
the operationalizations of a construct – the AST’s coefficients – to the theo-
retical construct on which the operationalization is based (Campbell & Fiske,
1959). Thus, as Campbell and Fiske suggested, the AST is compared to out-
side criteria for validation. Due to the fact that the constructs are already
heterogeneous in nature (compare Section 3.9.3), the following hypotheses
are considered to be of less significance than the two above main hypotheses.
Despite its differences to other structural knowledge elicitation techniques
(compare Table 3.2), the AST does have similarities to other elicitation tech-
niques requiring the participants to associate concepts to a stimulus, e.g.
SLT. Although the SLT captures only edges with explicit labels, such edges
are considered to be included in the set of edges that the AST elicits (edges
with labels and those edges that the participants cannot label). Thus, the
different indices that are both available for the AST and the SLT should
display correlations to a certain extent if employed on the same participants
with the same stimulus concept (convergent validity).
Hypothesis 3.9.3 The number of associated concepts, the number of links,
the density, the diameter, and the relative maximum path lengths of SLT-
elicited knowledge graphs and AST-elicited knowledge graphs correlate.
Furthermore, if AST-elicited knowledge has proven to be viable for the at-
tainment of certain goals (compare the knowledge definition in Chapter 2),
AST scores have to correlate with measures of goal attainment (congruent
validity).
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Hypothesis 3.9.4 AST-elicited structural knowledge measures that have
been obtained for a certain domain correlate with performance measures that
indicate achievement in that particular domain.
The prime research assumption put forward at the end of the second chap-
ter stated that a part of individual non-explicit knowledge can be conceptu-
alized as unconscious access to structural knowledge (structural implicitness,
compare Chapter 2). It has been hypothesized that the AST is able to at
least partly capture those unconsciously available concept relations. There-
fore, one has to assume that AST scores indicating structural implicitness (i.
e. the weighted density) correlate with implicit knowledge.
Hypothesis 3.9.5 In a task that involves implicit knowledge for successful
completion, the AST-elicited weighted density measure correlates with task
performance if the AST is invoked with a stimulus concept that captures the
nature of the task in question.
In order to empirically test Hypothesis 3.9.5 in a laboratory setting, a task is
required that does require implicit knowledge for completion. Such a task –
complex problem solving (CPS) – is presented in the following chapter. It is
followed by chapters on the role of knowledge on group level in CPS and its
elicitation. These lead to the presentation of the research method in Chapter
7.
Chapter 4
Knowledge in Complex
Problem Solving (CPS)
In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, a task
is required that involves implicit knowledge for successful completion and
whose successful completion can be determined with an objective measure in
order to demonstrate the usefulness of knowledge assessment through perfor-
mance prediction: If (implicit) knowledge enables a certain performance, the
amount and/or quality of that particular knowledge should serve as a pre-
dictor of the quality of the knowledge-related performance. This assumption
is employed widely in assessment practice in different contexts. For exam-
ple, future driving abilities are tested with a theoretical pen-and-pencil test
on driving-related knowledge in driving school. Military aircraft pilots’ abil-
ity to perform certain manoeuvres is assessed by assessing their structural
knowledge on flight-related concepts (Schvaneveldt et al., 1985).
In the same way, knowledge assessment with the AST (compare previous
chapter) will be used for performance prediction in a task. This should be a
realistic task modeling a capability that is useful outside of the psychological
laboratory. The task presented in this chapter is complex problem solving
(CPS).
4.1 Defining Complex Problems
According to Dörner (1979), a problem generally consists of three aspects:
An undesired initial state, a desired target state and some sort of barrier
preventing the immediate transformation of the initial state into the target
state (see also Kersting, 1999). Problems can be classified into simple and
complex problems, depending on the characteristics of the barrier and of the
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target state. In simple problems, the barrier can be overcome by combining
operations known to the problem solver (Kluge, 2004). These problems are
often artificial (or interpolative) puzzles like Towers of Hanoi (ibid) and they
have a clearly defined target state.
Complex problems resemble realistic everyday problems (Kluge, 2004;
Kersting, 1999), as faced by managers and politicians (Endres & Putz-
Osterloh, 1994). Complex problems are characterized by the complexity of
the situation, by opaqueness, interconnectedness, dynamics, and by polytely
(Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither, & Stäudel, 1983). Kluge (2004, p. 6), summarizes
the findings (Dörner et al., 1983; J. Funke, 1992; U. Funke, 1993; Kersting,
1999; Strauß & Kleinmann, 1995; Süß, 1996) on these five characteristics in
the following way:
• The complexity of the situation refers to the fact that the amount of
information to process is beyond individual human processing capabil-
ities, preventing a complete processing of all available information and
the arrival at an optimal solution.
• Opaqueness refers to the necessity of an active information search in
solving a complex problem, as not all decision-relevant information is
directly available.
• Interconnectedness refers to dependencies between the involved vari-
ables. The problem solver must discover dependencies between the
variables he or she can alter and must discover interdependency struc-
tures.
• Dynamics or momentum implies that the situation changes without ac-
tions of the problem solver which limits the time available for reflection
• Polytely means that there are multiple, possibly conflicting goals to
achieve. This requires “...the careful elaboration of priorities and a
balance between contradicting, conflicting goals” (J. Funke, 2001b, p.
72).
According to Funke (2001b), these characteristics can be reduced to two
main characteristics of complex problem solving: The connectivity between
variables and the dynamic nature of the problem situation. Neither can be
achieved with pen-and-pencil techniques, whereas the opaqueness depends
largely on how the problem is presented and complexity is mainly a result
of the connectivity. “Connectivity characterizes the structural features of
the system. The dynamics brings about a procedural aspect in form of a
time-dependent characteristic” (Kluge, 2004, p. 6, own translation). “To
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summarise: in CPS research, tasks are used which consist of two specific, dis-
tinctive features, namely connectivity and dynamics. Both attributes need a
computer program for their realisation, and cannot be realised by a paper-
and-pencil approach” (J. Funke, 2001b, p. 73). Based on the abovemen-
tioned considerations, Frensch and Funke (1995, p. 18) provide the following
definition of CPS, which is the one employed in this thesis:
CPS occurs to overcome barriers between a given state and a de-
sired goal state by means of behavioral and/or cognitive, multi-
step activities. The given state, goal state, and barriers between
given state and goal state are complex, change dynamically dur-
ing problem solving, and are intransparent. The exact properties
of the given state, goal state, and barriers are unknown to the
solver at the outset. CPS implies the efficient interaction between
a solver and the situational requirements of the task, and involves
a solver’s cognitive, emotional, personal, and social abilities and
knowledge.
The competence to solve complex, dynamic and partially intransparent prob-
lems can be seen as a key competence for all academic professions (Wittmann,
Süß, & Oberauer, 1996).
4.2 Analyzing CPS Performance with
Dynamic Scenarios
Computer programs simulating complex problems are referred to as micro-
worlds (Quesada, Kintsch, & Gomez, 2002) or dynamic scenarios (J. Funke,
2001a). These scenarios combine a formally complex task with a seman-
tic embedding (Hussy & Klinck, 1990). Over several intervals, the problem
solver is supposed to reach his or her goal and to make changes to the sce-
nario (Kluge, 2004). Such systems simulate, for example, the operation of
a forestry (FSYS, Wagener, Hochholdinger, Conrad, & Wittmann, 1997),
the work of a peace corps (MORO, Strohschneider, 1991; Endres & Putz-
Osterloh, 1994), being the mayor of a mid-sized town (LOHHAUSEN, Dörner
et al., 1983), and the operation of a small shirt factory (TAYLORSHOP, Süß
& Faulhaber, 1990). The simulations vary by the number of control variables
(from two to more than 2000) and by the complexity of the underlying vari-
able structure and algorithms. An overview over a number of microworlds
can be found in Funke (1992) and in Kluge (2004).
Psychometric assessment with dynamic scenarios faces two challenges:
comparability between participants’ performance in the same simulation and
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comparability between scores in different scenarios (J. Funke, 2001a; Kluge,
2004). With regard to the first issue, the problem in CPS lies in their feature
that “once a subject has entered the first response, the subject moves through
the microworld on an individual path.... It is virtually impossible that two
subjects follow exactly the same pathway through the system” (J. Funke,
1995, p. 248). In other words, the control over the manipulation is difficult
because the test situation in a given moment depends on the participant’s
previous alterations to the system and the test situation between participants
working on the same scenario is different after the first alterations, given
that they altered the system in two different ways. This feature complicates
standardization and control of the test situation significantly (Kluge, 2004, p.
9). However, the fact that stimuli are produced by the participants does not
render the entire experiment useless, but it demands a very careful analysis
of between-subject effects (J. Funke, 1995).
The fact that different scenarios employ different formal underlying sets
of logic complicates comparison across different scenarios (Wittmann et al.,
1996). Originally, Dörner and colleagues assumed that dynamic scenarios
are a valid operationalization of problem solving capability, a construct they
assumed to be mainly independent of standard IQ (Dörner & Kaminski, 1987;
Dörner, 1987, 1994; Dörner et al., 1983), comparable to Sternberg’s concept
of practical intelligence (R. J. Sternberg et al., 2000). However, the fact that
correlations between different scenario performance scores differ depending
on the employed scenario casts doubt on this construct (Wittmann et al.,
1996) and CPS performance is seen as an application of acquired scenario-
specific knowledge, mediated by the capacity of information processing (ibid).
According to Funke (2001b), two formal frameworks underlying micro-
worlds satisfy the two main requirements of complex problems (connectivity
and dynamics): The linear structural equation (LSE) approach and the the-
ory of finite state automate (FSA). Both are briefly outlined in the following.
4.2.1 Linear structural equations (LSE)
Linear structural models can represent systems that consist of quantitative
variables. The variables that can be directly manipulated by the problem
solver are represented as exogenous variables, the endogenous variables are
influenced by exogenous variables and cannot be directly manipulated. The
state of each endogenous variable at a given point in time t can be calculated
as a linear combination of exogenous and endogenous variables at t− 1 that
influence the endogenous variable in question. Thus, the state of a system
with n endogenous variables at a point in time can be described as a set of
n linear equations. Consider the following example (adapted from J. Funke,
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2001b, p. 75): A simple dynamic system has two exogenous variables A and
B and two endogenous variables Y and Z. The state of Y and Z at time t
depends on the weighted states of the variables at time t− 1 as presented in
Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Structure of a simple linear system with two exogenous variables
A and B and two endogenous variables Y and Z. The arrow weights indicate
the state at time t by multiplying the states at time t − 1 (adapted from
J. Funke, 2001a, p. 76).
This system can be represented with two linear equations (one for each
endogenous variable) as follows:
Yt+1 = 2At
Zt+1 = 3At − 2Bt + 0.5Yt + 0.9Zt
In linear structural systems, the problem solver’s task is “(a) to find out
how the exogenous and endogenous variables are related to each other, and
(b) to control the variables in the system so that they reach a certain goal
value” (J. Funke, 2001a, p. 75).
4.2.2 Finite state automata
Finite state automata can be used to formally describe systems with a more
limited scope if it meets three criteria: The sytem can only be in a limited
number of states, transitions from one state to another are triggered either
by user input or through an automatic process, and user input and system
states produce an output signal. FSA are a way of representing dynamic
systems whose variables are of nominal scale (Kluge, 2004). Examples for
finite state automata are ticket machines, coffee machines, and video tape
recorders. FSAs can be represented as state-transition matrices and directed
graphs (compare J. Funke, 2001a, p. 77 for further details on FSA).
Taken together, despite their challenges, dynamic systems possess the
quality of escaping “both the narrow straits of the laboratory and the deep
blue sea of field study, because scenarios allow for a high degree of fidelity
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with respect to reality and at the same time allow systematic control of
influential factors” (J. Funke, 2001a, p. 70).
4.3 Determinants of Individual Complex Prob-
lem Solving
According to Funke (1995), three different factors affect individual CPS per-
formance: person, situation, and system variables (p. 250). Person factors
are competencies that the subject acquires during interaction with the sit-
uation, for example knowledge on how to successfully control a microworld.
Person factors can also refer to individual disposition such as computer ex-
perience and test intelligence (see for example J. Funke, 1992, 1995, 2004;
Kersting, 1991, 1999; Preußler, 1996; Süß, 1996; Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer,
1991). Situation factors refer to a variation of experimental context inde-
pendent from the used scenario, e. g. to the possibility to experiment with
a system prior to task performance or to group versus individual settings.
System factors are formal or content related attributes of the scenario, e.g.
differences in the semantic embedding or different underlying algorithms.
The following sections primarily deal with person factors. Situation factors
in the sense of group settings are discussed in Chapter 5, but system factors
are not in the focus of this study. An overview of the influence of situation
factors on CPS performance can be found in Kluge (2004).
Among person factors, previous studies identified domain-specific declar-
ative knowledge and intelligence, especially reasoning (compare Section 2.7),
as influencing complex problem solving performance (J. Funke, 1992, 1995,
2004; Kersting, 1991, 1999; Preußler, 1996; Süß, 1996; Süß et al., 1991).
Apart from these established determinants of complex problem solving per-
formance, other individual influences such as other types of knowledge apart
from declarative knowledge have been suggested for prediction of CPS per-
formance, for example implicit knowledge (Berry, 1984; Berry & Broadbent,
1995; Broadbent, FitzGerald, & Broadbent, 1986; Buchner, Funke, & Berry,
1995). These individual determinants will be outlined in detail in the follow-
ing sections.
4.4 Intelligence
The discussion on the role of (test-) intelligence in CPS was sparked by
Dörner’s claim that test intelligence and the ability to solve complex prob-
lems are statistically unrelated (Dörner, 1979, 1980; Dörner et al., 1983)
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and has been a rather heated one (Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). Dörner
and colleagues found near-zero correlations between their employed general
IQ measures and their subjects’ performance in the LOHHAUSEN scenario
(Dörner et al., 1983). They argued that their employed microworld is a
valid operationalization of a real-world complex problem and questioned the
validity of IQ-tests, because of their inability to predict CPS performance.
Contrary to Dörner’s findings, others (e. g. Strohschneider, 1990, 1991;
Wittmann et al., 1996; J. Funke, 1983, 1986, 1992, 2001b; Kersting, 1999;
Kluge, 2004) did find significant correlations between measures of IQ and
CPS performance. An extended discussion of contradictory findings in CPS
with regard to the influence of test intelligence on performance is given by
Beckmann and Guthke (1995). They argue that contradictory results are
yielded by several moderator variables employed in different studies, such as
different interaction effects between solver and tasks, varying goal definitions,
differences in semantic embeddedness, transparency, requirements etc. They
conclude that both CPS and IQ research have certain deficits and demand a
shift away from “unsatisfactory global correlations between intelligence test
scores and CPS performance” (p. 186) towards identifications of the role
of specific cognitive processes in particular CPS situations. Funke (1995, p.
252) concludes that intelligence measures can predict CPS performance if two
criteria are met: (1) Instead of global IQ measures, more specific concepts
have to be employed and capacity of information processing as included as
“reasoning” in the BIS intelligence model (Operation K, compare Section
2.7) appears to be the most promising one; (2) “CPS quality has to be
measured reliably-a condition which is rarely met“ (p. 252). Due to the fact
that the larger number of studies did find a connection between reasoning
and CPS, and based on Funke’s argument, it can be proclaimed that one can
expect a correlation between the capacity of information processing and CPS
performance. The current state of literature as summarized in Kluge (2004)
can be interpreted in such a way that with regard to personal factors, CPS
performance can be explained as a combination of knowledge and intelligence.
4.5 Knowledge
Funke (2001a) argues that a complex problem-solving task has two main
demands, both related to the concept of knowledge: knowledge acquisition
and knowledge application. Knowledge acquisition is synonymous to the at-
tempt to identify the structure of the problem, i.e. to “find out details about
the connectivity of the variables and their dynamics” (p. 79). The analy-
sis of structure and dynamics are inseparable because system analysis can
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only take place as a process over time. The process of knowledge acquisition
requires identification strategies that establish different qualities of relation-
ships between system variables (i. e. existence, direction, and strength).
Knowledge application refers to a period of system control aiming at the
achievement of a certain goal state within the system. In systems based on
the linear structural equation model (compare Section 4.2), it requires two
subgoals: The transformation of a given state into a target state, and, once
achieved, the sustainment of that state.
Funke (2001a) sees knowledge acquisition as a necessary and sufficient
condition for knowledge application, but the two processes cannot, despite
the possibility of their formal distinction through experiment design, be
viewed as independent from each other: in knowledge application, new knowl-
edge is formed and newly acquired knowledge is often applied during the
process of its acquisition. Studies by Süß (1999) and Kersting (1991) show
significant correlations between knowledge acquisition and CPS performance
if subjects are instructed to acquire knowledge. Findings on the role of
specific types of knowledge as presented in Chapter 2 are presented in the
following subsections, if available.
4.5.1 Declarative knowledge
The role of knowledge in CPS has been empirically analyzed in a myriad of
studies. For the German field of research, Kluge (2004) groups the works
into schools or groups around certain authors. Without reproducing her ex-
tensive classification, the following groups have placed a special emphasis on
the role of forms of declarative knowledge in CPS: Kluwe and colleagues,
(e. g. Kluwe, 1991, 1996, 1997), Putz-Osterloh and colleagues (e. g. En-
dres & Putz-Osterloh, 1994; Putz-Osterloh, 1981, 1993; Putz-Osterloh &
Lüer, 1981), Funke (e. g. J. Funke, 1992, 1995), and Kersting, Süß and
Wittmann (Kersting, 1991, 1999; Süß, 1996, 1999). Some of the findings of
these groups will be presented briefly in this section; for a complete review,
compare Chapter 2 in Kluge (2004).
All of the abovementioned groups use their own conceptualizations and
forms of knowledge, which makes a comparison difficult. In the following,
their terminology that they see as a resemblance or subcategory of declarative
knowledge as introduced in Chapter 2 will be outlined.
In the context of CPS, Kluge refers to declarative knowledge as domain
knowledge (2004, p. 40). Domain knowledge is about the components of
the system and includes fact-knowledge on the function and organization of
system components and their possible states (ibid). In his 1997 study, Kluwe
elicited participants’ knowledge on the computer interface of a technical sim-
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ulation of an asphalt plant and found significant correlations with control
performance.
Putz-Osterloh (1993) refers to two types of knowledge required for CPS:
“knowledge about ‘how the system works’ ”(p. 332) and “about ‘How to
use the system’ ” (p. 332). Due to the fact that she equates knowledge
about how the system works with “structure” (p. 332) (i. e. the system’s
components, input and output variables, and their interdependencies), it
becomes evident that she is referring to conscious access to structural knowl-
edge as introduced in Section 2.5. Her empiric results are thus reported in
the section on structural knowledge. Knowledge about how to use the sys-
tem is explained as “goal-specific methods and goal-specific functions known
when accomplishing a specific control task” (Putz-Osterloh, 1993, p. 332)
which is categorized as procedural knowledge according to the model in Fig-
ure 2.8. Putz-Osterloh (1993) does not specify whether this knowledge is
accessed consciously or subconsciously, but her speculations on the impor-
tance of non-verbalizable forms of knowledge in CPS (Putz-Osterloh, 1993,
p. 334ff) allows the assumptions that she attributes relevance to both modes
of retrieval.
Funke (1992) states that the quality of CPS performance is determined
by the fit between the subjectively assumed “connectivity structure” (p. 72,
own translation) between the system’s variables and its objectively correct
connectivity structure. In his research, he elicits this structure with causal
diagram analysis: Participants are presented with a diagram containing a box
for each system variable. They are then asked to draw lines between those
variables where they assume a relationship, and are asked to specify further
information, if known: the direction of the relation with an arrowhead, the
sign of the relationship with a plus or a minus, and a factor in terms of
a number. This operationalization of the subjective mental model is thus
a consciously verbalizable form of structural knowledge, and the according
empiric results are presented in the section on structural knowledge.
Süß (1996) and Wittmann, Süß, and Oberauer (1996) present a model of
knowledge types for CPS-relevant knowledge that distinguishes between two
dimensions: what a person knows (fact knowledge and knowledge of actions)
and how a person knows: declarative (verbalizable knowledge) vs. procedural
(through action), compare Table 4.1.
With reference to the dimensional model of knowledge types (cf. Figure
2.8), these knowledge types translate into declarative knowledge (declara-
tive/fact and declarative/action), conscious access to procedural knowledge
(procedural/fact) and to procedural knowledge with arbitrary access mode
(procedural/action). Süß, Kersting, and Oberauer (1991; 1993) found sig-
nificant positive correlations between both postulated forms of declarative
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Table 4.1: Taxonomy of knowledge types with examples from the control of
a simulated coal power plant (adapted from Wittmann et al., 1996, p. 5)
Fact knowledge: Action knowledge:
What is the state? What to do?
Declarative knowledge: How is coal supply How can I quickly
Being able to answer related to steam increase energy
questions pressure? output?
Procedual knowledge: Anicipation of steam Assembly of an optional
Acting successfully pressure curve after a sequence of system
sequence of system alterations for the
alterations creation of a target
curve of energy
output
knowledge and microworld performance, and in the Wittman et al. study
from 1996, domain-specific declarative knowledge was the strongest perfor-
mance predictor of the participants’ performance in the TAYLORSHOP mi-
croworld.
In summary, the above findings allow the following two conclusions: (1)
Declarative knowledge has been found to correlate with CPS performance
and, more specifically, (2) the quality of consciously available structural
knowledge is seen as a predictor of CPS performance and is counted to the
domain of declarative knowledge by Putz-Osterloh (1993).
4.5.2 Procedural knowledge
An empiric analysis of the ability to solve a complex problem in the sense
of non-verbalizable know-how can be found in Funke (1992). He attempted
to operationalize this ability as “differences between target and actual values
averaged over intervals and all dependant variables during the control phase”
(p. 86, own translation). Due to the skewdness of the observed distribution
of this value, he employed a logarithmic scale for his measure, entitled quality
of system control (QoS).
The problem with this measure is that it equals the dependant variable
CPS performance an thus cannot be treated as a independent variable op-
erationalizing procedural knowledge. The QoS measure further depends on
a dynamic scenario with specific target values for each interval in order to
calculate deviations for each one. This condition is met in few microworlds,
as it conflicts with one of the features of CPS, namely its arbitrary goals
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(compare Section 4.1).
Other attempts to capture the ability to control a dynamic system have
always relied on verbalizable knowledge and thus cannot be counted to the
domain of procedural knowledge in the strict sense as outlined in Figure 2.8.
An example is the operationalization of scenario-specific declarative action
knowledge (compare Table 4.1) by Wittmann, Süß and Oberauer (1996) as
rules of thumb. Correct and incorrect rules of thumb for the control of
the TAYLORSHOP system were presented as items on a questionnaire and
participants had to decide whether the item is either true or false. Although
this measure correlated significantly with TAYLORSHOP performance while
other measures of declarative fact knowledge did not, this operationalization
cannot be seen as anything but a special form of declarative knowledge. In
summary, empiric evidence for the role of procedural knowledge in CPS is
scarce, although non-verbalizable forms of knowledge are assumed to play a
part in CPS, as the following subsection will outline.
4.5.3 Implicit knowledge
In the context of CPS, implicit knowledge can be captured by Kluwe’s define-
nition (2006) as “performance advantages in the accomplishment of cognitive
requirements, which are based on an unconscious use of previously perceived
and unintentionally stored information” (p. 41, own translation). It is thus
closely related to implicit memory processes (compare Chapter 2), which re-
trieve specific events or experiences “without making the actual content and
its meaning conscious” (Markowitsch, 1999, p. 25, own translation).
The concept of implicit knowledge with regard to CPS has been raised
and studied by a group at Oxford University, centered around Berry and
Broadbent (Berry, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1995; Broadbent et al., 1986).
In the study from 1984, they employed the SUGAR PRODUCTION FAC-
TORY and the PERSON INTERACTION microworlds. Both tasks are simi-
lar with regard to their underlying formal logic: a target state of one variable
has to be reached and maintained through the alteration of two input vari-
ables (in case of the sugar factory, the number of workers and the behaviour
towards the union leader). The goal variable also depended on its state in the
previous interval. In the person interaction task, participants had to engage
in a computer-simulated interaction and reach a certain level of friendliness
in a simulated interaction partner. In both scenarios, performance signif-
icantly increased over several repeated trials while practice had no effect
on the participants’ ability to answer questions on the underlying formal
structure. In other words, good problem solvers in terms of scenario perfor-
mance did not show significantly better results in multiple-choice tests on
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system knowledge than poor problem solvers. When Berry (1984) provided
the participants with decarative knowledge on the system, it led to signifi-
cantly better results in the knowledge test, but did not lead to an increase of
microworld performance in a second experiment. This dissociation between
verbalizable, declarative knowledge, and problem solving performance led the
to the conclusion that non-salient relationships in the system were learned
implicitly and were not accessible in a verbalizable way outside of the context
in which the system had to be controlled. Evidence for this dissociation was
also found in later studies (Berry, 1991; Broadbent et al., 1986), and Süß
(1996, p. 175) reported similar effects with the TAYLORSHOP microworld.
The sugar factory scenario that Berry and Broadbent employed was how-
ever not a linear structural model, but a finite state automat (compare Sec-
tion 4.2.2). Thus, the dissociation between verbalizable knowledge about the
automat’s states and the ability to control it can be based on the fact that
successful operators only have knowledge on desired target states of the au-
tomat, while unsuccessful operators have found themselves in a larger number
of undesirable states and have thus acquired more knowledge on the system
as a whole (Buchner et al., 1995). Other studies (e. g. Marescaux, Luc,
& Karnas, 1989; Sanderson, 1989; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope,
1989; Berry & Broadbent, 1995) also challenged the original assumption and
led Barry and Broadbent to summarize that “the dissociation between task
performance and associated verbalizable knowledge may not be as complete
as was at first thought” (Berry & Broadbent, 1995, p. 136). After a series
of further experiments with the WHALE GAME scenario (ibid), they still
postulate the assumption that repeated practice of scenario control does lead
to implicit knowledge on scenario control by stating the following principle:
“Keeping the idea that some knowledge is symbolic (verbal) and some is sub-
symbolic (nonverbal). These broad categories of knowledge are most readily
tested by different methods of measurement; questioning or measuring per-
formance. They are also most readily acquired in different ways; verbal
instruction and direct task experience being examples” (ibid, p. 146).
Dorfman, Shames, and Kihlstrom (1996) support this argument by stat-
ing that intuition and insight also account for CPS performance, which they
count to the implicit domain. However, experimental support for this notion
is so far laregely limited to the Oxford group’s work and has not yet been
applied to a group setting.
4.5.4 Structural knowledge
According to Funke (2001b), the quality of a problem solver’s identification of
a complex system, i.e. the quality of his or her knowledge acquisition process,
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can be assessed by obtaining the subject’s view of the casual relations of the
microworld. Thus, conscious access to structural knowledge is seen as a key
quality for CPS performance. This causal structure is then compared to the
existing one throgh structural assessment. In his study from 1992, Funke
operationalized structural knowledge assessment as causal diagram analysis
(compare Section 4.5.1). His resulting coefficient, quality of causal knowledge
(QoC), significantly correlated with the quality of system control in one study
at r = .54 (J. Funke, 2001a, p. 96).
In her 1993 study, Putz-Osterloh attempted to provide structural knowl-
edge to a group of problem solvers by providing them with the causal di-
agram of the system during the knowledge acquisition phase. Surprisingly,
the so-equipped group did not show significantly better CPS scores than a
control group that had been deprived of the structural information. In a
subsequent transfer task involving a modified dynamic scenario, the group
that had initially learned from the diagram outperformed the non-diagram
group. However, her design makes the fact evident that she employs a dif-
ferent concept of structural knowledge than the one presented in Section
2.5. Instead of viewing structural knowledge as integrated connectedness of
individual knowledge organization, structural knowledge “is defined as gen-
eral knowledge about the variables of a system and their causal relations”
(Schoppek, 2002, p. 2) in complex problem solving research and dynamic
system analysis (ibid). This form of specific knowledge of system structure,
as one could refer to it, thus belongs to the explicit domain, as Preußler
(1998) states by referring to the acquisition of this type of system knowledge
during learning as “explicit learning” (Preußler, 1998, p. 218, own trans-
lation). Preußler tried to elicit this knowledge of system structure with a
graph-building technique (compare Section 3.6) and did find positive corre-
lations between this type of knowledge an system performance. Contrary
to those results, Putz-Osterloh (1988) did not find such a connection. She
employed the structure-laying technique (compare Section 3.5.2) for eliciting
participants’ knowledge of causal relations between system variables. She
provided 20 readily labeled cards with the variable names of the dynamic
scenario she employed (MORO) to her subjects and asked them to place the
assumed variable relations between the cards. The correct number of placed
relations divided by the total number of placed relations was used as an
index for structural knowledge and it did not correlate with scenario perfor-
mance. This operationalization illustrates that Putz-Osterloh employs the
term structural knowledge in a different way than the way it was introduced
in Chapter 2.
Using the same complex-scenario specific definition of structural knowl-
edge as knowledge on the structure between system variables, Schoppek
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(2002) also did not find correlations with CPS performance.
In summary, both Schoppek and Putz-Osterloh attribute an important
role to structural knowledge in complex problem solving, define structural
knowledge in a very specific and explicit way and fail to find empiric sup-
port for their assumption. Thus, empiric findings on the connection between
structural knowledge and CPS are somewhat scarce and suffer from differ-
ent or unstated definitions of structural knowledge. However, the available
data leads Funke (2001a) to the conclusion that the assessment of structural
knowledge for prediction of CPS performance is not without problems, “but
in a number of studies this procedure has been validated” (p. 81). Thus, the
role of structural knowledge, defined as the organization of the relationships
of concepts in long-term memory providing the integration and organization
of declarative knowledge in such a manner to be accessible to procedural
knowledge applications (compare Section 2.5) will be revisited in the fur-
ther scope of this thesis because it is thought to positively influence complex
problem solving abilities.
4.6 Summary and Hypotheses
The ability to solve complex problems can be seen as a key competence for
all academic professions (Wittmann et al., 1996). Complex problems can
be simulated with computer-simulated dynamic scenarios or microworlds.
Personal factors influencing individual complex problem solving (CPS) per-
formance are intelligence, especially the capacity of information processing,
and knowledge. Apart from declarative knowledge in the sense of the model
presented in Figure 2.8, findings indicate that both implicit knowledge and
consciously available structural knowledge play a part in CPS. Since a part of
implicit knowledge can be conceptualized as unconscious access to structural
knowledge, the following hypothesis is put forward:
Hypothesis 4.6.1 Individual CPS performance is positively correlated with
implicit knowledge that is acquired through experience with a dynamic system.
If H 4.1 holds true:
Hypothesis 4.6.2 The acquisition of implicit knowledge through experience
leads to higher levels of structural implicitness than the acquisition of scenario
knowledge without experience.
If both 4.1 and 4.2 hold true, 4.3 follows:
Hypothesis 4.6.3 Individual CPS performance correlates positively with
scenario-relevant implicit structural knowledge.
Chapter 5
The Influence of Knowledge on
Problem Solving in Groups
Until now, this thesis has mainly referred to individual knowledge, its differ-
ent forms and shapes, its importance in (individual) complex problem solving
tasks, and to the ability to elicit a certain form of knowledge, namely struc-
tural knowledge. Thus, person factors of Funke’s taxonomy of variables that
affect CPS (J. Funke, 1995, compare Chapter 4) have been in the focus of
attention so far. This chapter will introduce complex problem solving in
small groups as a situation factor of CPS, review findings from literature
and present hypotheses on how the distribution of knowledge inside a group
affects its ability to solve complex problems. According to Forsyth (2006),
“a group is defined as two or more individuals who are connected to one an-
other by social relationships” (p. 3). More specifically, a team is defined as “a
distinguishable set of two or more people who interact, dynamically, indepen-
dently, and adaptively toward a common and valued goal/objective/mission,
who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who
have a limited life-span of membership” (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas,
& Cannon-Bowers, 2000, p. 273).
5.1 Research Strands on Group Performance
As stated in the introduction, assigning tasks to groups is seen as a possibility
to overcome individual information processing limitations in complex infor-
mation environments (J. H. Davis, 1980; Kahnemann et al., 1982). Project-
oriented team work is one of the most common forms of collaboration in
today’s knowledge-intensive businesses (Scholl, 1997). However, research on
the effects of group work on problem solving performance has revealed that
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group processes can lead to an increase in group performance as well as to
a decrease in group performance (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). In order to
determine the conditions under which groups show a higher level of perfor-
mance, different models and mechanisms have been suggested (Knippenberg,
De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). One aspect, the effect of knowledge distribution
inside groups on their performance, has been the subject of extensive research
under different headings in different fields, e.g. in research on team mental
models (Mathieu et al., 2000; Mohammed & Dumville, 2001), in research on
the effects of group diversity (Sauer et al., 2006; Knippenberg et al., 2004;
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), and in research
on team effectiveness (Scholl, 1996, 2005).
Team mental model research focuses on a group’s joint understanding (i.e.
of the task) and shared knowledge (Mohammed & Dumville, 2001, p. 89).
“Team Mental Models are team members’ shared organized understanding
and mental representation of knowledge about key elements of the team’s rel-
evant environment” (Mohammed & Dumville, 2001, p. 90). The term “refers
to an organized understanding of relevant knowledge that is shared by team
members” (ibid, p. 89). In Mathieu et al. (2000), the connection between
mental models and structural knowledge (compare Chapter 2) becomes evi-
dent: “Essentially, mental models are organized knowledge structures that al-
low individuals to interact wit their environment. Specifically, mental models
allow people to ... recognize and remember relationships among components
of the environment, and to construct expectations for what is likely to occur
next” (Mathieu et al., 2000, p. 274). Accordingly, Rowe and Cooke (Rowe &
Cooke, 1995) suggested to use structural knowledge elicitation techniques for
mental model assessment in team mental model research, and Mathieu and
colleagues (Mathieu et al., 2000) used the Pathfinder technique (compare
Section 3.7) to do so.
Team mental model research has dealt primarily with the effects of cogni-
tive homogeneity in a group on the group’s performance. Research on group
diversity focusses on the effects of differences among group members on the
performance of the group. Thus, the study of team mental models can be
seen as a strand of research among the (wider) field of group diversity (Sauer
et al., 2006).
Group diversity research deals with differences in group members occur-
ring on different levels (McGrath, Berdahl, & Arrow, 1995). One of these
levels is the social categorization level on which group members’ subjective
categorizations of self and others into subgroups is considered (Knippenberg
& Schippers, 2007). The information/decision-making level (Williams &
O’Reilly, 1998) considers the effects of the distribution of knowledge, in-
formation, and abilities among the group on the performance of the group.
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Differences on this level are also referred to as cognitive diversity (Sauer et
al., 2006).
Research on general team effectiveness such as Scholl’s work (Scholl, 1990,
1992, 1996, 1997, 2004, 2005) has focussed more broadly on the effects of
information and knowledge exchange and knowledge production in a team on
its performance and innovativeness.
However, as already pointed out in the introduction, many studies on
group performance do not model an information-rich environment or com-
plex tasks, but employ rather simple and deterministic problems (Endres
& Putz-Osterloh, 1994). This is insofar unfortunate, as complex computer-
simulated scenarios provide a way for simulating complex problem solving in
a laboratory setting (compare previous chapter). The few existing studies
that employ complex problems in a group setting, such as Endres and Putz-
Osterloh (1994), do not clearly identify whether the amount of knowledge in
complex problem solving groups or the amount of knowledge overlap inside
a group is the key determinant for CPS performance.
In the following sections, the findings from various strands of research on
the relationship between a group’s task performance and a group’s knowl-
edge will be discussed. It will become evident that some of the studies altered
both the way in which information was distributed among group members
and the amount of information a single group member had to remember at
the same time, which makes certain interpretations regarding the sole role of
information distribution in group performance difficult. The discussion will
ultimately lead to two opposing views: One promotes cognitive homogeneity
as a condition for group success, the other promotes cognitive heterogeneity
as a condition for group success. In order to combine these views, Scholl’s
model of team effectiveness (Scholl, 1996, 2005) is introduced claiming a
curvilinear relationship between cognitive heterogeneity and team perfor-
mance. The section closes with an application of Scholl’s model to complex
problem solving tasks and according hypotheses.
5.2 Task Types and Group Performance
In various studies, different types of tasks have been employed in order to
study the effect of knowledge or information distribution on group or team
performance.
According to Steiner (1972, 1976), group tasks can be classified into five
groups with reference to how individual inputs are related to the group’s
product: additive (individual performance is added up to potential group
productivity, PGP), compensatory (individual performance is averaged for
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PGP), disjunctive (best individual answer is PGP), conjunctive (worst in-
dividual performance determines PGP) and discretionary (PGP cannot be
determined because the group chooses how to combine individual efforts).
A typical example for additive tasks is idea generation in brainstorming
(Forsyth, 2006), which is dealt with extensively in brainstorming literature
(e. g. Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). Discretionary tasks are tasks in which “group
members can perform using their own preferred combination procedures”
(Forsyth, 1990, p. 266). The fact that non-discretionary tasks have domi-
nated laboratory research on problem solving is unfortunate (Scholl, 1997) as
project assignments, one of the most common forms of current organizational
work forms, fall into the discretionary category which may contain any of the
other tasks’ characteristics in an undistinguishable way (ibid, p. 385).
5.2.1 Group performance in non-discretionary tasks
In the following, findings from different fields that deal with the effect of
cognitive diversity on team performance in different task types are presented.
For those task types that rely on a fixed way of combining individual efforts
(all above types except discretionary tasks), additive and disjunctive tasks
are presented as representing this simple type of tasks. They are followed
by results for discretionary tasks before own hypotheses on the influence
of cognitive diversity in groups on a discretionary task (coacting complex
problem solving) are presented.
Additive tasks
One application of additive tasks in organizational practice is idea generation
in groups, i. e. brainstorming. However, the number of ideas generated per
person declines with group size in such a way that groups do not outper-
form a set of individuals with the same size as the group who work on their
own (so-called nominal groups). The brainstorming literature has identified
group processes that inhibit effective idea generation in groups (compare
Gallupe et al., 1992, for an overview). Two of those processes are production
blocking and evaluation apprehension. The former “occurs when individu-
als cannot express their ideas because somebody else is talking” (Gallupe et
al., 1992, p. 352), the latter “occurs when individuals withhold their ideas
out of concern that others may not approve of them” (ibid). These effects
can be countered by employing special techniques, e.g. computer-mediated
brainstorming (Gallupe et al., 1992).
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Disjunctive tasks
A simple type of disjunctive task employed in small group research are dis-
junctive puzzles. They typically involve a group that has to arrive at one
conclusion or decision to a given problem. An example of these tasks are
Laughlin’s rule-discovery tasks (Laughlin, 1980, 1988) during which groups
have to find a rule that correctly predicts the next card in a series of game
cards presented to the group through a process of theory-generation and
theory-testing.
Disjunctive learning tasks
Another type of disjunctive tasks are learning tasks. In these tasks, groups
are typically instructed to learn non-word letter sequences. The distribution
of learning items over group members is varied (i.e. all group members re-
ceive the full list of items to remember or some items are exclusively assigned
to certain group members, reducing the length of the item list that each sub-
ject has to remember). After learning, recall is tested on group level. The
group is able to supply a correct answer if at least one group member can
provide the correct answer. Such group memory effects, especially optimal
item distribution among group members, have led to two empirically con-
firmed models of group memory: Model A (Lorge & Solomon, 1955) and,
building on it, the model of group performance by Zajonc and Smoke (1959).
Model A specifies the probability that at least one member of a group
of the size n will come up with a correctly remembered item. The model
assumes that the probability that a group member will provide a correct
solution is equal over all group members and states: pGroup = 1 − (1 −
pIndividual)n, where pGroup and pIndividual are fixed parameters for a specific
group and a specific problem (Hartmann, 1996, p. 21). It becomes clear
that this model assumes that the superiority of the group in comparison to
the individual increases with problem difficulty and group size. This “truth
wins” - model was able to predict group performance in many simple problem
solving tasks with high accuracy (Hartmann, 1996, p. 22).
Model A predicts that group performance increases if all group members
know as much as possible. Since human information processing capacity
is limited, Zajonc and Smoke combined Model A with a model of individ-
ual memory performance in order to “a priori predict the optimal way of
distributing information in a group so as to maximize later group recall of
information” (Tindale & Sheffey, 2002, p. 6). Zajonc and Smoke found
that the optimal level of group performance is independent of group size
and is reached if each group member receives approximately 16% more items
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than he or she can remember. Thus, this model promotes partial overlap
of knowledge items among group members in information rich environments
for “truth wins” tasks and has been empirically confirmed by Tindale and
Sheffey (2002). In a similar study, Ohtsubo (2005) tested whether redundant
information or partially redundant information distribution among dyads and
triads is most effective for group problem solving performance. He employed
a logic puzzle requiring the correct combination of seven clues to solve as
the dependant variable. In dyads and triads, he either distributed all seven
clues to all group members (the shared condition), or he distributed only one
item to all group members and all other items exclusively to certain group
members (unshared condition). Thus, in the shared condition, each individ-
ual had to learn seven items in one minute while in the unshared dyad, each
individual had to learn four items, and in the unshared triad only three items
within the one-minute learning period. There was no significant performance
difference between the unshared and the shared dyad, but the unshared triad
significantly outperformed all other groups.
Hidden-Profile tasks
Another example for a disjunctive task is the one employed by Stasser and Ti-
tus (1985, 1987) in their ‘hidden profile’ experiments. In their study, a group
was asked to choose a candidate for a vacant job position. All information
about all candidates was given to the group, but only some bits of infor-
mation (e.g. certain candidate skills) were distributed to all group members
while the remaining information was distributed exclusively to some group
members in a non-overlapping way. If the group members exchanged all
unshared information, the optimal candidate would be identified while the
shared information alone would lead to the selection of an unsuitable candi-
date. Note that this experimental setting differs insofar from the previously
reported studies as the candidates were required to learn from each other, i.e.
share their information for making a decision. Stasser and Titus (1985; 1987)
found that there exists a bias that mainly shared information is discussed and
unshared information is withheld from group discussion. This widely repli-
cated phenomenon is referred to as the ‘common knowledge effect’ (Tindale
& Sheffey, 2002). According to these studies, a larger overlap of knowledge
inside a team leads to better performance, because more knowledge would
be shared and made available to all members.
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Summary
In summary, the studies on disjunctive tasks promote a certain level of knowl-
edge overlap inside a group for optimal group performance. For disjunctive
learning tasks, optimal overlap is reported to be at 16% of items, while for
hidden-profile tasks, a larger overlap conditions higher performance. How-
ever, in Ohtsubo’s study, the number of clues given to each group remained
constant (seven), but the amount of information that each individual had
to learn differed over the conditions. In one of the shared conditions, each
group member had to memorize seven clues, in another four, and in another
condition three clues. Learning time was one minute regardless of the condi-
tion. The fact that the shared groups performed poorer thus appears to be
somewhat artificial as one minute is merely enough to read all seven clues,
let alone remembering them. In both Ohotsubo’s and Tindale and Sheffey’s
study, both magnitude of knowledge overlap between group members and
the amount of items each group member had to memorize were altered at
the same time. As item overlap and items per subject are thus confounded,
it is difficult to judge whether the effects stem from a characteristic of the
group (overlap) or from group members’ individual learning difficulties in the
condition where individual item load was high. It would thus be desirable
to keep individual characteristics at a constant level in order to determine
effects on group level.
As noted earlier, the abovementioned studies employed memory recall of
meaningless words or solving puzzles as tasks. The transferability of such
results to organizational practice is questionable (Endres & Putz-Osterloh,
1994). Complex problem solving scenarios or microworlds represent a class
of tasks that is of high practical importance as it shares characteristics
with problems that politicians or managers face: complexity, dynamics, in-
transparency and interconnectedness (ibid, see also Section 4). These tasks
belong to the category of discretionary tasks (Scholl, 1997); the influence of
cognitive diversity on group performance in complex problem solving tasks
is elaborated in the following section.
5.2.2 Group performance in discretionary CPS
A small number of studies on the effect of knowledge distribution on group
performance have targeted complex problem solving (Endres & Putz-Osterloh,
1994; Rulke & Galskiewicz, 2000). Endres and Putz-Osterloh concluded that
two classes of variables influence group performance in such tasks: individual
features of group members and features of the group interaction process.
According to Endres and Putz-Osterloh (1994), on the group level, cohe-
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sion, communication structure and patterns of interaction determine group
performance. They concluded from two experimental studies during which
the participants worked on the TAYLORSHOP microworld (Süß & Faul-
haber, 1990) that individual capabilities are a strong predictor for group
performance in complex problem solving. They also found that group inter-
action processes differ depending on group structure, but these differences
in interaction style did not lead to different outcomes. The authors hint at
the possibility that the process of collaborative work on the microworld was
so error-prone that these errors superimpose the effect of interaction style
on performance. It should be noted that the authors did not systematically
vary the amount of domain-specific knowledge in the dyads they studied,
but assessed individual capabilities on the basis of an ex-post assessment of
general economic knowledge.
In a different study, Rulke and Galskiewicz (2000) analyzed the effect of
prior knowledge distribution on group performance in a complex manage-
ment simulation game that lasted for several weeks. The game, judged by
the author’s description, fulfils the requirements of complexity in Dörner’s
sense (compare Section 4.1). Rulke and Galskiewicz found that in terms
of knowledge distribution, generalists groups outperformed groups consist-
ing of specialists because there was more knowledge overlap in generalists
groups than in specialist groups, where non-overlapping knowledge resided
in few specialists. These findings indicate that information shared among
many group members is more likely to be retrieved in complex problem solv-
ing than unshared information. This indicates that the ‘common knowledge
effect’ (compare previous section) is also present in CPS tasks. Rulke and
Galskiewicz (2000) further argue that non-overlapping knowledge leads to
difficulties in sharing and discussing and prevents optimal decision-making.
However, in their understanding, generalists have “a mastery of knowledge
across various domains” whereas in specialists groups knowledge is “con-
centrated in individuals” (p. 613). Generalists groups had more members
with broader knowledge than specialist groups. Since individual knowledge
of group members is a strong predictor for group performance in complex
problem solving (compare Endres & Putz-Osterloh, 1994, above), and in this
experiment, generalists groups included more individuals with broader knowl-
edge than specialists groups, the finding that generalist groups outperformed
specialist groups may solely be due to the individual characteristics of group
members: Generalists groups are more likely to include individuals that have
an especially rich knowledge of the problem domain. Furthermore, Rulke and
Galskiewicz did not experimentally control for the amount of knowledge that
each group member possessed, but used an ex-post classification of partici-
pants’ self-assessment that casts doubt on their categorization as specialists
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and generalists. Thus, the amount of knowledge inside a group may have
influenced the group’s performance.
Another strand of research in cognitive diversity is team mental models,
which identifies shared team mental models, i.e. cognitive homogeneity, as
improving team performance, while another strand of team diversity research
identifies “increasing team diversity as a means to improve overall team per-
formance” (Sauer et al., 2006, p. 935). Studies from the field of shared mental
models (compare Sauer et al., 2006, for an overview) “generally suggest that
a strongly shared mental model is advantageous for team performance” (ibid,
p. 937). An example for the assumption that cognitive homogeneity leads
to performance increase is a study by Mathieu and colleagues (Mathieu et
al., 2000): They hypothesized that cognitive homogeneity among two-person
simulated fighter pilots would increase their performance. Sauer (2006) as-
certains that the role of a shared team mental model depends on the type of
task in Steiner’s classification and admits at the same time that it is unclear
how team performance is affected by the different types of tasks. According
to Mohammed and Ringseis (2001), complex problem solving group tasks –
that belong to the category of discretionary tasks – benefit from heterogene-
ity. Note that this assumption is contrary to Mathieu’s assumption, whose
simulated scenario also qualifies as a complex problem.
In order to test whether team heterogeneity or homogeneity are most
profitable for team performance, Sauer (2006) analyzed cognitive diversity
in teams operating a computer-based multiple task environment. Two types
of cognitive diversity were examined and altered in dyads: System under-
standing and team specialization. System understanding was altered on an
individual level; it was either trained as a deep and system-oriented un-
derstanding (SOT) or as a more superficial procedure-oriented knowledge
(POT). In this way, there were SOT dyads, POT dyads, and mixed dyads
(MIX). Teams were also altered with regard to their training about dealing
with errors. A total of twelve errors were trained. In one condition, both
team members received training on all twelve errors, while in the special-
ist condition; each team member received a more intensive training on six
(non-overlapping) errors. MIX Teams achieved higher performance scores
and generalist teams detected more errors than specialized teams.
5.3 Intermediate Summary
To sum up findings so far: the results from disjunctive tasks favored a par-
tial knowledge overlap among group members for optimal group performance.
The abovementioned findings from the field of discretionary tasks indicate
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that cognitive homogeneity (i.e. knowledge overlap) inside the group is pro-
portional to group performance, but the amount of knowledge available on
group level may also be of importance. Since some of the above-mentioned
studies did not control for the actually acquired problem-relevant knowledge
and also indicated that individual knowledge of group members is a strong
predictor of complex problem solving group performance, insights with ref-
erence to effects of knowledge overlap in groups on complex problem solv-
ing performance are vague. In cognitive diversity research, one strand of
research claims that cognitive homogeneity leads to increased team perfor-
mance, while another strand of research claims that heterogeneity delivers
better team results.
Based on these limitations and contradictions of previous studies on group
knowledge and complex problem solving, it is desirable to experimentally con-
trol the specific domain-relevant individual knowledge in complex problem
solving and its distribution among a group. It would further be desirable to
keep the amount of problem-relevant knowledge per individual constant and
to solely alter the amount of knowledge overlap and the amount of knowl-
edge inside the group in order to rule out the influence of individual perfor-
mance on task performance and to be able to explain differences in group
performance solely with group characteristics. A systematic variation of the
amount of knowledge at group level could reveal its influence and clarify
Rulke and Galaskiewicz’s (2000) findings.
5.4 Scholl’s Model of Team Effectiveness
In his model of team effectiveness, Scholl (1996, 2005) formulated hypotheses
with regard to the effect of knowledge acquisition and distribution in groups
on group complex problem solving performance. He argued that positive
effects of teamwork are based on the increase of relevant knowledge in the
team, and that the magnitude of this effect is proportional to the complexity
of the problem, i.e. the more complex the problem, the higher the impact of
knowledge increase in teamwork. In other words, knowledge increase among
group members during task performance leads to task performance increase.
Scholl (1996) further argues that knowledge increase through discussion
depends on the cognitive overlap among group members: If it is very large,
there is little that people can learn from each other, and if it is very small
as in highly heterogeneous or diverse groups, people can hardly understand
each other due to different mindsets. This idea resembles Polanyi’s concept
of “interpretative frameworks” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 74): Transmitted informa-
tion carries the interpretative framework of the sender, i.e. his or her prior
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knowledge, beliefs, and context (compare also Rauchhaupt’s knowledge def-
inition in Section 2.1.1). In order to transform the transmitted information
into knowledge, it has to be interpreted through the receiver’s framework.
If the interpretative frameworks are very different, knowledge acquisition
cannot take place. If the conveyed information is equal to information that
the receiver already possesses, no knowledge acquisition can take place either,
because there is nothing new to learn. Thus, the relationship between knowl-
edge overlap and knowledge increase must be of a second-degree polynomial
kind. This proposed relation between knowledge heterogeneity and perfor-
mance is also based on the argument that cognitive heterogeneity and group
potential have an asymptotical rising relationship which is superimposed by
a exponentially growing relationship between knowledge heterogeneity and
processes inhibiting actual group performance (Scholl, 1996, p. 137), com-
pare Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Scholl’s model of team effectiveness assuming a polynomial rela-
tionship between cognitive heterogeneity of participants, amount of knowl-
edge, and knowledge increase (adapted with permission from Scholl, 1996, p.
137). Copyright 1996 From Effective teamwork - a theoretical model and a
test in the field by Wolfgang Scholl (in Understanding Group Behavior, Vol.
2 by Erich Witte and James H. Davis (Eds.)). Reproduced by permission of
Routledge, Inc., a division of Informa plc.
Note that Scholl’s model integrates opposing views that either claim a
superiority of cognitive homogeneity or a superiority of heterogeneity by
assuming an n-shaped relation between group cognitive heterogeneity and
group performance.
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5.5 Hypotheses
The assumptions of Scholl’s model of team effectiveness in the context of
complex problem solving are rephrased into the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5.5.1 In complex problem solving groups, the extent of knowl-
edge overlap among group members has a curvilinear n-shaped impact on
knowledge increase among group members.
If knowledge increase during the performance acts on complex problem solv-
ing performance, complex problem solving performance and knowledge over-
lap should display the same relationship. Based on Hypothesis 5.5.1, it is
stated:
Hypothesis 5.5.2 In complex problem solving groups, knowledge increase
among group members increases group CPS performance.
If a curvilinear n-shaped relationship between knowledge overlap and knowl-
edge increase is visible and knowledge increase correlates with group CPS
performance, the following should also hold true:
Hypothesis 5.5.3 CPS performance on group level displays an n-shaped
relation with knowledge overlap inside the group.
Chapter 6
Prediction of Collaborative
Performance with an
IT-System
The previous chapter concluded that knowledge distribution among group
members influences a group’s performance in complex problem solving. This
chapter will introduce an IT-system that allows to determine the distribu-
tion of knowledge among a group, allowing predictions on the group’s per-
formance. Therefore, the development of an algorithm for calculating the
similarity of self-assessed knowledge between individuals is outlined. This
algorithm is implemented into an IT-system, the skillMap1, which is intro-
duced first. After system introduction, regulations for the calculation of the
similarity measure with regard to the system are explained. The chapter
ends with predictions regarding the connection between the proposed simi-
larity measure and group performance.
6.1 IT-based Organizational Knowledge Man-
agement
Until now, it has been referred to individual knowledge and knowledge in
small groups. From an organizational point of view, creation and use of both
individual knowledge and knowledge at higher ontological dimensions such as
project groups or teams needs to be supported (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).
1The skillMap was originally conceived by Sarah Spiekermann and has been developed
jointly since the original idea. Sarah Spiekermann also participated in the editing of
Sections 6.1.2, 6.1.3, and 6.1.6 which have been previously published together (Meyer,
Spiekermann, & Hertlein, 2005; Meyer & Spiekermann, 2006a, 2006b).
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Individual knowledge is a precondition for organizational knowledge that
results from the publication of technical and/or individual knowledge and
of its consolidation in organizational communication structures (Klimecki &
Thomae, 2000). This consolidation of individual knowledge in organizational
structures (e.g. in methods, models, documentation, and culture) is also re-
ferred to as the organizational knowledge base (Rehäuser & Krcmar, 1996, p.
15). According to Damerow and Lefèvre (1998), such external representations
have the same psychological functions as internal, individual representations
and are based on the same mental capabilities. Individual knowledge enlarges
organizational knowledge (Amelingmeyer, 2004, p. 122) and individual learn-
ing is a central element in organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996).
Thus, organizational knowledge is based on individual knowledge.
Knowledge management (KM) is defined as “the process of continuously
creating new knowledge, disseminating it widely through the organization,
and embodying it quickly in new products/services, technologies and sys-
tems” (Takeuchi et al., 2004, p. ix). KM has become an important manage-
ment concept in the change towards knowledge-based economies (compare
Chapter 1), that see knowledge as “the one sure source of lasting compet-
itive advantage” (Takeuchi et al., 2004, p. 29). The aim of the European
Union to become the world’s leading knowledge-based economy (European
Council, 2000) underlines the political importance of this view. KM ap-
proaches are thus considered to form the basis for innovation and economic
success (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Dick & Wehner, 2002; Nonaka & Ta-
keuchi, 1995; Scholl, 2004; Takeuchi et al., 2004). Especially in the works
of Nonaka, Takeuchi, and colleagues, the concept of non-explicit knowledge
is considered to play an important role in organizational knowledge creation
and innovation (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka & Reinmoeller, 2000; Non-
aka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000; Takeuchi et al.,
2004). Nonaka’s popular SECI model (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), which
sees the cyclic processes of knowledge conversion from tacit to explicit and
back over different levels (individual, group, organization) at the heart of
innovation, has received widespread attention (Snowden, 2002).
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), organizational knowledge cre-
ation takes place through a continuous process of knowledge transformation:
From tacit to explicit knowledge and back, from the individual level to group
to organizational level. The SECI-model postulates the following processes:
Individual tacit knowledge is shared between two individuals through social-
ization. An indiviual can, through metaphors and analogies, make his or
her (newly) acquired knowledge explicit through externalization. This ex-
plicit knowledge can then be combined with other existing knowledge, e.g.
on the team level, to new explicit knowledge. This new explicit knowledge
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can then be transformed into tacit knowledge through internalization and
can transcend into tacit knowledge on group level (compare Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: The SECI-Model of organizational knowledge creation (based on
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 62 & p. 71)
6.1.1 Organizational Knowledge as Structural Connec-
tivity Pattern
The knowledge potentially available in an organization goes beyond individ-
ual knowledge and is contained in the organizational knowledge base: “The
organizational knowledge base is comprised of several different individual and
collective knowledge repositories that can be accessed for task completion. It
spans the data and information repositories, on which individual and organi-
zational knowledge is built ” (Probst, Raub, & Romhardt, 1999, p. 46, own
translation). Knowledge Management can also be defined as the organization
and design of the organizational knowledge base (Probst et al., 1999, p. 47).
According to Trier’s knowledge management entity model (2005), the or-
ganizational knowledge base is mainly made up of the following knowledge
entities: Individuals (employees), processes, documents, and topics. These
entities are linked together into a network through communication and tech-
nology (i.e. references in information systems). Trier’s model further states
that concrete knowledge management measures target the establishment of
new links between those entities or the modification of existing ones. For
example, the support and/or establishment of communities of practice, in-
formal groups of experts that exchange knowledge on a specific topic that
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are seen as key drivers of innovation processes (Wenger, 2003; Scholl, 2004),
can be conceptualized as establishing links between certain individuals and
topics. Based on this model, the organizational knowledge base can be un-
derstood as a structural connectivity pattern (compare definition in Chapter
2), and knowledge management targets the alteration of this structure on an
organizational level.
6.1.2 IT-based organizational knowledge management
Knowledge management processes in organizations are usually supported by
IT-based knowledge management systems, a heterogeneous group of systems
(Gronau, 2002), whose objective is to “support creation, transfer, and appli-
cation of knowledge in organizations” (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 107). They
can be divided into two main categories (Bush & Tiwana, 2005): Knowledge
repositories focusing on the externalization and storage of explicit knowledge
(see also Schütt, 2003) and knowledge networks, focussing on the establish-
ment of individual contact for knowledge exchange through personal inter-
action (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). The strategy behind knowledge repositories
has also been referred to as the codification approach (Hansen, Nohria, &
Tierney, 1999), because it implies codification of individual explicit knowl-
edge into documents and data bases which can be accessed from anywhere
inside the organization. Note that this view employs the terms knowledge
and information synonymously (compare Rauchhaupt’s knowledge definition
on p. 6 for an explanation for this synonymous use). The strategy behind
knowledge networks is also referred to as personalization approach (Hansen
et al., 1999), because it enables personal contact.
Codification-only approaches have often turned out as failures because
they do not take the personal context of individuals into account (Schütt,
2003). In their concept of ba, Nonaka and Konno (1998) state that the ex-
change of both tacit and explicit knowledge between individuals is optimal
in a shared physical context. Ba is “... a context which harbors meaning..., a
shared space that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation” (Nonaka &
Konno, 1998, p, 40). Nonaka and Konno (ibid) define four different bas for
different stages of knowledge creation that correspond to the four cycles of
knowledge creation of the SECI-Model (see above): Originating ba for face-
to-face interaction during socialization, interacting ba for peer-to-peer inter-
action during externalization, cyber ba in group-to-group interaction during
combination, and exercising ba for on-the-site interaction during internaliza-
tion. Despite the fact that a physically shared space for interaction is opti-
mal, individuals cannot always get together in order to exchange knowledge
in virtual or complex organizations. In this case, the shared context between
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individuals is reduced to shared “interpretative frameworks” (Polanyi, 1958,
p. 74) that originate in shared knowledge. This shared context can be de-
scribed as shared activities, social relations among organizational members,
fields of work and expertise (“topics”) and related documents: as links in the
structural connectivity pattern that comprises organizational knowledge (see
above).
6.1.3 Graph representations of organizational knowl-
edge
In the same way as graphs can be used to represent individual structural
connectivity patterns (compare Section 3.1), they can be used to visualize the
structural connectivity patterns that comprise the organizational knowledge
base (see above). The representation, display and modification of such an
organizational knowledge graph thus poses an operationalization of cyber ba.
Graph-based knowledge management systems model the interrelations be-
tween entities that comprise the organizational knowledge base and attempt
drawing conclusions from those. Graph-based systems contain vertices (or
nodes) representing knowledge entities and edges (or arcs) between them
(compare Section 3.1). By visualizing semantic relations between entities,
graph-based knowledge representations allow capturing complex knowledge
domains. Examples include creativity support systems like D-ABDUCTOR
(Sugiyama & Misue, 1996), knowledge networks that help to structure data
according to semantic relationships such as theBrain c© or social software
such as Orkut c©, LinkedIn c©, or Xing c©.
Social networks contained in these systems are created by the means of
social network analysis (SNA). This can either be done by manually spec-
ifying relations to others or by data-mining techniques on logged point-to-
point communication data, such as e-mail traffic, web-based schedules and
IM-protocols. In a company context, social networks are considered as an
adequate representation of knowledge creation (Jansen, 2004), because they
reveal how “work really gets done in organizations” (Cross & Parker, 2004,
title page) and how information search and retrieval is carried out through-
out firms (Hansen et al., 1999). Thus, knowledge bearers and knowledge
dissemination in firms can be identified on the basis of social networks, in-
creasing knowledge transparency and facilitating knowledge exchange (Cross
& Parker, 2004).
In the following sections, three knowledge management systems that visu-
alize knowledge networks as a graph and offer opportunities for its modifica-
tion for KM activities are introduced: KnowWho, Commetrix, and skillMap.
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Afterwards, a method for assessing knowledge heterogeneity between individ-
uals in the skillMap system is developed which can be used for performance
prediction for knowledge-intensive work.
6.1.4 KnowWho
Fujitsu’s KnowWho-System (Igata, Tsuda, Katayama, & Kozakura, 2003;
Tsuda, 2003) visualizes the semantic structure of products and innovations at
Fujitsu as a graph: Products are connected to the product they have evolved
from (i.e., fingerprint scanners are connected to flatbed scanners because they
are based on flatbed scanning technology). Selecting a product switches to
a social network view with the expert on the selected product as the central
node (compare Figure 6.2). With reference to Trier’s knowledge entities (see
above), KnowWho visualizes the connections between employees, between
employees and topics (products in this case) and documents (associated with
products). The system’s visualization engine is based on the static visualiza-
tion engine from the D-ABDUCTOR system (Sugiyama & Misue, 1996). The
data for KnowWho’s social network is automatically retrieved from Fujitsu’s
repositories. Meeting schedules and joint publications of technical documents
provide the basis for network construction. The semantic network of product-
interrelations is built via data-mining on technical documents. Yet, however
advanced the data-mining behind KnowWho, its visualization has certain
limitations. Generally, graph based systems face the specific challenge to in-
tegrate a highly comprehensive visualization. Sugiyama (2002, p. 11) gives a
detailed overview of graph drawing rules and frameworks. Graphs typically
have to obey a set of 20 static structural rules (e.g. placement of high de-
gree vertices in the centre and identical drawing of isomorphic sub graphs)
and have to be editable and changeable dynamically in such a way that “the
human mental map of a graph” (Sugiyama, 2002, p. 11) and the continuity
of cognition is preserved. The issue with Fujitsu’s System is that it does not
preserve the continuity of cognition because clicking a node in either network
switches to a static new layout of the graph, and the transition between the
two states of the network are not presented in a continuous way.
6.1.5 Commetrix
Commetrix (Trier, 2005) is another example of a graph-based system that
seeks to support organizational knowledge processes through graph visualiza-
tion. It is primarily focussed on identifying and supporting intra-organizational
expert groups (communities of practice). “It aims at eliciting the structure
of the expert group by analyzing the communication networks stored in data
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Figure 6.2: Fujitsu’s KnowWho Human Knowledge Navigator (Igata et al.,
2003). The top window displays the semantic structure of related products,
services, and technologies. Clicking a node brings up a second window (be-
low) that displays a social network with the expert on the selected technology
in the center.
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archives.... This set of data can be visualized as an actual network of experts”
(Trier, 2005, p. 979). The system displays individuals (employees) as nodes
and e-mail communication between individuals as edges between nodes. The
more frequently two individuals communicate, the thicker the edge between
them. The edges are labeled with the most frequent topics of communication
between two individuals that are obtained through data-mining techniques.
Commetrix includes only employees as graph nodes. Edges between em-
ployees are labelled with topics, but contrary to KnowWho, these topics are
not semantically related as nodes of a graph. The advantage of organizing
topics semantically lies in the ability to discover related topics and in making
statements on the degree of their relatedness, which can be modelled through
path distance. In Commetrix’s visualization, it is not possible to visualize
topics that are semantically closely related to the topic of a knowledge ex-
change between two individuals. However, these closely related topics may
be the subject of frequent communication of other employees that are linked
to the individuals in the visualization. Thus, the actual size of the commu-
nity of practice may be underestimated. Another advantage of visualizing
topics as semantically connected nodes instead of labels of communication
edges lies in the possibility of discovering undesired parallel developments,
i.e. two people working on the same topic without being aware of each other
(that is, without having an edge between them that symbolizes communica-
tion). Such a constellation can be visualized as a topic node with edges to
two individuals that don’t have a communication edge between them. Com-
metrix may be very useful for identifying communities of practices on a strict
topic within organizations, but it may not be as suitable for discovering such
parallel developments.
6.1.6 skillMap
In this section, the skillMap-System (Meyer et al., 2005; Meyer & Spieker-
mann, 2006a, 2006b) and its different knowledge visualizations are described.
Its description is followed by the introduction of an algorithm for knowledge
similarity calculation.
System design
The system consists of two interlinked components: A social network of
individuals and a graph (semi-lattice) of the individual fields of expertise or
knowledge. Figure 6.3 illustrates this structure.
With reference to Trier’s knowledge management entity model (see above),
the skillMap includes employees and topics as nodes and is thus able to vi-
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Figure 6.3: Schematic representation of the skillMap system (Meyer et al.,
2005)
sualize the semantic relation between both. The skill inventory graph can be
edited by all users of the system. As users edit and amend the graph freely
for their individual fields of expertise, the skill inventory graph converges
towards a stable status of structure consent. The result is a self-assessment
of the entire organizational expertise. The inclusion of knowledge entities as
different node types makes the system capable of visualizing shared organi-
zational context (see Figure 6.4). The skillMap visualizes this context with
the help of its two-component design as follows: Person-nodes from the so-
cial network graph are connected to the expertise nodes in the skill inventory
graph according to individual expertise with undirected edges. The users
themselves specify these connections manually. In this way, a person vertex
from the social network graph is linked to all the fields of expertise that he or
she has in the skill inventory and to all documents that he or she authored.
The newly combined graph is referred to as skillMap. Placing an employee
node in the centre of the visualization (compare Figure 6.4) thus visualizes
the employees’ organizational context.
Assigning people to competencies is not a new concept and is already in
practice with yellow pages systems (Ruggles, 1999). However, yellow pages
systems only store a link between two objects (person and skill(s)) without
further connecting the objects at the ends of the connecting line. By merging
the social graph and the skill inventory graph into one skillMap, several uses
of the system become evident:
1. The system can visualize who-knows-who and can report a line of con-
nections from any given person inside the organization to another.
2. The system can visualize who-knows-what by displaying the fields of
work and expertise for any member of the organization.
3. By visualizing persons that are connected to the same expertise node
but have no social edge between them, the user can identify members
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of the organization that work in the same field without knowing each
other (e.g. P1 and P4 in Fgure 6.3, compare Figure 6.7 for an example).
Especially the last characteristic is a benefit new to KM systems because it
can reduce undesired parallel developments and thus poses a possibility to
increase organizational performance.
Visualization and technical background
The skillMap is implemented in Java as a distributed client-server web based
application and relies on JavaWebStart for launch. Continuity of cogni-
tion in the skillMap is achieved by smoothly animating all changes of graph
layout. Therefore, preFuse (Heer, 2004; Heer, Card, & Landay, 2005), a
toolkit for interactive information visualization, was chosen. Its capability
of dealing with a vast number of nodes as well as its impressive graphic pro-
cessing performance were crucial for the decision for preFuse, which is used
for creating skillMap’s graph structure and for its visualization and navi-
gation. PreFuse has been designed in order to “augment human cognition
by leveraging human visual capabilities to make sense of abstract informa-
tion, providing means by which humans with constant perceptual abilities
can grapple with increasing hordes of data” (Heer et al., 2005, p. 1) and it is
hoped that the continuity of cognition will be achieved. For the skillMap and
social network views, the user can choose between a static Fruchterman and
Rheingold layout and a dynamic fore-directed layout (compare Sugiyama,
2002, for a description of both), both supplied by preFuse. Especially the
constantly hovering spring embedded algorithm has received positive feed-
back from beta testers because of its playful appearance.
A platform independent standard for describing the structure of the graph
was chosen in order to allow simple data exchange with other applications.
XGMML (Punin & Krishnamoorthy, 2001), an XML-derivate used in many
graph-based applications, was chosen as standardized data exchange format.
The underlying graph structure is stored in a SQL-database from which
the XGMML representation of the graph is generated by the server and
transmitted to the client. Figures 6.4 to 6.7 give examples of the skillMap’s
different visualizations.
6.2 Calculating Knowledge Similarity with the
skillMap
In order to determine knowledge-based similarities between individuals rep-
resented in the skillMap, a skillMap is conceptualized as a graph in the fol-
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Figure 6.4: skillMap system interface after login. The first-degree social
network of the user, his or her fields of work and expertise and the fields of
work and expertise of his or her colleagues are visible.
Figure 6.5: skillMap visualization of of the social network graph. The own
node is displayed in red, all other directly connected individuals are in yellow
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Figure 6.6: skillMap visualization of the skill inventory graph with the
‘knowledge management’ node in the centre.
Figure 6.7: skillMap visualization of a possible unrecognized parallel devel-
opment: Two individuals work with the same technology (XML) and have
expertise in similar fields but do not know each other.
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lowing section and a way of calculating the similarity between two individuals
represented in the skillMap system is introduced2.
6.2.1 The skillMap as a graph with two node types
A skillMap is defined as a labeled directed graph G (compare definitions 1
to 6 on p. 33) with two different types of vertices, referred to as persons p
and skills s: G = (Vp ∪ Vs, A, L(exp), L(depth)) where
• Ap = A ∩ (Vp × Vp)
• As = A ∩ (Vs × Vs)
• Aps = A ∩ (Vp × Vs)
• Vp ∩ Vs = ∅
• (p, s) ∈ E for p ∈ Vp, s ∈ Vs ⇒ (s, p) ∈ E
• L(exp) := label for edges ∈ Aps, called expertise.
• L(depth) := label for edges ∈ As, called depth.
6.2.2 Similarity calculation
In order to identify possible parallel work between all persons stored in the
skillMap, the skill similarity calculation is introduced. The aim of this cal-
culation is to quantify the similarity of individuals based on the skills they
share. This skill similarity (denoted sksim) ranges from 0 to 1, where 1
denotes that both persons are incident to the same skills without any further
incident paths from them. The similarity between two persons is 0 if there
are no paths between these persons with only skills on them. For a given
skillMap G, the calculation produces a similarity index for each pair of per-
son nodes (v, u). It will thus be possible to obtain a similarity matrix for all
individuals represented in the graph which can then be used for analysis and
layout, for example for an MDS scaling procedure (compare Section 3.6). In
this way, the skillMap can be laid out according to the similarity of persons.
Furthermore, this measure can be used for identifying persons similar to a
specific person by listing similarity indexes of all persons in reference to the
2I am very grateful to Sarah Spiekermann, Manuel Hertlein, and Tobias Lattke for their
valuable comments and feedback on the similarity calculations. I am especially grateful
to Hans-Florian Geerdes for his help with the mathematical formalisms.
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target person in ascending order. An average similarity measure over a group
of individuals could be used for the prediction of group performance.
Such a similarity calculation has been developed in the reviewed ver-
sion of this thesis. As it will be included in future commercial versions of
the skillMap system, notions of confidentiality prevent its publication in the
public version of this thesis. The suggested similarity measure is refered to
as sksim and has the following properties:
Properties of sksim
• sksim(u, v) = sksim(v, u)
• sksim ∈ [0, 1]
• sksim(u, v) = 1 if σ(v) = σ(u)
• sksim = 0 if u and v are not connected in G′
The suggested similarity measure is implemented in a Java command-
line application3 that parses a skillMap XML-file that holds a particular
skillMap graph and returns a matrix containing pairwise similarity ratings
for all pairs of person vertices included in the system. In order to test the
similarity calculation, a test graph is implemented in the skillMap system
(compare Figure 6.8). The output of the application is in line with the
suggested calculation:
similarity(P4, P3) = 0.2888889
similarity(P1, P4) = 0.22222222
similarity(P3, P2) = 0.22222222
similarity(P3, P1) = 0.22222222
6.3 Summary and Hypotheses
The sksim similarity measure calculates the similarity of knowledge-self as-
sessment between individuals represented in the skillMap knowledge man-
agement system. If knowledge overlap in a small group has an influence
on its performance in complex problem solving as argued in Chapter 5, the
similarity measure obtained with the method above should display some con-
nection with CPS performance. Due to the fact that the similarity measure is
3I am very grateful to Tobias Lattke for implementing and programming the similarity
calculations.
116 Prediction of Collaborative Performance with an IT-System
Figure 6.8: skillMap test graph for similarity calculations
supposed to increase with intra-group cognitive homogeneity, and a medium
cognitive heterogeneity is supposed to lead to highest problem solving per-
formance, a linear relation between the similarity measure and group per-
formance cannot be assumed: Low and high similarities are supposed to
coincide with low group performance, medium similarities are supposed to
coincide with high performance scores.
Hypothesis 6.3.1 For small groups in which each group member assesses
his or her knowledge on a dynamic system in the skillMap knowledge man-
agement system, the proposed similarity measure for intra-group knowledge
overlap displays a curvilinear n-shaped relation with CPS performance.
Chapter 7
Method
This chapter has two main sections. In the first one, preliminary experiments
are described that determine whether the AST is suitable for the elicitation
of structural knowledge. The second section will outline a laboratory ex-
periment that aims at testing hypotheses from Chapter 4 with regard to
implicit and structural knowledge and complex problem solving performance
and from Chapters 5 and 6 with regard to group knowledge distribution and
group performance.
7.1 AST Validation
In this section, three pilot studies aiming at AST validation are presented.
They are based on Hypotheses 3.9.1 to 3.9.5. For hypotheses 3.9.1 through
3.9.4, an experiment will be conducted. Hypothesis 3.9.5 is tested as part of
a larger experiment that also aims at testing the hypotheses from Chapter
4. It is presented in the second section of this chapter.
7.1.1 Labeled and unlabeled AST testing
The first pilot study was conducted in order to test the assumption that the
AST actually taps on the implicit knowledge domain. Hypothesis 3.9.1 as-
sumes that AST-elicited knowledge graphs will contain more edges if edges
are placed in a quick, intuitive, and unlabeled way by experiment partici-
pants. In order to test this assumption, 26 participants of a graduate seminar
on organizational psychology at the department of psychology at Humboldt
University Berlin completed the AST on the seminar’s subject as stimulus
concept (‘Wissensmanagement’, German term for ‘knowledge management’)
at the end of the semester. As the seminar involved many practical tasks
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and role-play situations, participants were expected to have acquired some
structural implicitness. The AST was presented in two different versions and
participants were assigned randomly. In one condition, participants worked
on the AST as described in Section 3.9 (standard condition). In the other
condition (explicit condition, compare Section 3.9.1), the AST differed inso-
far as in the second part on pairwise concept comparisons, participants were
only allowed to indicate a relationship between concepts if they were able
to explicitly label the kind of connection. This was enforced by displaying a
text box in which the nature of the connection had to be entered if a value
greater than ‘0’ had been chosen. The standard condition should thus con-
tain edges for which subjects would have been able to provide an explicit
label as well as those which could not be labeled while the explicit condition
is supposed to capture only the former type of edges. Thus, the number of
edges elicited in the explicit condition should be smaller than the number
of edges elicited in the standard condition (compare Hypothesis 3.9.1) while
the overall number of associated concepts should be equal between the two
modes since the section on term association was identical in both conditions.
7.1.2 AST sensitivity to learning
The second pilot study was conducted in order to determine the sensitivity of
the AST to learning. Hypothesis 3.9.2 assumes that all six coefficients display
a shift towards their respective more favorable states if learning occurs. In
order to test this assumption, the participants of a graduate seminar at
the Institute of Psychology at Humboldt-University Berlin completed the
AST with the seminar’s topic (Wissensmanagement, German for knowledge
management) as stimulus concept in the first session and in the last session
of the seminar. The time span between the first and the second test was
two months. Note that this was a different seminar than the one mentioned
in the previous subsection. In this seminar, the focus was mainly on the
acquisition of academic explicit knowledge. The AST’s parameter were set
to PFNET(n−1,∞) and a maximum number of 25 concepts entered pairwise
comparisons. If one assumes that at least some learning took place, at least
those AST-parameters that are thought to elicit knowledge at different levels
of explicitness (number of associated concepts, number of edges, number of
clusters, diameter, and RMPL) should display an increase from the first to
the second measurement.
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7.1.3 Convergent validity
In order to establish construct validity (compare Section 3.9.4), the conver-
gent validity (the degree to which concepts that are related theoretically are
interrelated empirically, compare Campbell & Fiske, 1959) was surveyed by
comparing AST scores to SLT scores. The Heidelberger Strukturlegetech-
nik SLT (Scheele & Groeben, 1984, 1988) is a standardized manual concept
mapping tool for structural knowledge elicitation which builds on Shavel-
son’s concept mapping techniques (Shavelson, 1972; Shavelson & Stanton,
1975). When applying this technique, participants are asked to visualize a
knowledge structure by labelling cards and connecting them with labelled
edges (compare Section 3.5.2 for further details on the SLT technique). In
order to analyze the AST’s validity, AST parameters are compared to SLT
parameters. Since the SLT technique requires subjects to label the placed
edges, both versions of the AST are compared with the SLT procedure: The
standard AST that asks for quick and intuitive judgements for placement of
unlabeled edges, and the more explicit version introduced in Section 3.9.1
that requires participants to label relations of strength above 0 they place
during the pairwise comparison task.
Positive correlations between both AST versions and the SLT are ex-
pected as all three of them are intended to elicit structural knowledge. Higher
correlations between the explicit version of the AST and SLT as compared
to the correlation between the standard version of the AST and SLT are
expected, because the standard AST is supposed to tap into implicit use of
structural knowledge in a stronger extent than the explicit version.
In order to obtain a comparison between AST and SLT scores, both tests
are employed on the same subset of associations. Therefore, the AST system
is modified in such a way that the term association task is split from the
pairwise word comparison task. After term association, the AST system
stops and saves the associations in a database for further use. At a second
point in time, pairwise similarity ratings can be performed, but the associated
concepts can also be read from the database for other analysis purposes.
Undergraduate psychology students at Humboldt University and Univer-
sity of Potsdam who were a week short of their exam on biological psychology
were asked to associate concepts to ten stimulus concepts from the field of bi-
ological psychology. The stimulus concepts had been selected as relevant by
the professor for biological psychology at Potsdam University. The students
then associated to these ten concepts in the association module of the AST
and were dismissed. In a second session, they were then asked to perform
an SLT on the concepts they had previously associated to the term ‘nervous
system’, and in a third session they were asked to do pairwise comparisons in
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the AST comparison module for the same associations. The order of SLT and
AST tasks in sessions two and three was randomized. Half of the subjects
worked on the AST in the standard mode as presented in Section 3.9, and
the other half worked on the explicit version as presented in Section 3.9.1.
In this way, the number of associated concepts was equal for both tests, and
the measures obtainable for both tests (number of edges, density, diameter,
and RMPL) are correlated.
7.1.4 Congruent validity and discriminant validity
As the AST is supposed to predict performance in real-life settings, another
experiment outside the university setting is conducted in order to deter-
mine whether AST-elicited structural knowledge measures that have been
obtained for a certain domain correlate with performance measures that in-
dicate achievement in that particular domain as stated in Hypothesis 3.9.4.
At a vocational school for cleaners and plumbers in Berlin1, students were
asked to complete a regular AST on a stimulus concept identified as crucial to
their current state of learning by the teacher. For the cleaners, this stimulus
was ‘Detaschur’ (a German professional term for the cleaning of textile floor
surfaces), and for the carpenters, it was ‘Dach’ (roof). The students worked
on the AST a few days after the completion of a written exam that was
focused on the stimulus concepts. These exams included writing tasks but
also practical tasks such as calculating a floor area or dimensioning a roof.
AST-elicited coefficients were then correlated with the total grade for all
students from both subject areas. Further sample details are presented in
the results section.
This experiment also offered the possibility to evaluate the discriminant
validity (the degree to which concepts that are theoretically independent
are so empirically, compare Campbell & Fiske, 1959) of the AST by com-
paring it to a German vocabulary test. Vocabulary tests correlate highly
with the general intelligence (g; Neisser et al., 1996) and are thus suited
for obtaining a quick estimate of g. In a study comparing different German
vocabulary tests with the general IQ as obtained by the German Hamburg
Wechsler Intelligence Test for Adults (HAWIE-R), Satzger, Fessmann, and
Engel (2002) determined that the German vocabulary test (Wortschatztest)
WST (K.-H. Schmidt & Metzler, 1992) delivers the highest correlations with
the HAWIE-R IQ. In order to determine the interdependency of the AST’s
coefficients with intelligence measures, the students, prior to completing the
1I am very grateful to Siegfried Richter who suggested to test his students and who
supported the experiment with his motivation and determination.
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AST, filled out a WST, which consists of 42 items, each consisting of five
words. Of these five words, one actually exists and the others do not. The
subject is asked to tick the existing word; difficulty increases from item to
item. There is no time limit. WST scores are then correlated with AST
scores and grades. Due to the fact that intelligence and knowledge are partly
overlapping constructs (compare Section 2.7), a certain degree of overlap has
to be expected.
7.2 Laboratory Experiment
The following experiment aims at testing Hypothesis 3.9.5 that assumes a
correlation between the AST-elicited weighted density measure and task per-
formance in a performance task involving implicit knowledge. The experi-
ment further aims at testing the hypotheses from Chapter 4 with regard to
implicit and structural knowledge and complex problem solving performance
and from Chapters 5 and 6 with regard to group knowledge distribution
and group performance. It is supposed to test whether the experience with
a complex scenario leads to more structural implicitness on scenario con-
trol, and whether the distribution of knowledge in a group influences the
group’s performance in a complex problem solving task. The experiment is
a 3 (shared knowledge elements – partially shared knowledge elements – un-
shared knowledge elements) × 2 (practical experience during learning – no
experience during learning) × 2 (practical experience during discussion – no
experience during discussion) factorial design.
7.2.1 Sample
The study took place from April to August 2006 at the section of Orga-
nizational and Social Psychology at Humboldt University Berlin2. It was
advertised as an assessment center simulation as it involved elements that
are typical for assement centers such as an IQ test, a group discussion, and
a complex management computer simulation. Participants were offered a
detailed individual feedback on their performance and the top ten teams
were offered a reward of 10-15 EUR per member. 150 persons, mostly stu-
dents from different fields and universities in Berlin, participated, forming
2I am very grateful to the following students for their work as experimenters and for
their support in processing the data: Janina Blume, Barbara Haller, Ludmila Herdt,
Christina Karsten, Conny Lochelfeld, Goran Milacevic, Anja Rettig, Emanuel Schmider,
Marion Schwenke, Nicole Steckloina, Sho Tsuji, Xenia Weißbecher-Klaus, and Thomas
Wildermuth.
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75 dyads. Individuals were distributed evenly over experimental conditions.
A screening of the data revealed that the AST-data for six participants was
unusable: Due to technical errors, the data of three participants was incom-
pletely recorded, and three participants failed to comply with the instruc-
tions by entering random words. Three subjects showed extreme deviations
in taylorshop performance (more than five standard distributions off the pop-
ulation mean). As measurement errors cannot be ruled out as a cause, these
subjects are excluded from the sample. Four subjects failed to fully complete
all questionnaires and the taylorshop data of two subjects was not recorded
due to technical errors. This reduces the total effective sample size to 134
individuals. The distribution of participants over experimental conditions is
presented in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Distribution of participants on individual level after case exclusion
over experimental conditions
Knowledge overlap in the dyad
Learning Discussion Little Partial Full Total
From texts
only
No experience 14 12 12 38
Experience 12 12 8 32
From texts &
experience
No experience 10 10 8 28
Experience 10 14 12 36
Total 46 48 40 134
The remaining effective sample consists of 73 female and 61 male partic-
ipants. Average age of participants was 26.3 years, (σ = 5.98). The average
individual score for reasoning (BIS-K) was 100.15 (σ = 10.8).
As the hypotheses on group level do not include assumptions with regard
to AST scores, those subjects with missing or invalid AST scores are included
in the aggregation of participants to dyads, leading to a slightly different
sample of 70 dyads (140 individuals, 73 female and 63 male) The distribution
of dyads over experimental conditions is presented in Table 7.2.
Of the resulting 70 dyads, 23 were same-gender female dyads, 20 same-
gender male dyads, and 27 mixed-gender dyads. The average IQ for reasoning
is the same as above.
7.2.2 Complex problem solving task
Complex problem solving performance is measured with Süß’s A version of
the TAYLORSHOP (SCHNEIDERWERKSTATT) microworld (Süß, 1996).
The two main reasons for this choice were the availability of a validated
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Table 7.2: Distribution of dyads after case exclusion over experimental con-
ditions
Knowledge overlap in the dyad
Learning Discussion Little Partial Full Total
From texts
only
No experience 6 6 7 19
Experience 7 6 4 17
From texts &
experience
No experience 5 5 6 18
Experience 5 7 6 18
Total 23 24 23 70
questionnaire on declarative knowledge on TAYLORSHOP scenario control,
the WIS (Kersting & Süß, 1995) and its short form (in Klocke, 2004) and
the finding that TAYLORSHOP scenario performance correlates with per-
formances in other complex problem computer simulations (Endres & Putz-
Osterloh, 1994; Wittmann et al., 1996). Furthermore, the employed version
of the TAYLORSHOP scenario received the highest evaluation with regard
to its suitability for psychometric assessment in Kluge’s overview of available
scenarios (Kluge, 2004, p. 71).
In the TAYLORSHOP scenario, participants play the owner of a small
shirt factory and have to achieve as much profit as they can during a simu-
lated period of 12 months. In each month, twelve variables can be altered by
the participant: purchase of raw material for shirt production, market price
for shirts, marketing budget, number of shops, number of traveling salesmen,
number of small shirt-producing machines (producing 50 shirts per month),
number of large shirt-producing machines (producing 100 shirts per month),
the number of workers for each type of machine, machine maintenance bud-
get, wages, and social welfare. The changes made to these variables influence
the values of the observable variables account balance, overall profit, de-
mand, shirt production, shirts on stock, machine damage, number of shirts
produced, production loss, and workers’ motivation. The original German
wording of the control variables and observation variables can be taken from
the image of the scenario’s interface, depicted in Figure 7.1.
The changes of the monitor variables is based on a complex intercon-
nection scheme including further invisible variables (Süß, 1996, p. 102). It
is depicted in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1. The system is dynamic (some
changes of variable states occur regardless of the participants’ actions) and
the scheme of variable interrelationships is highly complex. The target of the
game is to maximize the overall profit after the 12-month period. Thus, the
variable overall profit serves as dependent variable that operationalizes task
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Figure 7.1: Original German interface of the TAYLORSHOP dynamic sce-
nario (Süß, 1996) as used in the experiment. The control variables are pre-
sented in the left column, the variables that monitor the state of the factory
on the right.
performance or effectivity.
7.2.3 Procedure
In order to operationalize Hypotheses 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 assuming a connection
between group knowledge increase and performance, phases of knowledge
exchange among group members and phases of task execution need to be
separated. Since groups go through several phases during problem solving
processes (Bales & Strodtbeck, 1951), this separation is not interfering with
natural patterns of group processes: During orientation, information is gath-
ered; during the evaluation phase, discussion (and thus knowledge sharing)
and assessment of strategies take place whereas the actual performance of the
task is carried out in the control stage. Thus, evaluation and control phases
of task performance should be separated in order to test the hypotheses.
This separation is based on the assumption that group processes are both
beneficial to learning and to task performance, as shown in several studies
(Hausmann, 2005, p. 2).
Participants were assigned to dyads in order to minimize social effects
that occur in larger groups and due to the fact that dialogue is considered
one of the most powerful forms of learning and knowledge sharing in problem
solving (Hausmann, 2005).
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At the beginning of the experiment, each participant individually worked
on the reasoning scale of the short form of the Berlin Structural Intelligence
Test (BIS-K, Jäger et al., 1997), as reasoning is known to correlate with
TAYLORSHOP scenario performance (Süß, 1996; Wittmann et al., 1996).
Manipulation of knowledge overlap
After the BIS-Test, the learning sequence began. During learning, partici-
pants individually acquired knowledge on TAYLORSHOP scenario control
from instructional texts developed by Klocke (2004). In our study, we as-
signed sections of his instructional text to labels G1, G2, A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H, I, and J, where G1 and G2 represent general, introductory information
on the system and elements A...J encompass specific knowledge elements on
how to perform successfully (compare Table 7.3). The originally employed
German texts can be found in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
Each group member received items G1 and G2 and five Items from the
set A...J, embedded into a running text for learning3. For the latter, the
intra-group overlap between group members was experimentally varied: In
the shared condition, both group members received the same five elements.
In the partially shared condition, two of the five elements were assigned to
both group members, and three elements were exclusive to each member.
In the unshared condition, each group member received five knowledge ele-
ments that the other members did not receive. Note that cognitive load was
about the same for the individual group members over all conditions (two
general elements G1 and G2 plus five specific elements), but the number of
knowledge elements present inside the dyad differed: Apart from the general
elements G1 and G2, there were five elements in the shared condition, eight
in the partially shared condition, and ten elements in the unshared condi-
tion. Learning took place individually and learning time was ten minutes.
Participants were allowed to take notes at their discretion during learning.
Due to the connectionist structure of the existing instructional text edited
by Klocke (2004), it was not possible to present each knowledge element in-
dependent of each other, as some text passages refer to each other. The
following combinations of knowledge elements could be formed without ren-
dering the text illegible: ABCIJ, DEFGH, BCDEF, and EFGHI. Dyads in the
unshared condition received texts containing elements ABCIJ and DEFGH,
dyads in the partially shared condition received texts containing BCDEF
and DEFGH, and dyads in the shared condition received varying sets of two
identical texts. The question whether these combinations are individually of
3An example text with knowledge elements A, B, C, I, and J in German can be found
in Section A.3 of the Appendix.
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Table 7.3: Knowledge elements for TAYLORSHOP scenario control that were
embedded in instructional texts based on Klocke (2004).
Element Title Content
G1 Stable sys-
tem
Small changes lead to small consequences; do not act too cau-
tiously. The bank offers generous credit and a negative value
on the bank account is not a problem. If in financial trouble,
do not sell assets such as machinery and shops.
G2 Equilibrium The demand should meet production, the number of machines
should be equal to the number of workers, one should continu-
ously increase sales, and expand business.
A Raw mate-
rial
The price of raw material on the market is independent of all
other variables and is subject to market fluctuations. There
should always be enough raw material in stock to meet produc-
tion capacity.
B Stocking Stocking creates costs. Do not produce too much but enough
to satisfy market demand.
C Production
and de-
mand
The number of shirts in stock plus raw material should equal
demand. If the demand is unequal to production, it is better
to increase one variable instead of decreasing it.
D Investment
strategy
In order to pay off investments such as new machinery and new
shops, they should be made at an early point in time.
E Machine
efficiency
Displays (in percent) usage of machinery capacity. If the value
falls below 100%, machines may be damaged, may have too
few operators, workers may not be motivated or too little raw
material may be present.
F Worker ef-
ficiency
Displays (in percent) usage of work capacity. If the value falls
below 100%, workers may be unmotivated (depending on wages
and welfare) or raw material may be short.
G Investing
in machin-
ery
One should only buy machines that produce 100 shirts per
month as these produce the same costs in maintenance as ma-
chines producing 50 shirts a month.
H Damage to
machinery
Spending on machinery maintenance prevents damages and
should never be 0. If damages rise above 10%, maintenance
should be increased. More machines require more maintenance
and damage to machinery is independent of workers’ motiva-
tion.
I Demand The marketing budget, the number of shops, and the number
of traveling salesmen increase demand. The shirt price has a
stronger influence on demand than marketing.
J Expenses Marketing budget, number of shops, the number of traveling
salesmen, stocking and expenses per worker (wages and welfare)
increase costs and reduce profit.
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equal worth for performance is addressed in the result section. The text was
two pages in length and included a picture of the TAYLORSHOP interface
as well as the initial state of the scenario. This enabled the participants to
discuss possible strategies for the alteration of the unfavorable initial state
of the factory in the discussion part that followed at a later stage of the
experiment.
Manipulation of scenario experience
In order to induce a dissociation between performance and verbalizable knowl-
edge (which would indicate the presence of implicit knowledge, compare Sec-
tion 4.5.3), half of the participants had a TAYLORSHOP simulation available
during the learning period and were allowed to alter only those variables
that were covered in their instructional texts. In this way, they acquired
hands-on scenario experience through learning-by-doing and were expected
to hold more implicit knowledge on scenario control compared to those par-
ticipants who only learned from texts. After learning, participants performed
a self-assessment: For each title of the ten specific knowledge elements, they
were asked to assess their own level of expertise on a four-item scale. This
self-assessment was then coded into a skillMap that contained a simple skill
inventory of the ten knowledge elements. The structure of the graph is visible
in the upper area in Figure 7.2.
Participants were also asked to rate their computer experience and the
degree of their prior economic knowledge on a five-point Likert scale, as
these features influenced problem solving capabilities in other studies (Süß,
1996). After self assessment, participants completed the short version of
the WIS questionnaire on TAYLORSHOP scenario declarative knowledge
(Klocke, 2004). They were not allowed to use their notes during the test.
Participants were then asked to teach each other as much of their acquired
knowledge as possible (knowledge exchange). Participants were told that
their performance would be assessed on the basis of the mean of individual
performances after the experiment, and were thus motivated to actually ex-
change their knowledge. Participants were allowed to bring their notes to
the discussion and were allowed to make further notes. Time for discussion
was fifteen minutes and the discussion was not structured in any further way.
The instructions emphasized the aspect of knowledge exchange, which aimed
at keeping normative influences to a minimum and to maximize informa-
tional processes. Such a setting can be seen as a viable operationalization
of situations occurring in organizational practice: Two individuals freely dis-
cuss a complex problem in a fifteen-minutes meeting and take notes and
proceed with individual work afterwards. For half of the dyads, a computer
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Figure 7.2: skillMap with the knowledge graph containing the labels of the
ten knowledge elements provided. The boxes represent participants, edges
between boxes and TAYLORSHOP labels represent the participants’ self
assessment.
running the TAYLORSHOP simulation was present during discussion for ex-
perimenting and trial and error. After discussion, the participants filled in
the short version of the WIS questionnaire for a second time (again, the use
of notes was not permitted). This second test allows the quantification of
individual declarative knowledge increase caused by the discussion. These
two post-discussion WIS results are averaged in order to indicate knowledge
increase on group level. Afterwards, participants worked on the AST (com-
pare Section 3.9) with the stimulus word “Taylorshop” and a maximum of
15 concepts for pairwise similarity ratings. Participants were not allowed
to use their notes during AST-based structural knowledge assessment. Fi-
nally, participants worked on the TAYLORSHOP microworld individually
but were allowed to use their notes. In this way, group members had access
to knowledge from the group discussion process, but were able to perform
the task on their own. Group performance was then calculated by averaging
the two individual scores obtained for TAYLORSHOP profit. In this way,
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group processes from the knowledge exchange phase enter the task execution
stage, but task execution itself does not interfere with interaction processes
and possible process losses due to other interaction phenomena, as probably
occurred in the study by Endres and Putz-Osterloh (1994). This approach
is also referred to as the collective approach: “the collective approach tar-
gets the knowledge of individual team members and then aggregates this
information” (Cooke, Salas, & Stout, 2000, p. 164). After the completion
of the simulation, participants were thanked and debriefed. The entire ex-
periment lasted approximately 2.5 hours. The resulting experimental design
is a 3 (shared knowledge elements – partially shared knowledge elements –
unshared knowledge elements) × 2 (practical experience during learning –
no experience during learning) × 2 (practical experience during discussion –
no experience during discussion) factorial design (compare Table 7.1). They
layout of the laboratory setting is depicted in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Spatial layout of the experimental setting
Chapter 8
Results
The result section is divided in three parts. In the first one, results from the
AST validation experiments are reported. It is followed by the second section
on results of the laboratory experiment on the individual level, where find-
ings with reference to the connection between structural knowledge, implicit
knowledge and complex system control are reported. Results of the labora-
tory experiment on the group level are reported in the third section, which
is mainly on the connection between knowledge overlap inside the dyad and
the dyad’s complex problem solving (CPS) performance.
8.1 AST Validation
In order to test the hypotheses on AST validity that have been put forward
in the third section, four separate experiments were conducted that each
tested one of the Hypotheses 3.9.1 through 3.9.4. They are presented in
the following. Results relating to Hypothesis 3.9.5 are presented in Sections
8.2.4, 8.2.5, and 8.2.6.
8.1.1 AST internal consistency
As outlined in Section 3.9.3, the six AST coefficients number of associated
concepts, number of links, weighted density, diameter, and the relative max-
imum path length are either mathematically deductible from each other or
will correlate due to their underlying logical structure (compare Table 3.3).
This subsection will confirm this pattern by reporting empirical correlations
among the above-mentioned coefficients. This will allow an assessment of the
AST’s internal consistency: As all coefficients will correlate, the question is
whether they must all be counted to one underlying factor or whether the
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subtle differences in actual correlations justify the existence of more than one
underlying factor.
As this analysis requires a dataset of the six AST coefficients of an ap-
propriate size, no separate experiment is required. Instead, individual AST
scores from all available sources will be assembled into one large AST sample
for analysis. Factor analysis procedures require a large sample size: Guadag-
noli and Velicier (1988) found that for stable parameter estimates, the ab-
solute sample size is more important than functions of sample size. They
suggested a minimum sample size of 100 to 200 cases. In order to obtain such
a sample, the data is aggregated from Experiments 7.1.1 through 7.1.4 and
from Experiment 7.2 (compare next sections). Only participants that worked
on the AST under the standard condition (quick and intuitive placement of
edges without the necessity to label them) are included. In anticipation of
the sample characteristics of the following sections, the aggregated sample
contains 193 cases (107 male, 86 female, average age = 24.59, σ = 3.29). The
correlations of AST-coefficients are presented in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Spearman rho rank order correlations between AST coefficients
(N = 193). * indicates significance on 5%-level, ** on 1%-level, and *** on
0.1%-level.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Concepts – .64*** .77*** -.72*** .54***-.90***
2. Edges – .49*** -.24*** .39***-.63***
3. Clusters – -.54*** .42***-.70***
4. Weighted density – -.51*** .58***
5. Diameter – -.17***
6. RMPL –
All but one coefficients correlate according to the predictions of Table
3.3. The diameter and the RMPL exhibit a small correlation in the opposite
direction of the relationship illustrated in Figure 3.8. This is most probably
due to the small range of actually occurring diameter values: in the given
sample, the diameter ranges between 1 and 5 (the latter occurred only twice)
and very small diameters coincide with small RMPL valus as visible in Figure
3.8. Overall, the empiric data mirror the dependencies established in Section
3.9.3.
After correlation analysis, the six AST coefficients are subjected to a fac-
tor analysis with oblimin rotation (δ = 0◦). The Eigenvalue > 1 criterion
results in a two-factor solution, which accounts for 61.4% of the overall vari-
ance. The first factor accounts for 42.4%, the second for 19%. The pattern
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matrix of the rotated solution is presented in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Pattern matrix of the rotated factor solution for the aggregated
sample of 193 AST participants (oblimin rotation)
Factor 1 Factor 2
# of nodes .90
# of edges .72 .28
Clusters .76
Weighted density .98
Diameter .32 -.28
RMPL -.73
Note. Loadings < |.20| are omitted.
Three things become evident from the rotated factor solution. Firstly,
the four AST coefficients number of nodes (graph degree), number of edges
(graph size), number of clusters, and RMPL load on one factor, presumably
because of their close tie to the number of nodes (compare Section 3.9.3).
Note that for RMPL, smaller values are favorable, which explains the negative
sign. The fact that the number of nodes displays the highest loading on the
first factor underlines the fact that these four coefficients are predominantly
bound to the number of nodes.
Secondly, the subtle differences among AST coefficients are mirrored in
the observation that the weighted density does not load in the first factor,
despite its logical ties to the number of edges and nodes (compare Figure
3.7). This might be due to the fact that the weighted density measure is
the only AST coefficient that includes the edge weights in its computation
(compare Section 3.9.3). Since the weighted density is the only coefficient
loading substantially on the second factor and is thought to be the closest
indicator of structural implicitness (compare Section 3.9.3), the second factor
could be labeled as such. The close logical link between the weighted density
measure and the number of nodes is mirrored by the inter-factor correlation
of r = .41 (p < 0.001).
Thirdly, the diameter does not load substantially on the two factors. This
indicates that it it measures something else than the weighted density and
those coefficients exhibiting a tight connection to the number of nodes (Fac-
tor 1). This is insofar interesting as the diameter is significantly correlated
with all other coefficients (compare Table 8.1) and has been attributed with
carrying structural information by others (compare Bonato, 1990, in Section
3.9.3).
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Taken together, the analysis of the internal consistency shows that all
AST coefficients depend heavily on the number of nodes and that their cor-
relations mirror their logical dependency. However, this dependency does not
justify a combination of all coefficients into one measure, as factor analysis
indicates that two coefficients, the weighted density and the diameter, do not
load on the same factor than the other four coefficients. The coefficients are
therefore kept separate for further analysis.
8.1.2 Labeled and unlabeled AST testing
The fundamental claim of the AST is its assumed capability to capture struc-
tural implicitness, i.e. to capture links between explicit concepts that lie in
the implicit. Hypothesis 3.9.1 thus assumes that those participants who are
asked to make quick and intuitive pairwise concept comparisons will place
more edges than those participants who are asked to place only edges that
they can explicitly label. This would also lead to denser networks. As word
associations are made before any concept relations are placed in the AST sys-
tem, the number of associated concepts (the graph degree) is not supposed
to exhibit any differences between the two conditions for concept placement
(standard vs. explicit). The same applies to the number of clusters, which
depend heavily on the number of associations, but have no connection with
the placement of edges.
In order to test Hypothesis 3.9.1, 30 students at the Institute of Psy-
chology at Humboldt-University Berlin (19 female, 11 male, average age =
23.59, SD = 2.23) participated in the first experiment (compare Section
7.1.1). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normal distribution reveal normal dis-
tributions for the number of associated concepts (K − SZ = 1.145, p = .14),
the number of edges (K − SZ = 1.130, p = .15), the number of clusters
(K − SZ = 1.309, p = .065), the weighted density of the graph (K − SZ =
0.883, p = .42), and relative maximum path length scores (RMPL, measure
for graph compactness, smaller values indicate a more compact organization
of the AST graph, K − SZ = 0.953, p = .32). The diameter is not normally
distributed (K − SZ = 1.708, p = .006). The hypothesis is thus tested with
independent-sample t-tests for the normally distributed variables and with
the Mann-Whitney Test for the diameter variable. The results are presented
in Table 8.3.
The networks elicited under the standard (quick, intuitive, and unlabeled)
condition have a significantly higher number of edges than those elicited
under the explicit condition. On average, they have more than twice as many
edges and are also significantly more compact as visible in the significant
difference in RMPL-scores. Neither the number of clusters, nor the number
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Table 8.3: Comparison of means with independent sample t-tests and Mann-
Whitney’s U-Test comparing graph-theoretic coefficients for the standard
AST mode with the explicit mode (see text).
Test mode
Standard Explicit
(n = 13) (n = 13)
x¯ SD x¯ SD df T / Z p(t/z) dua
# of concepts 13.40 6.0 10.87 5.67 24 1.189 .244 .43
# of edges 53.47 45.35 25.53 15.73 24 2.254 .032 .82
Cluster 5.27 2.789 4.80 3.10 24 0.434 .668 .15
Diameter b 2 n/ab 2 n/ab n/ab -0.046 .967 n/a
Weighted Density 1.13 0.45 0.98 0.61 24 0.755 .457 .28
RMPL 0.24 0.07 0.32 0.11 24 -2.538 .017 .87
a Effect size Cohen’s d with bias correction for small samples.
b Due to the non-normal distribution of the diameter, Mann-Whitney’s U-
Test was used for the comparison of means. Instead of the mean, the
median is reported. Measures of dispersion are not available (n/a) for the
median.
of associated concepts significantly differs between the groups. Hypothesis
3.9.1 is thus supported with regard to the number of edges and the RMPL.
Networks elicited in the standard condition are also denser than networks
elicited in the explicit condition, but this difference does not reach statistical
significance. Networks elicited in the standard mode do not display different
diameter values than networks elicited in the explicit mode.
Taken together, these results support the fundamental assumption that
the AST is able to capture at least a fraction of structural implicitness by
prompting test participants for quick and intuitive similarity ratings on pre-
viously associated concepts. If participants are asked to place only those con-
nections they can explain, they place considerably fewer connections. Thus,
edges elicited under the standard intuitive connection encompass the labels
that a participant cannot label (structural implicitness) and the labels that
can be labeled.
8.1.3 AST sensitivity to learning
Hypothesis 3.9.2 assumes an increase or a change towards the more favorable
direction of AST-coefficients on a given knowledge domain if learning occurs
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in that particular domain. In order to test this assumption, participants of a
seminar were tested on the seminars’ topic (knowledge management) before
and after the completion of the course.
Of the 32 seminar participants that participated in the experiment, 19
participated in both measurements: Eight females and eleven males (aver-
age age= 24.01, SD = 3.24). Of the six measurement variables that were
elicited at both points in time, only two variables deviate from the assump-
tion of normal distribution in the pretest: The relative maximum path length
(RMPL) and the diameter (compare Table B.1 in Appendix B). All variables
in the post test display a standard normal distribution (compare Table B.2 in
Appendix B). The comparison between pre- and posttest values for the two
variables RMPL and diameter is thus performed with the non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the other variables are compared with paired-
sample t-tests (compare Table 8.4)
Table 8.4: Paired sample t-test comparing graph-theoretic coefficients for pre-
learning and post-learning AST-elicited structural knowledge parameters. *
indicates significance on 5%-level (two-tailed), ** on 1%-level (two-tailed).
Test
Pretest Posttest
(n = 19) (n = 19)
x¯ SD x¯ SD df T / Z p(t/z) dua
# of concepts 9.67 4.39 15.90 7.59 20 -4.148 < .001** .98
# of edges 27 23.42 54.89 35.44 17 -3.675 .002** .82
Cluster 4.19 1.83 6.57 2.98 20 -4.200 < .001** .94
Diameterb 2.43 n/a 2.86 1.06 n/a -1.369 .085+ .41
Weighted
Density
1.14 .71 1.01 .57 15 .980 .171 -.11
RMPL b .25 n/a .21 n/a n/a -2.475 .013* -.65
a Effect size Cohen’s d with bias correction for small samples.
b Due to the non-normal distribution of this variable, the Wilcoxon signed
ranks test was used for the comparison of means. Instead of the mean,
the median is reported.
Of the six measurement variables, four display a significant increase from
the first measurement to the second. This indicates that learning is reflected
by changes in AST these four coefficients over time. The diameter’s increase
reaches marginal significance, while the density slightly decreases from the
first to the second measurement. Thus, Hypothesis 3.9.2 is supported by
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four of the six measurement variables. The diameter has been proposed as a
measure for structural knowledge by Eckert (1998a). However, the diameter
encompasses something different. In order to obtain a large diameter, two
conditions have to be met. Firstly, a certain number of nodes has to be
present for the diameter to span a longer distance. Secondly, the nodes
have to be somewhat scarcely connected, bacuase a highly dense, star-shaped
network will most likely deliver a shorter density. Thus, a large density
requires the activation of a chain of word associations with start and end
points that lie far away from each other in their respective network. A
large diameter requires a lot of verbal associations that span a wide range
of subject areas. It thus can be seen as a qualitative measure of the span of
declarative word knowledge and not as a measure of structural knowledge.
The marginally significant increase of the diameter during the course of a
seminar would also support this notion.
The weighted density has been suggested to indicate structure implicit-
ness (compare Section 3.9.3). Therefore, the lack of a significant change of
the measure from pretest to posttest could be caused by a lack of structural
knowledge acquisition during the course of the seminar. The slight visible
decrease of the weighted density measure from the first to the second mea-
surement is also due to the internal logic of the AST (compare Section 3.9.3):
As the weighted density correlates negatively with the number of concepts
and the number of edges, a significant increase of those two variables has to
be accompanied by a decrease of the weighted density measure.
8.1.4 Convergent validity
Hypothesis 3.9.3 assumes that the number of associated concepts, the number
of links, the density, the diameter, and the relative maximum path lengths of
SLT- elicited knowledge graphs and AST-elicited knowledge graphs correlate.
Only eighteen students participated in the experiment (compare Section
7.1.3), fourteen female and four males. Severe technical problems with the
data base system led to a usable subsample of only eleven cases (four males,
seven females, seven in the explicit condition, four in the standard condi-
tion), which renders the explanatory power of this particular study highly
questionable. Although some argue that a correlation with a little as five
cases might be of use (Kareev, 2000), this is heavily debated (Juslin & Ols-
son, 2005) and from a stistical point of view, the smallest sample size that
has a possibility of delivering an interpretable correlation coefficient is eleven,
employing Kendall’s tau (Bonett & Wright, 2000). The sizes of the subsam-
ples do not meet this criterion. They are thus combined into one sample and
are correlated with SLT scores on aggregate level.
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Average age of the participants was 26.21 (SD = 7.567) years. All mea-
surement variables except for the diameter exhibit a standard normal dis-
tribution in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (compare Table B.3 of the Ap-
pendix). Due to the small sample size, Kendall’s tau rank order correlations
between aggregated AST scores and SLT scores are calculated with R (R
Development Core Team, 2007) and are presented in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5: Kendall’s tau correlations between AST-elicited coefficients and
SLT-elicited coefficients of knowledge networks on the stimulus “nervous sys-
tem”. * indicates significance on 1%-level.
# of edges W. Density Diameter RMPL
rAST(std+explicit),SLT (N = 11) .07 .53 .63* .26
On the aggregated level, a significant correlation between the AST-elicited
diameter and the SLT-elicited diameter is visible. The weighted density mea-
sures and RMPL scores also display a positive correlation, but both do not
reach levels of statistical significance, which is probably caused by the ex-
tremely small sample size. SLT-elicited edges exhibit a close-to-0 correlation
with AST-elicited edges. That is probably due to the fact that the aggre-
gated AST-sample contains edges that the participants would not label, while
the SLT sample contains only labeled edges. All in all, hypothesis 3.9.3 is
refuted by these results; SLT and AST only correlate on only one of the four
coefficients. This may however be caused by the extremely small sample size.
8.1.5 AST congruent validity and discriminant validity
In order to test whether AST scores correlate with outside criteria of knowl-
edge based performance, AST-scores are compared to exam grades. Hypoth-
esis 3.9.4 postulates a positive correlation between the two. The discriminant
validity of the AST is tested by comparing AST scores to the results of an
IQ-test (compare Section 7.1.4).
A total of 52 students from three classes (two cleaners, one plumbing)
participated in the experiment (49 male, three female). Average age was
20.31 (SD = 3.48). With regard to their education prior before training,
six students came from a special school, 26 have the German Hauptschula-
bschluss, (an equivalent of a CSE certificate that qualifies below O-Levels),
15 hold a German secondary modern school certificate (Realschulabschluss),
and two have Abitur, the diploma from German secondary school qualify-
ing for university admission. Average WST-IQ score of the sample is 87,08
(SD = 8, 86). The average total grade of the reference examination was
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4,39 (SD = 1.08) on the standard German school grade scale ranging from
1 (excellent) to 6 (unsatisfactory).
According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normal distribution, five
measurement variables fail to display a standard distribution: Grade (K −
SZ = 1.423, p = .035), number of clusters (K − SZ = 1.549, p = .016),
number of edges (K − SZ = 1.378, p = .045), PFNET diameter (K − SZ =
1.657, p = .008), and RMPL (K − SZ = 1.420, p = .034). Only the number
of associated concepts (K − SZ = 1.209, p = .109), the weighted density of
the PFNET (K − SZ = 0.908, p = .382), and the average WST IQ (K −
SZ = 0.871, p = .434) display a normal distribution. Thus, spearman rank
correlations are employed for correlating the AST-elicited measures with IQ
and grade scores (compare Table 8.6).
Table 8.6: Spearman rho rank order correlations between AST scores, exam
grades and WST-elicited IQ scores (N = 52). + indicates marginal signif-
icance on 10% level (one-tailed), * indicates significance on 5%-level (one-
tailed), ** on 1%-level (one-tailed).
WST Concepts Edges Clusters Weighted Diameter RMPLb
Density
Gradea .41** .22+ .31* .25+ -.36* .18 -.41**
WST-IQ 1 .34* .13 .37** -.07 .13 -.15
a The employed standard German grades range from 1 – 6; 1 is best, 6
is worst. In order to simplify the interpretability of the correlations,
this grade scale is reversed, i.e. larger values are desirable and positive
correlations with the grade indicate higher achievement.
b Note that smaller RMPL values are desirable as they indicate a more
compact organization of knowledge.
Of the six AST-coefficients, two are correlated with the exam grade in the
expected direction at marginally significant levels: the number of concepts
and the number of clusters. Two coefficients exhibit a significant correlation
with exam grade in the expected direction: The number of edges and the
RMPL. These four coefficients thus support Hypothesis 3.9.4. The diameter
also correlates positively with exam grade, but fails to reach statistical sig-
nificance. The weighted density displays a significantly negative correlation
with exam grade. Although this is contrary to the hypotheses, it is in line
with the logical structure of the AST (compare Sections 3.9.3 and 8.1.1):
the weighted density correlates negatively with the graph order (number of
concepts) and the graph size (number of edges). As those two coefficients
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correlate positively with exam grades, the weighted density has to exhibit a
negative correlation with exam grades.
Taken as a whole, these results are more supportive of Hypothesis 3.9.4
than opposing as it is supported by four of the six coefficients.
Apart from this observation, it becomes evident from Table 8.6 that in
this case, the construct measured by the AST and the construct measured
by the WST overlap to a significant extent. In order to evaluate whether
the AST measures something else than the WST, a partial correlation of the
AST-scores with grade is performed, controlling for WST. As partial corre-
lations are based on Pearson’s correlation coefficient, the given data do not
allow this analysis in the strict sense. It is however performed in order to
establish a trend; the results will be interpreted with the appropriate cau-
tion. As visible in Table 8.7, no significant correlations between AST scores
and grade remain if the influence of the WST IQ variable is kept constant,
although the weighted density measure and RMPL score might achieve sig-
nificant values if a larger sample size was employed. These results indicate a
low discriminant validity of the AST if compared to the construct of verbal
intelligence as measured by the WST. Due to the AST’s heavy dependency
on verbal capabilities for term associations, this is not surprising and the
question remains whether operationalizations of IQ with lesser dependence
on verbal skills will also correlate to these extends. This question will be
addressed in Table 8.13 in Section 8.2.6.
Table 8.7: Partial correlation between AST-elicited variableas and exam
grade controlled for WST-IQ (N = 52)
Concepts Edges Clusters Weighted Diameter RMPL
Density
r -.00 -.04 -.14 .24 .12 .23
p (one-tailed) .497 .437 .264 .141 .294 .147
8.2 Laboratory Experiment Results on Indi-
vidual Level
Prior to hypotheses testing, the data is screened for normal distributions.
Furthermore, it is tested whether the manipulation of knowledge overlap was
also subjectively experienced by the participants. Afterwards, the hypothe-
ses are tested by means of analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlations, and
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error-bar charts. The section concludes with further findings not originally
included in the hypotheses.
8.2.1 Operationalization of scenario performance
As a first step, a variable operationalizing TAYLORSHOP CPS performance
needs to be selected. Since the participants were told to achieve as much
profit as possible, the variable profit has the highest face validity and the use
of a different operatinalization of profit should only be used if severe reasons
prevent the usage of profit. However, past researches encountered difficulties
with this variable. Funke (J. Funke, 1983) found skewed distributions of this
variable and argued that the TAYLORSHOP scenario was too difficult for the
majority of his participants. He also found only small correlations between
intelligence scores and profit and thus suggested a new operationalization of
performance, the trend measure. The trend measure denotes the number of
simulated months during which a participant is able to achieve a profit in
comparison to the previous month. Süß (1996, p. 144) found that in the
original version of the TAYLORSHOP as employed by Funke, the number of
sold shirts negatively correlated with overall profit. He simplified the system
and obtained satisfactory difficulty measures for both the profit and trend
measure. However, he also suggested a different measure, the sum of the
Z-transformed scores of shirt sales per month and profit margin per shirt.
A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test reveals that the assumption of
bivariate normal distribution does not hold for the four measures profit
(K − SZ = 1.412, p = .037), trend (K − SZ = 1.534, p = .018), average
profit per shirt (K − SZ = 3.335, p < .001), and average shirt sales per
month (K − SZ = 2.190, p < .001). Thus, the combined measure of average
shirt sales and average profit per shirt cannot be used as suggested by Süß,
because the conditions for the z-transformation are not met. An examination
of the remaining two performance indicators reveals the following: The profit
measure resembles a normal distribution more closely than the trend does
(compare Figures 8.1 and 8.2), but was the more difficult goal to achieve:
The average profit is -36780.30 DM and the modal interval (43 participants)
represents a loss between 0 and 50000 DM. In the trend measure, 107 partic-
ipants managed to achieve an increase in profit compared to the last month
in at least one month. However, the distribution of the trend variable is more
skewed than the profit variable. In summary, an overall profit was more diffi-
cult to obtain for the participants (43 of 134 achieved a profit larger than 0)
than a trend larger than 0, but the data quality of the profit measure is better
than the trend measure due to its closer resemblance of a normal distribu-
tion. A non-parametric Spearman-rho correlation of the profit and trend
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measure with the established determinants of TAYLORSHOP performance,
declarative knowledge (WISpost, BIS-K, computer experience (CE) and prior
economic knowledge (EK)) displays significant positive correlations indicat-
ing validity of both measures (compare Table 8.8). Since the two measures
correlate at .90, they seem to capture the same ability and are thus both kept
as operationalization of TAYLORSHOP performance. As the trend measure
has proven to be a more robust against participants’ control errors (J. Funke,
1983) and due to the finding that the trend and the performance have dis-
played different correlations with outside criteria (ibid), the two measures
are kept separate.
Figure 8.1: Histogram with normal curve of the variable profit on individual
level
8.2.2 Comparability of individually learned knowledge
elements
In order to meet the demand that all participants have a quantitatively com-
parable amount of scenario knowledge after learning the five TAYLORSHOP-
related elements and to make sure that no combination of knowledge elements
was superior to others, it is tested whether all four combinations of knowl-
edge elements (ABCIJ, DEFGH, BCDEF, and EFGHI, compare Table 7.3)
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Figure 8.2: Histogram with normal curve of the variable trend on individual
level
Table 8.8: Spearman rho correlations between profit, trend, and established
predictors of TAYLORSHOP performance on individual level (N = 134). +
indicates marginal significance on 10% level (one-tailed), * indicates signifi-
cance on 5%-level (one-tailed), ** on 1%-level (one-tailed).
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Profit – .91** .00 .21** .32** .40**
2. Trend – .10 .19* .34** .44**
3. Computer experience – .36** .13+ .16*
4. Economic knowledge – .13+ .04
5. BIS-K – .50**
6. WISpost –
led to comparable pre-discussion WIS-Test results (WISpre) in the declara-
tive knowledge test. A one-factorial ANOVA of WISpre over the four com-
binations of knowledge elements reveals no significant effect of the learned
knowledge element on individual pre-discussion declarative knowledge score
(F (3, 133) = 0.339, p = 0.80). Thus, on individual level, all participants
enter the experiment with sets of declarative scenario knowledge that lead
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to a comparable amount of declarative knowledge across learning variations.
The question whether different combinations of knowledge elements lead to
superior implicit scenario knowledge on individual level cannot be tested, as
no pre-discussion measure of implicit knowledge exists. But it is not very
plausible to assume differences in implicit scenario knowledge because no
participant had any prior experience with the scenario.
8.2.3 Analysis of intra-group dependencies of variables
Hypotheses 3.9.1 through 3.9.5 make assumptions on the individual level,
but the data has not been surveyed on a purely individual level. Experiment
participants are embedded in dyads (compare methodology in Section 7.2),
which has to be considered in the analyses. In a dyadic setting, an observed
correlation “can reflect relations between the variables at an individual level,
at a dyadic level, or both.... The observed ‘overall’ correlation for individuals
interacting in dyads can be seen as a mixture of both the individual-level and
the dyad-level relation” (Griffin & Gonzales, 1995, p. 430). It thus has to be
determined whether the observed correlations on the individual level partly
stem from the relations on the dyadic level. Therefore, it is analyzed whether
the variables are independent, i.e. whether the membership to a certain dyad
influences the expression of measurement variables.
There are several methods available for this analysis, depending on whether
the two members of a dyad are interchangeable or not (Kashy & Kenny,
2000). In the design of the laboratory experiment, different knowledge el-
ements were assigned to the members of the dyad. Group members are
also distinguishable in terms of gender and age. However, such a distinction
should only be made if it affects responses (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006).
As Section 8.2.7 will establish, male participants usually score higher than
female participants. Thus, in order to be on the safe side, the distinguish-
able case is assumed. The measure for nonindependance for distinguishable
dyads is the Pearson product-moment correlation between the two members
of a dyad. Kenny, Kashy and Cook (2006) strongly advise to control this
correlation for independent variables, because “failing to control for these
variables may lead us to mistakenly conclude that there is nonindependence
when, in fact, there is none” (Kenny et al., 2006, p. 30). For the dependent
variables TAYLORSHOP profit and trend, the intragroup Pearson correla-
tion between the dyads’s members is thus controlled for reasoning (BIS),
scenario-specific knowledge (WISpre, WISpost, and WIS∆), prior economic
knowledge, AST weighted density, the gender composition of the dyad (com-
pare Section 8.3.8), and a variable representing knowledge overlap inside the
dyad. The resulting intragroup correlation is r = .32 (p = .020) for profit,
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and r = .13 (p = .345) for the trend measure. The intragroup Pearson
correlations for the independent variables are presented in Table 8.9.
Table 8.9: Assessment of dyadic nonindependence of independent measure-
ment variables: Pearson product-moment correlation. Correlations are ad-
justed by partialling out known predictors where appropriate. * indicates
significance on 5% level.
Variable r
Economic knowledge .09
Computer experience .07
BIS-K .14
WISpre .16
WISpost .01a
WIS∆ -.12
AST
Coefficients
Associated concepts .37*
Edges (graph size) .08
Cluster .09
Diameter -.06
Weighted density .03
RMPL .14b
a controlled for BIS-K, WISpre and WISpost.
b controlled for associated concepts.
* indicates significance on 5% level (two-tailed).
The discovered nonindependence of the dependent variable profit and the
independent variable associated concepts is not surprising, as these were most
probably influenced by the dyad’s interaction during the discussion. Kenny,
Kashy, and Cook (2006) advise an analysis on group level through group
mean calculation if nonindependence among dependent variables is identified.
This will be conducted in Section 8.3. In order to maintain an analysis on
individual level, the individual correlations must be treated carefully, as they
are influenced by two components: By a portion of variance shared between
the dyadic partners and an “individual component representing the portion
of the variable that is unshared or unique between dyadic partners” (Griffin
& Gonzales, 1995, p. 433).
This can be achieved with a covariance theorem decomposition of bivari-
ate two-level correlation introduced by Robinson (1950). This procedure has
also been referred to as Within-And-Between-Analysis (WABA) by Danser-
aeu, Alutto and Yammarino (1984), who discussed this approach extensively.
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WABA delivers a group-size weighted correlation of group means and, more
importandly for this case, a group-mean-centered within-group correlation
between two variables. This within-group correlation is adjusted for group
effects and represents the correlation at individual level. For further dis-
cussion of the WABA approach cf. Bliese (Bliese & Halverson, 1998; Bliese,
2000). Table 8.10 reports the group-mean-centered within-group correlations
between the dependent variables and independent variables profit and trend
and the uncorrected individual correlations for comparison. WABA corre-
lations were obtained with the multilevel package (Bliese, 2006) of the R
software (R Development Core Team, 2007).
Table 8.10: WABA group-mean-centered within-group correlations and non-
adjusted individual correlations of dependent and independent variables. The
uncorrected correlations are Spearman rank-order correlations. + denotes
marginal significance on 10%-level, * denotes significance on 5%-level, **
denotes significance on 1%-level, and *** on 0.1%-level.
WABA Uncorrected
Variable Profit Trend Profit Trend
Economic knowledge .19* .17+ .21* .19*
Computer experience .09 .06 .10 .10
BIS-K .28* .28* 31*** .34***
WISpre .36** .33** .25** .30***
WISpost .45** .40** .40*** .44***
WIS∆ -.16 -.15 -.11 -.12
AST
Coefficients
Associated concepts -.11 -.04 -.08 -.08
Edges (graph size) -.09 -.07 .02 .02
Cluster -.10 -.02 -.08 -.08
Diameter -.10 -.07 .02 .01
Weighted density .18* .08 .18* .16+
RMPL .06 -.08 .05 .06
A comparison with the uncorrected values reveals one substantial differ-
ence among the significant correlations: The pre-discussion knowledge score
WISpre correlates .11 weaker with the TAYLORSHOP profit measure if un-
controlled for group effects. All other significant correlations differ no more
than |.03| between corrected and uncorrected (except for WISpost, where the
difference is .05), and with two exceptions, the uncontrolled correlation is the
smaller correlation.
Another visible difference between corrected and non-corrected corre-
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lations is the lack of a significant mean-centered corrlation between the
weighted density measure and the trend measure. This is insofar negligible
as the weighted density’s effect on the trend measure will not be analyzed
further, because the dissociation between verbalizable knowledge and perfor-
mance will only become visible for the profit measure in Section 8.2.4. In
summary, the use of the uncorrected values on individual level cam be jus-
tified for further analysis in this section due to their minor deviations from
the corrected values, especially since an analysis on average dyadic level will
be performed in Section 8.3.
8.2.4 Implicit knowledge and TAYLORSHOP perfor-
mance
As stated in Hypothesis 4.6.1, it is assumed that exposure to the TAY-
LORSHOP scenario during learning leads to more scenario-relevant implicit
knowledge compared to those participants who only learned from texts. In
order to test this assumption, an analysis of variance with the two fixed fac-
tors learning mode and discussion mode would be desirable. Unfortunately,
the data level does not permit this analysis, as the dependent variables profit
and trend are not normally distributed. Differences in those two variables
over the two factors are thus determined with two separate non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U-Tests. The first one is performed comparing the central
tendencies of TAYLORSHOP profit and trend between the two modes of
individual scenario knowledge acquisition: learning from texts only versus
learning from texts and from experimenting with the system presented in
the text. The Mann-Whitney U test exhibits a marginally significant dif-
ference in performance scores for profit (Z = −1.298, p = .10, one-tailed),
but not for trend (Z = −0.944, p = .17, one-tailed). Participants who had a
scenario available during learning achieved an average profit of -22846 DM
while those who only learned from texts made an average profit of -49519
DM. Experience learners achieved a profit with comparison to the previous
month (trend) in 5.07 months on average, compared to 4.48 months for those
who learned from texts only.
In order to test whether this slight superiority of experience during learn-
ing is based on implicit knowledge acquisition during learning, pre- and
post-discussion declarative knowledge WIS-Test scores are compared be-
tween experience learners and text-only learners. WISpre, WISpost and WIS∆
display normal distributions (WISpre: K − SZ = .749, p = .63; WISpost:
K − SZ = .793, p = .56; WIS∆: K − SZ = .983, p = .29) and are thus
z-transformed and compared with independent sample t-tests (compare Ta-
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ble 8.11). It turns out that the slight superiority of experience learners is
not mirrored in superiority in declarative TAYLORSHOP scenario knowl-
edge at any time. Thus, a dissociation between performance (in profit) and
knowledge on individual level is visible in the data, induced by experience
learning.
Table 8.11: Independent sample t-test between experience learners and text
learners for the three declarative knowledge measures (N = 134)
Knowledge acquisition
Texts only Texts & experience
n x¯ SD n x¯ SD t df p
ZWISpre 70 .09 1.02 64 -.02 .95 .628 132 .53
ZWISpost 70 .09 1.05 64 -.05 .91 .879 132 .38
ZWIS∆ 70 .01 1.01 64 -.06 1.01 .397 132 .69
In order to test whether an exposure to the TAYLORHOP microworld
during discussion led to a further increase in CPS for those in the experience
learning condition, a second Mann-Whitney test for TAYLORSHOP perfor-
mance is carried out, comparing profit and trend between those groups who
had a scenario present during the discussion and those who had had one
during learning, but not during the discussion. The Mann-Whitney U Test
does not show significant differences, neither for profit (Z = −.744, p = .23,
one-tailed), nor for trend (Z = −1.247, p = .11, one-tailed). Similarly to the
abovementioned results, a slight superiority of those who were subjected to
experience learning and to a scenario during discussion compared to those
who had no scenario available, neither during learning, nor during discussion,
is visible for profit (Z = -1.341; p = .09) and trend (Z = -1.319, p = .09). All
in all, the data provide marginal support for Hypothesis 4.6.1 with reference
to learning mode and profit.
8.2.5 Knowledge acquisition and structural knowledge
As a marginally significant dissociation between TAYLORSHOP performance
and verbalizable knowledge for experience learners has been established, this
subsection analyzes whether this dissociation is accompanied by an increased
structural implicitness (as assumed by Hypothesis 4.6.2). As structural im-
plicitness is most closely operationalized with the weighted density measure
(compare Sections 3.9.3 and 8.1.1), it is tested whether the weighted den-
sity exhibits significantly higher values for experience learners in contrast
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to participants who only learned from texts. The other five available AST-
coefficients (number of concepts (degree), number of edges (size), clusters,
diameter, and RMPL) will also be subjected to this analysis.
Only the variable graph size (number of edges in the PFNET) displays
a normal distribution (K − SZ = .585, p = .88). Thus, this variable will
be submitted to a t-test while the other values will be submitted to Mann-
Whitney U-tests between groups that worked on the system during learning
and those groups who did not. For the graph size, no significant increase
in edges under the experience condition is observed (t(131) = .84, p = .20,
one-tailed). The non-parametric comparisons for the other graph theoretic
values are presented in Table 8.12.
Table 8.12: Mann-Whitney U test for AST-elicited structural knowledge
coefficients between experience learning and learning from texts only (N =
134)
Knowledge acquisition
Texts only Texts & experience
n Mean rank n Mean rank U Z pa
# of nodes 70 70.60 64 64.11 2023 -.968 .17
Cluster 70 72.81 64 61.69 1868 -1.670 .08+
Diameter 70 72.24 63 61.17 1838 -1.852 .06+
W. density 70 61.92 63 72.64 1849 -1.602 .05*a
RMPL 70 66.06 63 68.04 2139 -.296 .38
a The significance value for the weighted density measure is one-
tailed as Hypothesis 4.6.2 assumes more structural implicitness
under the experience condition.
It becomes visible that the knowledge graphs of participants who learned
from experience have less clusters and a smaller diameter. Both differences
reach marginal levels of significance. At the the same time, knowledge graphs
elicited under the experience condition are significantly denser than those net-
works from participants who learned from texts only. This finding is in line
with the logical structure of the AST (compare Section 3.9.3): The weighted
density depends negatively on the number of edges and associated concepts.
As there are fewer associated concepts in the text-only condition, the density
in the experience condition is larger. The fewer number of associated con-
cepts in the text-learning condition is most probably also responsible for the
smaller diameter and number of clusters. Thus, a more favorable density in
the experience condition automatically leads to less favorable values among
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the other coefficients. This issue will be discussed further in Section 9.1.1,
but overall, Hypothesis 4.6.2, postulating denser knowledge graphs under
experience learning, is supported by the data.
The fact that experience with the scenario leads to denser networks also
supports Hypothesis 3.9.5, stating that task performance involving implicit
knowledge for completion (as established by the marginal superiority of expe-
rience learning and its dissociation from verbalizable knowledge), correlates
with the AST-elicited weighted density measure.
8.2.6 Structural knowledge and CPS performance
Hypothesis 4.6.3 assumes a relationship between structural knowledge pa-
rameters and TAYLORSHOP performance. This is tested by calculating
a non-parametric Spearman rho correlation between structural knowledge
coefficients and the two variables that operationalize TAYLORSHOP perfor-
mance, as both of them and most of the independent variables are not nor-
mally distributed (compare previous sections). The correlations are presented
in Table 8.13, together with the correlations between structural knowledge
parameters and WISpost and BIS-K.
Table 8.13: Spearman rho correlations between structural knowledge param-
eters, TAYLORSHOP performance, declarative knowledge and reasoning (N
= 134). + indicates marginal significance on 10% level (one-tailed), * indi-
cates significance on 5%-level (one-tailed), ** on 1%-level (one-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profit -.08 .02 -.08 .02 .18* .05
Trend -.08 .02 -.08 .01 .16* .06
BIS-K .07 .14* .02 -.02 -.01 -.12
WISpost .03 .10 .00 .12+ .02 .00
1. # of nodes – .44** .82** .38** -.78** -.88**
2. # of edges – .30** .19* -.21** -.45**
3. Cluster – .30** -.65** -.73**
4. Diameter – -.43** .04
5. W. density – .62**
6. RMPL –
Only one feature of structural knowledge, the weighted density, signif-
icantly correlates with both TAYLORSHOP performance measures profit
and trend. At the same time, the weighted density displays near-zero cor-
relations with the established determinants of TAYLORSHOP performance
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declarative knowledge (WIS) and reasoning (BIS-K). This indicates an ad-
ditional variance explanation of the density measure on CPS performance;
an assumption one would test by adding the weighted density measure to
a hierarchical regression that includes the established determinants of CPS
and then adds the weighted density measure. However, two assumptions
of regression models are violated by the data: Normal distribution of error
terms leading to a normal distribution of residuals (Statsoft Inc., 2006) and
linear independence of regressors (Mansfield & Helms, 1982): The residuals
of a regression involving not normally distributed variables will most likely
not be normally distributed as well, and the other established predictors of
CPS performance either correlate (BIS scores and knowledge) or are in direct
linear dependency (WISpost = WISpre + WIS∆). These two problems will be
handled through permutation tests and lasso regressions1 in the following.
Not normally distributed residuals do not prevent the conduction of a re-
gression analysis, but they render the p-values meaningless. The beta weights
of a regression always minimize the quadratic error of the fit, but without a
normal distribution of errors, the statistics underlying p-value computation
in regression analysis do not follow a t- or F-distribution, which is assumed
when calculating the p value. If the distributions of the t- and F-statistics
are not known, no concrete p can be supplied. A workaround for this is
the use of permutation tests for calculating a p value. Permutation tests
were developed in the 1930s by Fisher and Pitman (Fisher, 1935; Pitman,
1937, 1938). In order to test whether two sample means originate from two
(alternative hypothesis) or one underlying distribution(s) (null hypothesis),
permutation tests pool the data from two samples A and B (of size nA and
nB) into one sample C of size nA+B. nA cases are drawn from C and their
average is computed and compared to the average of the remaining sample
of size nB. This process is repeated frequently until an estimation of the dis-
tribution of the mean difference given the null hypothesis is obtained. The
one-sided p-value denotes the proportion of permutations where the differ-
ence in means is larger than the observed difference. The two-sided p-value
employs the absolute values.
Anderson and Legendre (1999) summarized various permutation-based
tests of significance of a single predictor variable in multiple regression, test-
ing the null hypothesis that the predictor’s beta coefficient equals zero. “An
important application of such permutation tests is their use in canonical anal-
ysis of multivariate data..., where the data generally do not fulfill the assump-
tions required by traditional parametric testing procedures” (M. J. Anderson
1I am very grateful to Stephan Kolassa for his suggestions on those methods and for
his help with the according R scripts.
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& Legendre, 1999, p. 272). One of the approaches presented is the permu-
tation of residuals under the full model as proposed by ter Braak (1992). It
proceeds as follows:
A standard least-squares regression of the dependent variable Y with the
independent variables X and Z of the type
Y = β0 + β1−2X + β2−1Z + 
is performed. It delivers b0, b1−2, and b2−1 as estimates of the corresponding
β values and residuals R corresponding to .
For a specific estimate of a β coefficient b, a reference value tref is obtained
by calculating t = (b−0)/se(b) where se denotes the estimated standard error
of the partial regression coefficient. The residuals are permuted randomly,
producing R∗, and new values Y ∗ are created by calculating
Y ∗ = b0 + b1−2X + b2−1Z +R ∗ .
“The new values Y ∗ are regressed on X and Z to obtain an estimate b∗2−1
and a value t∗ under permutation. Here, t∗ = (b∗2−1 − b2−1)/se(b∗2−1)” (p.
280), and the permutation of R, the calculation of Y ∗ and the new regression
are repeated a large number of times, yielding a distribution of values of t∗
under permutation. The two-sided significance value p denotes the propor-
tion of absolute values in this distribution larger than |tref |, the one-sided
significance the percentage of values larger than tref .
Anderson and Legendre (1999) employed simulation studies in order to
demonstrate that this procedure is robust to several violations that underlie
classic parametric calculation of significance values, including violations of
the assumption of normal distribution of residuals and non-collinearity of
regressors.
Collinearity of regressors also bears the risk of delivering unrealistic beta
weights, as an increase of collinearity between columns of the design matrix
increases the probability that the error terms, the statistical white noise,
influence the calculation of betas (M. J. Anderson & Legendre, 1999). Sub-
sampling and shrinkage are strategies in regression analysis that are robust
against collinearity issues (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2001).
“In this approach, we retain only a subset of the variables, and eliminate
the rest from the model. Least squares regression is used to estimate the
coefficients of the inputs that are retained. There are a number of different
strategies for choosing the subset” (ibid, p.55).
By retaining a subset of predictors and discarding the rest, subset
selection produces a model that is interpretable and has possibly
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lower prediction error than the full model. However, because it is
a discrete process – variables are either retained or discarded – it
often exhibits high variance, and so doesn’t reduce the prediction
error of the full model. Shrinkage methods are more continuous,
and don’t suffer as much from high variability (ibid, p. 59).
The least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (lasso) is a regression
technique first proposed by Tibshirani (1996). It regularizes a least squares
regression by imposing a penalty on the size of regression coefficients (Hastie,
Taylor, Tibshirani, & Walther, 2007). It fits a linear model
f(x) = β0 +
p∑
j=1
xjβj (8.1)
by solving the optimization problem
minβ
N∑
i=1
(
yi − βi −
p∑
j=1
xijβj
)2
subject to
p∑
j=1
|βj| ≤ s (8.2)
The lasso method performs a continuous subset selection (Hastie et al., 2001),
because “choosing an s can be thought of as choosing the number of predic-
tors to include in a regression model” (Hastie et al., 2007, p. 2). If the tuning
parameter s is set to 1, it delivers ordinary least square estimates, as the beta
weights are scaled in such a way that they sum up to 1.
In summary, the lasso selects a subset of predictors that deliver a maxi-
mum in variance explanation of the full model including all predictors, but
whose included parameters are below the threshold of a collinearity that vi-
olates regression model assumptions. If a regressor from the set of regressors
“offered” to the lasso procedure is included in the model before s reaches 1,
this indicates its importance for the prediction. The lasso thus produces a
rank-order of regressors, sorted by relevance. According to Hastie (2007),
this is due to the fact that lasso chooses always that regressor for inclusion
in the next step that correlates highest with the residuals of the model of the
current step.
In the following, two lasso regressions are performed with computer ex-
perience, economic knowledge, BIS scores, WISpre, WISpost, WIS∆, and the
weighted density measure; one with profit as dependent variable, the other
with trend. The employed algorithms are described in Hastie, Taylor, Tib-
shirani and Walther (2007). For computation, the LARS package (Hastie
& Efron, 2007) of the R software (R Development Core Team, 2007) was
employed.
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Lasso Regression for TAYLORSHOP Profit
A lasso regression with the dependent variable TAYLORSHOP Proft (Profit)
is performed. It delivers the variable sequence reported in Table 8.14. The
Table 8.14: Sequence of lasso regression moves with TAYLORSHOP profit
as dependent variable
Step Variable # Variable df RSS Cp
0 - - 1 1.954× 1012 37.063
1 5 WISpost 2 1.819× 1012 24.477
2 3 BIS-K 3 1.792× 1012 27.125
3 2 Economic knowledge 4 1.689× 1012 20.364
4 6 WIS∆ 5 1.658× 1012 19.738
5 1 Computer experience 6 1.616× 1012 18.145
6 7 AST weighted density 7 1.554× 1012 14.814
7 4 WISpre 8 1.450× 1012 8
standardized beta weights over the incrementing s parameter are plotted in
Figure 8.3. Note that the weighted density is included before s – the tuning
parameter that is gradually increased, compare Equation 8.2 – reaches .4.
This indicates a certain significance of the weighted density, although its
relevance appears to be small. The lasso indicates that the variable WIS∆
is of least importance for prediction of the dependant variable. This is not
surprising, as WIS∆ is collinear with WISpre and WISpost.
Due to its low significance (and its collinearity) as identified by the lasso,
WISpre is dropped as a predictor. The remaining variables are inserted in a
linear regression. As its residuals are not normally distributed as visible in
the deviation from the main diagonal of the q-q plot (compare Figure 8.4),
the one-tailed permuted p (calculated with ter Braak’s method as explained
above) is reported (compare Table 8.15). It accounts for 22.35% of the over-
all variance (multiple R2 = .223, adjusted R2 = .184). This indicates that
the proposed model is able to explain a substantial fraction of the regressand
variable profit, and that the weighted density makes a small but marginally
significant contribution to this regression. Thus, the weighted density mea-
sure has a small and marginally unique explanatory power in predicting the
TAYLORSHOP profit, and Hypothesis 4.6.3 receives marginal support for
the profit variable. The strongest predictors of TAYLORSHOP profit in the
lasso regression are post-discussion knowledge, reasoning, and prior economic
knowledge.
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Figure 8.3: Plot of standardized β coefficients over the lasso tuning parameter
s (denoted as |β|/max|β|) for TAYLORSHOP profit. The variable names
according to variable numbers are presented in Table 8.14, the vertical lines
represent the steps of the lasso regression given in Table 8.14. The weighted
density is denoted by variable 7.
Lasso Regression for TAYLORSHOP Trend
A lasso regression with the regressors computer experience, economic knowl-
edge, BIS-K, WISpre, WISpost, WIS∆, and the weighted density measure and
the trend variable as regressand is performed. It delivers the variable se-
quence reported in Table 8.16.
The standardized beta weights over the incrementing s parameter are
plotted in Figure 8.5. Note that in this regression, the weighted density is
included before s reaches .3. This indicates a stronger significance of the
weighted density in predicting the trend measure, although its relevance ap-
pears to be small. The lasso indicates that the variable WIS∆ is of low
importance for prediction of the dependent variable. This is not surprising,
as WIS∆ is collinear with WISpre and WISpost. For the prediction of the
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Figure 8.4: Q-Q plot of standardized residuals of the regression of profit on
WISpost, WISdelta, BIS, computer exprience, and economic knowledge.
trend, the computer experience appears to be even less important than the
collinear WISpre. The two variables are thus excluded, and a linear regression
is performed.
Like in the previous case, its residuals are not normally distributed as vis-
ible in the deviation from the main diagonal of the q-q plot (compare Figure
8.6). Thus, instead of regular significance values, the one-tailed permuted p
(calculated with ter Braak’s method as explained above) values are reported
(compare Table 8.17). The regression accounts for 26% of the overall variance
(multiple R2 = .260, adjusted R2 = .229). As in the case of the profit, these
results indicate that the proposed model is able to explain a substantial frac-
tion of the regressand variable profit, and that the weighted density makes
a small but marginally significant contribution to this regression. Again,
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Table 8.15: Linear regression of TAYLORSHOP profit on WISpost, BIS, eco-
nomic knowledge, WIS∆, computer experience and AST weighted density.
b Std. error t p f 2
(Intercept) -353163 151466 -2.332 .010** -
WISpost 4317 1398 3.089 .001** .142
BIS 2334 1591 1.467 .072+ .026
Economic knowledge 30316 9900 3.062 < .001** .046
WIS∆ -6482 5705 -1.136 .12 .017
Computer experience -25728 12957 -1.986 .030* .037
AST weighted density 48437 32909 1.472 .068+ .018
Table 8.16: Sequence of lasso regression moves with TAYLORSHOP trend
as dependent variable
Step Variable # Variable df RSS Cp
0 - - 1 1611.2 37.063
1 5 WISpost 2 1474.4 24.477
2 3 BIS-K 3 1361.1 27.125
3 2 Economic knowledge 4 1294.6 20.364
4 6 WIS∆ 5 1248.4 19.738
5 7 AST weighted density 6 1213.5 18.145
6 4 WISpre 7 1129.2 14.814
7 1 Computer experience 8 1126 8
the strongest predictors of TAYLORSHOP trend in the lasso regression are
post-discussion knowledge, reasoning, and prior economic knowledge.
Table 8.17: Linear regression of TAYLORSHOP trend on WISpost, BIS, eco-
nomic knowledge, WIS∆, computer experience, and AST weighted density
b Std. error t p f 2
(Intercept) -8.18 4.22 -1.936 .029* -
WISpost .12 .39 3.627 < .001** .234
BIS .08 .045 1.791 .041* .040
Economic knowledge .62 .263 2.381 .010** .041
WIS∆ -.25 .16 -1.551 .070+ .019
AST weighted density 1.27 .931 1.362 .091+ .016
In summary, hypothesis 4.6.3 (individual CPS performance is influenced
8.2 Laboratory Experiment Results on Individual Level 157
Figure 8.5: Plot of standardized β coefficients over the lasso tuning parameter
s (denoted as |β|/max|β|) for TAYLORSHOP trend. The variable names
according to variable numbers are presented in Table 8.16, the vertical lines
represent the steps of the lasso regression given in Table 8.16. The weighted
density is denoted by variable 7.
by scenario-relevant implicit structural knowledge) receives marginal support
by the findings. Although significant correlations are visible, effects in com-
parison to the established predictors of CPS performance are at the brink of
visibility.
8.2.7 Further findings: Self-evaluation and gender dif-
ferences
Apart from the calculations with reference to the hypotheses, further effects
are reported in this subsection. It is assessed whether the self-assessment of
TAYLORSHOP knowledge on the ten knowledge elements has any connec-
tion with TAYLORSHOP performance and the other measurement variables.
Furthermore, possible gender differences in TAYLORSHOP performance are
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Figure 8.6: Q-Q plot of standardized residuals of the regression of trend on
WISpost, WISdelta, BIS, computer exprience, and economic knowledge.
reviewed.
With reference to self-evaluation, the total self-assessment score displays
a significant (two-tailed) correlation with prior economic knowledge (r =
.17, p = .05) and AST diameter (r = .21, p = .02). All other correlations
of self-assessment do not reach significant values, e.g., with TAYLORSHOP
profit (r = .10, p = .23) and trend (r = .07, p = .42). Thus, self-evaluation of
scenario knowledge is neither able to predict TAYLORSHOP performance,
nor is it able to predict declarative knowledge scores. It can be seen as a
reflection of general economic knowledge due to its small correlation with
prior economic knowledge.
Since Wittman (1996) and Süß (1996) reported gender differences with
respect to TAYLORSHOP scenario performance in such a way that men
achieved significantly better performance scores than women, this effect is
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also checked. Therefore, a Mann-Whitney U test between male and female
problem solvers and the two measures of TAYLORSHOP performance is em-
ployed. A significant difference for both overall profit (Z = −4.939, p < 0.001
(two-tailed)) and trend (Z = −5.295, p < 0.001 (two-tailed) is observed:
Male participants scored substantially higher on both criterions: For profit,
male participants achieved a median loss of -5301 DM while female partic-
ipants achieved a median loss of -54056 DM. Male participants exhibit a
median trend of seven, female participants exhibit a median trend of three.
This finding requires a further analysis in order to determine whether the
effects reported above are artifacts of this effect or are confounded with it,
because male and female participants were not intentionally balanced over
the cells of the experimental design (compare Section 7.2.1). Therefore, a χ2
analysis is performed in order to test whether there are significantly more
men than women in the experimental conditions of relevance for data analy-
sis on individual level (differences in gender compositions of dyads on group
level will be analyzed in the section on group results). The two findings on
individual level where fixed factors could be contaminated by the random
factor gender are:
1. Participants who learned from experience achieved marginally signifi-
cantly higher profit scores in the dynamic scenario compared to those
who learned from texts only.
2. Participants who learned from experience exhibited a marginally sig-
nificant higher weighted density of AST-elicited pathfinder-adjusted
knowledge networks (PFNETs).
Since the non-normal distribution of data prevents the use of an analysis of
variance, a cross-tabulation with a Chi-Square test is performed. It reveals
that there are no significant differences in the distribution of male and female
participants over the factor learning mode (compare Table 8.18). It reveals a
χ2(N = 134) = 1.802, p = .18; Fisher’s exact test of significance (2-sided) =
.225 Thus, there is no significant overrepresentation of any gender in the fac-
tor learning mode. Thus, the previously discovered effects are most probably
not solely attributable to gender artifacts.
8.3 Laboratory Experiment Results on Group
Level
In this section, the results of hypotheses testing on the group level will be
reported. The level of analysis is shifted, and the unit of analysis will be
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Table 8.18: Crosstabulation of participant gender and learning mode (N =
134)
Gender
Female Male Total
From texts only 42 28 70
From texts and experience 31 33 64
Total 73 61 134
the dyad instead of the individual participant. Therefore, variables will be
averaged. This also pays tribute to the nonindependence of the profit vari-
able (compare Section 8.2.3). In this way, the following new variables are
created: The dyadic average of the short version of the BIS scale K, “rea-
soning” (dBIS-K), average dyadic self assessment of computer experience
(dCE) and prior economic knowledge (dEK), dyadic average of pre- and post-
discussion WIS declarative TAYLORSHOP scenario knowledge (dWISpre and
dWISpost), and post-discussion knowledge increase (dWIS∆). Furthermore,
there is the skillMap similarity measure sksim, calculated on dyadic level
(compare Section 6.2) and the Euclidian distance of self-assessment, as ex-
plained in the following section. Structural knowledge coefficients are not
calculated on dyadic level, because there is no hypothesis referring to them on
group level. For the assessment of TAYLORSHOP scenario performance, the
following coefficients are available: dProfit (dyadic average), dTrend (dyadic
average), number of sold shirts (dyadic average), and dProfit per shirt (dyadic
average).
8.3.1 Operationalization of scenario performance on
group level
In order to obtain comparability of group level results with those on indi-
vidual level, it would be desirable to use the same operationalizations for
TAYLORSHOP profit on group level (dyadic average of profit and trend) as
on individual level. Since some of the hypotheses require the testing of poly-
nomial hypotheses, normal distribution of dependent variables is another de-
sirable feature, because it would allow the use of variance analysis techniques
from the general linear model. Thus, dyadic average of profit and trend are
subjected to Kolmogornov-Smirnov tests for normal distributions. Both the
dyadic average of profit (Z = .637, p = .81) and trend (Z = .789, p = .56)
display a standard normal distribution. As participants were instructed to
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maximize their profit and the dyadic average profit (referred to as dProfit)
exhibits significant correlations with the established outside criteria of CPS
(compare Table 8.20), it is employed as the single measure for CPS perfor-
mance on group level. For easier comparability, its z-transformed score will
be employed as operationalization of TAYLORSHOP scenario performance
on the dyadic level. All other variables on the dyadic level also display a
normal distribution, except for computer experience (dCE, compare Table
8.19). The correlation matrix of the measurement variables on the group
level is presented in Table 8.20.
Table 8.19: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution of independent
variables on the dyadic level
dBIS-K dCE dEK dWISpre dWISpost dWIS∆
x¯ 101 3.63 2.38 18.85 21.90 3.08
SD 5.57 .625 .831 6.38 6.70 3.76
Z .516 1.501 1.182 .497 .620 .690
p(Z) .953 .020 .950 .970 .840 .730
Table 8.20: Intercorrelation matrix of measurement variables on group level.
* denotes significance on 5%, ** on 1%, and *** on .1% level. + denotes
marginal significance on 10% level. All sigificance values are one-tailed.
dBIS-K dWISpre dWISpost dWIS∆ dEK dCEa
dProfit .25* .24* .37** .25* .15 .05
dBIS-K .61*** .55*** -.04 .03 .19+
dWISpre .84*** -.22* .06 .18+
dWISpost .34** -.07 .19+
dWIS∆ -.20* -.03
a Correlations between dCE and other variables are Spearman
rank-order correlations. All other correlations are Pearson cor-
relations.
8.3.2 Comparability of knowledge distribution condi-
tion
Over the three conditions of knowledge distribution (shared, partially shared,
unshared), a one-sample ANOVA reveals no statistically relevant differences
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in dyadic average scores for reasoning (BIS-K) (F (2, 64) = 0.616, p = 0.543)
and pre-discussion TAYLORSHOP declarative scenario knowledge dWISpre
(F (2, 64) = 1.01, p = 0.367). Possible differences for computer experience
and economic foreknowledge were tested with the Kruskal-Wallis-Test re-
vealing no statistically relevant difference between conditions for economic
foreknowledge (χ2 = 4.01, p = .260). However, despite the random assign-
ment of participants to dyads, a difference of computer experience between
conditions was visible (χ2 = 9.6, p = .020): The participants assigned to the
unshared condition showed less average computer experience than groups in
the partially shared and shared condition. Since no significant correlation
between the employed operationalization of computer experience and indi-
vidual TAYLORSHOP profit was found (r = −.03, p = .400), this result can
be neglected.
8.3.3 Subjective experience of knowledge-overlap
In order to test whether the manipulation of knowledge overlap was subjec-
tively experienced, the Euclidian distance between group members in self-
assessment on TAYLORSHOP expertise is calculated for each dyad. The
Euclidian distance is a vector with ten elements; each element is the abso-
lute value of the difference of the two individual responses to the same item
on the self-assessment questionnaire in one dyad. One element of the vector
can thus range from 0 to 3. The elements of the vector are summed up and
divided by the possible maximum (30). In this way, the Euclidian distance
in self-assessment is a number between 0 and 1. 1 indicates a maximum
difference in knowledge self-assessment between the two group members, 0
indicates a perfect overlap of knowledge self-assessment. If the manipulation
in terms of knowledge overlap inside the dyad was successful, groups in the
unshared condition should display a larger Euclidian distance than groups in
the partially shared condition, who again should display a larger Euclidian
distance than groups in the shared condition. This pattern is visible in the
data (compare Figure 8.7) and a one-way analysis of variance of the Euclid-
ian distance over the factor knowledge distribution exhibits significant results
(F (2, 64) = 4.688, p = .013, η2 = .132).
If all ten self-assessment items are summed up into one total self-assessment
score and this score is averaged on dyadic level, there is no significant cor-
relation between this score and taylorshop profit on dyadic level (r = .05,
p = .66). The skillMap similarity measure is not employed for the analysis
of knowledge overlap, because its connection to the subjective experience of
knowledge overlap is not determined at this point, as weighted semantic re-
lations between the different items of the self-assessment questionnaire are
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Figure 8.7: Euclidian Distance of TAYLORSHOP-relevant knowledge self-
assessment in the dyad with regard to experimental conditions
employed in its calculation and its relation to cognitive group heterogeneity
is hypothetical. The relationship between the knowledge dstribution in the
dyad and the skillMap similarity measure will be tested in Section 8.3.7.
8.3.4 Knowledge distribution and knowledge increase
In order to test Hypothesis 5.5.1 (knowledge overlap among group members
has a curvilinear n-shaped impact on knowledge increase), a one-way analysis
of variance with linear and quadratic polynomial contrasts of the effect of
knowledge distribution on post-discussion knowledge increase (dWIS∆) is
performed. The combined model does not reach significance (F (2, 69) =
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1.684, p = .19, η2 = .048), nor does the linear term (F (1, 69) = .048, p =
.83, η2 = .000). The quadratic term exhibits a marginally significant effect
(F (1, 69) = 3.320, p = .073, η2 = .047). The pattern of the data follows the
prediction of the n-shaped connection between knowledge overlap inside the
dyad and knowledge increase (compare Figure 8.8). Hypothesis 5.5.1 thus
receives marginal support.
Figure 8.8: The effect of knowledge distribution in the dyad on average post-
discussion knowledge increase (dWIS∆)
8.3.5 Knowledge increase and group performance
Hypothesis 5.5.2 assumes a positive correlation between a group’s knowl-
edge increase and its CPS performance. The group average of declarative
knowledge increase after discussion (dWIS∆) correlates with average group
TAYLORSHOP profit at r = .25 (p = 0.26 (one-tailed)). The Hypoth-
esis is thus supported. Hypothesis 5.5.3 postulates an n-shaped relation
between knowledge overlap and CPS performance, which is observed in the
data (compare Figure 8.9). A one-way analysis of variance with linear and
quadratic polynomial contrasts of the effect of knowledge distribution on
TAYLORSHOP performance reveals a significant combined effect between
groups (F (2, 69) = 4.810, p = .011, η2 = .125), a marginally significant effect
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of the linear term (F (1, 69) = 3.458, p = .067, η2 = .045), and a significant
quadratic effect (F (1, 69) = 6.162, p = .016, η2 = .080) as visible in Figure
8.9. Hypothesis 5.5.3 is thus supported.
Figure 8.9: The effect of knowledge distribution in the dyad on average
Complex Problem Solving Performance (dProfit)
8.3.6 Implicit knowledge on group level
In order to test the influence of implicit knowledge on TAYLORSHOP perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 4.6.1) on the group level, the means and standard errors
of the variable dProfit are plotted over the different levels of experience with
the scenario (none / during learning / during discussion / during both), com-
pare Figure 8.10. The highest level of exposure to the scenario prior to the
actual control task leads to a higher performance on group level, but the dif-
ference is not significant as visible by the overlapping error bars. Hypothesis
4.6.1 is thus refuted on group level. A plot of the post-discussion dyadic av-
erage declarative knowledge (compare Figure 8.11) reveals that exposure to
the scenario during learning leads to significantly less verbalizable knowledge
compared to no exposure at all and exposure during learning and discussion.
One might have expected that scenario exposure does not necessarily lead to
an increase of declarative knowledge, buts its cooccurrence with a decrease in
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verbalizable knowledge is somewhat surprising. This finding will be further
discussed in Section 9.2.3.
Figure 8.10: The effect of experience with the scenario on scenario perfor-
mance (dProfit)
In order to test for interaction effects between knowledge distribution and
experience with the scenario, a univariate analysis of variance of the effect
of the two factors on dProfit is performed, including dBIS-K and dWISpre
variables as covariates (dWISpost and dWIS∆ are not included due to their
confoundation with the factor knowledge distribution). The model does not
reach significance (F (15, 69) = 1.216, p = .229). It reveals only one sig-
nificant effect of knowledge distribution on dProfit (F (2, 69) = 3.636, p =
.033, η2p = .115). Neither the main effect of experience on dProfit (F (3, 69) =
0.271, p = .85), nor the interaction effect between experience and knowledge
distribution (F (6, 69) = 0.462, p = .83) reach significance. This provides
further support for Hypothesis 5.5.2 stating that group average of declara-
tive knowledge increase after discussion correlates with the group’s complex
problem solving performance.
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Figure 8.11: The effect of experience with the scenario on post-discussion
verbalizable knowledge (dWISpost)
8.3.7 skillMap similarity and group performance
Prior to hypothesis testing, the skillMap similarity data is screened for normal
distribution. Due to technical problems during the similarity calculation,
there are two invalid similarity measures, resulting in an sample size of 68
cases. A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test reveals that the skillMap
similarity measure exhibits a normal distribution (K-S Z = 1.062, p = .209).
In order to test whether the proposed similarity measure for intra-group
knowledge overlap displays a curvilinear n-shaped relation with CPS per-
formance (Hypothesis 6.3.1), a quadratic regression of the groups’ average
CPS performance (dProfit) is performed on the skillMap similarity mea-
sure. Neither the linear term (β = 10.19, p = .106) nor the qadratic term
(β = −20.94, p = .339) reach significance; overall variance explanation is low
(R2 = .08) and the overall model reaches marginal significance (F (2, 64) =
2.874, p = .064). Hypothesis 6.3.1 is thus refuted. Due to the marginal
significance of the overall model, a correlation is calculated between dProfit
and the skillMap similarity measure. The two variables correlate at r = .26
(p = .032, one-tailed). Thus, contrary to the hypothesis, a linear relationship
between the similarity measure and CPS performance (dProfit) is observed.
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Since dProfit exhibits an n-shaped distribution over experimental conditions,
the similarity measure is also plotted over experimental conditions (compare
Figure 8.12).It turns out that its distribution is very similar to the distribu-
tion of dProfit over experimental conditions: The similarity measure exhibits
the highest values under the partly shared condition and has significantly
lower averages in the other conditions as indicated by the non-overlapping
error-bars. This surprising finding wil be further discussed in Section 9.2.5.
Figure 8.12: Error bar plot of the skillMap similarity measure and dyadic
CPS performance (dProfit) over knowledge distribution condition
8.3.8 Gender effects
As gender effects were found on the individual level (compare Section 8.2.7),
this effect is also examined on the group level. An error-bar plot of complex
problem solving performance over the gender composition of the dyads shows
that same-gender male dyads outperform mixed-gender dyads, which again
outperform same-gender female dyads (compare Figure 8.13). A similar pat-
tern is visible for dBIS-K (reasoning) scores and pre- and post-discussion
declarative knowledge scores; the pattern of declarative knowledge increase
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(dWIS∆) is less clear. One-way analyses of variance of the factor gender com-
position on these variables exhibit significant differences in means for dProfit
(F (2, 69) = 4.873, p = .011, η2 = .071), dWISpre (F (2, 69) = 4.283, p =
.018, η2 = .062), and dWISpost (F (2, 69) = 4.274, p = .018, η2 = .062). dBIS-
K reaches marginal significance (F (2, 69) = 2.812, p = .067, η2 = .041), and
dWIS∆ after discussion does not show significant differences (F (2, 69) =
.287, p = .752). Thus, performance differences over different gender compo-
sitions might be due to higher dBIS-K and dWIS scores of dyads containing
men. However, a partial correlation of gender composition (same gender
female = 2, mixed gender = 3, same gender male = 4) and dProfit control-
ling for dBIS-K, dWISpre, dWISpost, dWIS∆, computer experience (dCE) and
prior economic knowledge (dEK) still leads to a correlation of r = .22 (p =
.020, one-tailed).
Figure 8.13: The effect of the gender composition of the dyad on TAY-
LORSHOP performance, reasoning, declarative knowledge pre- and post-
discussion score and knowledge increase
As the assignment of gender to cells of the experimental design was not
intentionally balanced (compare 7.2.1), it is checked whether the reported
findings might be based on gender effects. A crosstable analysis of the factors
knowledge distribution and gender distribution leads to χ2(n = 70) = 5, 604
(p = .231). Thus, there are no significant over- or under representations of
gender composition in the experimental design.
Chapter 9
Discussion
The second chapter of this thesis outlined the concept of knowledge and pre-
sented unconscious access to structural knowledge or structural implicitness
as a part of individual implicit knowledge. The third chapter introduced a
computer-based structural knowledge elicitation technique, the association
structure test (AST), intended to elicit a part of this structural implicit-
ness. The fourth chapter introduced the domain of complex problem solving,
which encompasses highly relevant real-life tasks that managers and politi-
cians face, and outlined how different kinds of knowledge and intelligence
play a role in successful complex problem solving. The fifth chapter focused
on complex problem solving tasks in groups, and presented theories on the
relationship between group cognitive heterogeneity and group performance.
The sixth chapter introduced a computer system from the realm of knowl-
edge management, the skillMap, which aims at eliciting group knowledge and
expertise through self-assessment. For this system, a method for quantifying
dyadic similarity with regard to self-assessment of represented individuals
was introduced. The following experiments, whose methodology was intro-
duced in the seventh, and whose results were presented in the eighth chapter,
aimed at testing several hypotheses put forward with regard to the ability
of the introduced methods to measure knowledge and with regard to the
connection between knowledge and performance in complex problem solv-
ing: It was assumed that the AST-elicited structural implicitness correlates
with CPS performance and provides an additional and unique explanation of
CPS variance in comparison to established predictors of CPS, such as declar-
ative knowledge and intelligence. Complex problem solving performance of
groups should display a n-shaped connection with group heterogeneity, and
the skillMap similarity measure was supposed to predict group performance.
This chapter will discuss and integrate the results with regard to the
influence of AST-elicited structural knowledge on performance, with regard
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to the connection between group heterogeneity and group performance, and
with regard to the connection between the skillMap similarity measures and
group performance. For each of the three fields, results will be integrated,
and implications and issues will be discussed. The chapter ends with an
outlook on future research and a conclusion.
9.1 Knowledge Elicitation with the AST
In this section, the results of the experiments that aimed at validating the
association structure test (AST) are discussed and integrated. The discussion
will try to answer the question whether it is possible to measure a part of
unconsciously accessed individual structural knowledge with the AST test
system in a valid way.
9.1.1 AST internal consistency
After an initial analysis of the logical structure of the AST coefficients number
of nodes, number of edges, clusters, diameter, weighted density, and RMPL
in Section 3.9.3, an inspection of empiric correlations among the coefficients
reveals the same correlational structure as the logical structure: There are
high levels of correlations among all coefficients and some display an inverse
proportional relationship with each other. With regard to the overall high
correlations among coefficients, it is visible that the three highest correlations
occur between the number of nodes and three other coefficients: the relative
maximum path length, the number of edges, and the weighted density. This
illustrates the strong dependence of all AST coefficients on the number of
nodes.
With regard to the inverse proportional relationship between coefficients,
it becomes clear that all measures of the AST either have a conceptual corre-
lation or are fully or partly mathematically deductible from each other. The
main problem of this feature is the resulting negative correlation between the
weighted density on one side and the number of edges and nodes on the other.
The nodes are supposed to partly capture declarative knowledge, while the
weighted density is supposed to capture structural knowledge and structure
implicitness. A high weighted density will thus co-occur with a low number
of edges. Translated into the intended underlying concepts, this would mean
that a high level of structural implicitness in a certain domain co-occurs with
low explicit knowledge in that domain and vice-versa. Although this may be
plausible for some instances, it must not always be the case. A high degree
of structural implicitness and a thorough explicit knowledge on a certain do-
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main is very plausible. This inverse proportional relationship between two
measurement variables that are supposed to capture concepts that are not
inversely proportional to each other casts doubts on the AST’s construct
validity.
A factor analysis of empirical AST coefficient correlations (compare Sec-
tion 8.1.1) reveals that five AST-coefficients (the number of nodes, the num-
ber of edges, the number of clusters, the weighted density measure, and the
relative maximum path length (RMPL) are based on two underlying factors.
Four of these coefficients, the number of nodes in the graph, the number
of edges in the graph, the number of clusters, and the relative maximum
path length, load on one factor, while the second factor exhibits only one
substantially loading coefficient, the weighted density.
The number of nodes and the relative maximum path length (RMPL)
measures were originally assumed to tap into aspects of declarative knowl-
edge. Thus, their underlying factor is labeled as explicit knowledge. The
number of edges was originally supposed to capture the implicit and explicit
structural aspect of knowledge, but due to its logically tight coupling with the
number of nodes, the number of edges also loads on the factor that is already
loaded by the number of nodes. The number of clusters and the diameter
were originally thought to range somewhere in between declarative knowl-
edge and structural knowledge. Due to its tight logical connection with the
number of associated concepts, the number of clusters also loads on the first
factor. The diameter measure does not exhibit substantial loadings on the
two extracted factors, which leaves its role and its interpretability unclear.
This is especially unfortunate as other researches have credited the diameter
of Pathfinder-elicited knowledge networks with a certain explanatory power
(Eckert, 1998b).
Adjusting the number of edges to the graph degree (the number of nodes)
by calculating the weighted density weakens the tight connection between the
number of edges and the number of nodes: The absolute correlation between
weighted density and number of nodes is only half as large as the absolute
correlation between the number of edges and the number of nodes. The fac-
tor analysis shows that the weighted density measure is part of an underlying
construct which is different from those constructs which are closely related to
the number of nodes (number of edges, number of clusters, and the relative
maximum path length RMPL). These two underlying constructs correlate,
but they are not completely overlapping. As the weighted density is con-
sidered to be the coefficient that captures structural features best (compare
Section 3.9.1), the second factor is labeled “structural knowledge includ-
ing structural implicitness”. The observed medium correlation between the
factors supports the assumption that the different types of knowledge are in-
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terrelated (compare Chapter 2). The identification of this second factor thus
supports the original assumption that the AST is able to capture a certain
aspect of structural implicitness.
In the overall assessment of the AST, despite a somewhat encouraging
underlying factor structure, two problems remain: The ambiguity of the
diameter variable and, more severe, the inverse proportional relationship be-
tween the weighted density measure on the one hand and the number of nodes
and edges on the other. These issues render the AST imperfect. Whether
they also render it unusable for diagnostic purposes will be analyzed in the
following subsections.
9.1.2 Labeled and unlabeled AST testing
The AST is supposed to elicit structural knowledge (Jonassen et al., 1993)
that is unconsciously accessed (compare Chapter 2). It tries to do so by
minimizing the cognitive load when asking for the existence of connections
(edges) between previously associated concepts in a pairwise manner without
displaying the entire graph and by asking for a quick and intuitive judgment
on the existence of a relation between two concepts based on ‘gut-feeling’.
Such a mode of elicitation is supposed to include both those edges that can be
explicitly labeled and those that the participant cannot define. If this mode
of edge elicitation is compared to a mode where edges have to be explicitly
labeled, it should contain significantly more edges (compare Section 3.9).
This hypothesis is supported by the results: Given a comparable amount
of associated concepts, quick and intuitive placements of edges lead to a larger
amount of placed edges than the placement of edges that have to be labeled
(compare Table 8.3). Note that this holds true for the adjusted PFNETS
(compare Section 3.7) in which edges that violate the triangulation assump-
tion have been removed. The increased amount of edges placed under the
non-explicit condition also influences the diameter of the structural knowl-
edge graph and its measure of relative maximum path length (RMPL) to
similar extents. The weighted density measure, which is conceptualized as
operationalizing structural implicitness to the closest extent, remains below
levels of significance, but displays the predicted trend, i.e. a higher density
for graphs elicited under the non-explicit condition.
These results indicate that a quick and intuitive placement of connections
between concepts captures some inter-concept relations that the participants
cannot label. This discovery is able to explain Rothe’s and Warning’s findings
(1991) that individuals have difficulties with consistently assigning labels to
edges: Individuals are just not able to name all edges they assume to be
present. Labels attached to edges that a person cannot properly name in the
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first place will be arbitrary and inconsistent.
Nonetheless, these results have to be treated with a certain degree of
caution. The employed explicit test mode of the AST forced participants
to enter a written label for an edge if placed. This procedure might have
been very tiresome, and it is possible that participants did omit labels they
could have possibly placed in this mode due to a lack of motivation and/or
compliance, which again limits the task performance (as predicted by Goal
Theory, compare Locke & Latham, 1990). Although this possibility cannot be
ruled out, the magnitude of the observed effect (compare Table 8.3) renders
this possibility as the sole explanation improbable, and it is very likely that
experiment participants could not label at least some of the edges placed in
the quick and intuitive condition. The fact that there are some unnamable
edges is not a sufficient condition for the AST’s capability to tap into the
implicit, but it is a sine qua non and justifies further analyses.
9.1.3 AST sensitivity to learning
The AST is supposed to correspond to learning: If learning takes place,
the changes in knowledge organization invoked by the learning process are
supposed to be mirrored by the according changes of the AST’s parameters
(compare Hypothesis 3.9.2).
In the seminar task, four AST-parameters changed significantly over the
course of a weekly three-month seminar: The number of associated concepts,
the number of edges, the number of clusters, and the relative maximum path
length (RMPL). The coefficients for diameter and weighted density did not
exhibit significant changes. As theory asserts that academic learning, as oc-
curred in this specific case, is a process of knowledge construction and thus
a process of knowledge organization (Phye, 2002), the fact that four of the
six AST-elicited parameters changed supports the validity of the assumption
that the AST is able to capture changes in structural knowledge. However,
the domain of the experiment, an academic seminar, does not suggest that
much implicit learning took place, because implicit learning “is the acquisi-
tion of knowledge that takes place largely independent of conscious attempts
to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was ac-
quired” (Reber, 1996, p. 5) – these conditions are hardly met in the context
of the experiment. Thus, the absence of significant changes of the diameter
and density could be due to their sensitivity to implicit learning, which might
not have taken place here. This assumption is in line with a study analyz-
ing changes in knowledge structures in a domain where implicit learning was
likely to occur: Schvaneveldt et al. (1985) compared structural knowledge
scores of novice and senior fighter pilots. They found significant differences
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in the number of edges, but contrary to the expected levels, as novice pilots
placed more edges than expert pilots between expert-selected stimulus con-
cepts representing typical fighter maneuvers. One possible explanation for
this finding is the higher level of automation among expert pilots, which co-
occurs with forgetting of knowledge that once was explicit. This observation
also might have been caused by the fact that the changes occurring in struc-
tural knowledge during implicit learning are not only of a quantitative, but
also of a qualitative nature not captured in the employed metrics. Winitzky,
Kauchak, and Kelly (1994) found that expert teachers’ knowledge did not
change quantitatively, but displayed trends towards qualitatively different
knowledge structures as compared to novice teachers. However, the fact that
the RMPL measure, which is a measure for the organization of the knowl-
edge organization (compare Section 3.9.1), did not change, casts doubts on
the latter possibility.
The factor analysis of the AST coefficients (compare Section 8.1.1) justi-
fies the assumption of sensitivity to implicit learning for the weighted density
measure as it is the only coefficient with a minor loading on the same factor
as those who are undoubtedly connected to explicit knowledge, such as the
number of associated concepts. The connection between the diameter and
implicit learning is less clear as it is not loading on the two factors that re-
sulted from the factor analysis; its role will be discussed later in this section.
Another reason for the lack of change of these two coefficients might of
course lie in their indifference towards learning in general. Whether this is
the case can be established by linking them to outside criteria, which will be
discussed in Section 9.1.5.
In summary, four of the five AST-coefficients that are thought to cap-
ture explicit parts of knowledge (compare Section 8.1.1) display significant
changes after an academic seminar. Changes in the construct led to signif-
icant changes of the measurements, which indicates that the AST measures
what it is supposed to measure.
9.1.4 AST convergent validity
The third experiment aimed at establishing a measure for convergent validity
of the AST test system by comparing AST scores, obtained both under the
standard condition and under the explicit condition with labeled edges, with
the Structure Laying Technique (Scheele & Groeben, 1984, 1988). Hypothesis
3.9.3 assumed that the number of edges, the weighted density, the diameter,
and the relative maximum path lengths of SLT-elicited knowledge graphs and
AST-elicited knowledge graphs correlate. The results of this experiment are
unsuitable to support this hypothesis for the standard AST system due to
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an insufficient sample size. With only four cases in the subsample containing
the participants who worked on the AST in its standard mode, correlations
are too unstable. The only correlation that can be interpreted with utmost
caution is the one between AST scores aggregated from both test modes
(standard and force-labeled edges) and SLT scores. The fact that the number
of elicited edges correlates near zero between AST and SLT in the aggregated
sample indicates that in term of edges, the AST measures something different
than the SLT. However, AST and SLT exhibit a certain level of overlap
for the diameter measures, which partly rely on the number of edges for
calculation. The density measures of the AST and the SLT also display a
medium correlation, but it fails to reach levels of statistical significance. The
fact that one coefficient significantly overlaps indicates at least some degree of
overlap between the two methods: Little for the number of elicited edges and
compactness, medium overlap with regard to the diameter. These results are
surprising for two reasons: Firstly, the diameter relies heavily on the number
of edges inside the graph, which show no significant overlap. Secondly, the
RMPL value does not exhibit significant crorrelations between AST and SLT,
but it is also a measure for graph structure that relies heavily on the number
of edges, the diameter (which overlaps) and the number of nodes (which is
kept constant).
All in all, the results for this experiment are inconsistent due to their
internal contradictions and due to the their limited sample size and the re-
sulting questionable correlation coefficients.
9.1.5 AST congruent and discriminant validity
The fourth experiment assessed whether AST-elicited structural knowledge
measures obtained for a certain domain correlate with performance measures
indicating achievement in that particular domain (Hypothesis 3.9.4), and
whether they correlate with verbal IQ scores. Both findings will be discussed
in this subsection.
AST and exam grades
In the comparison between the AST and the SLT, the correlations between
exam grades on the one side and the relative maximum path length (RMPL)
and the number of edges on the other reaches a significant level in the ex-
pected direction: More compact networks (indicated by smaller RMPL val-
ues) and networks with more edges correlate with higher grades. The number
of concepts and the number of clusters reach marginally significant correla-
tions with the exam grade in the expected direction. These four correlations
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provide a certain support for the AST’s congruent validity.
The diameter does not exhibit significant correlations with the grade. On
top of that, the weighted density variable correlates contrary to the expected
direction (a higher density correlates with a lower grade). At first glance, the
latter finding may appear odd, but it is in line with the logical dependencies
among the AST coefficients (compare Section 3.9.3): As the weighted density
is in an inverse proportional relationship with the number of nodes and edges
of a graph (compare Figure 3.7), it must exhibit a negative correlation with
grades, since the number of concepts and edges exhibit a positive correlation
with grades. This finding outlines the dilemma of the logical structure of the
AST: a high correlation of explicit measures with a criterion conditions a low
correlation of the weighted density with that criterion (and vice-versa).
In this case, the external criterion was of a rather explicit nature, and
its correlation with all the four AST-coefficients that load on the explicit
factor (see above) speaks in favor of the AST’s ability to capture explicit
knowledge structures. This finding also demonstrates that implicit structural
knowledge scores do not perform well in predicting the performance of tasks
that rely heavily on the correct reproduction and codification of explicit
knowledge. An experiment where the importance of other forms of knowledge
other than declarative knowledge reproduction in an intellectual task plays
a role is required to determine whether AST-elicited structural knowledge is
of predictive value. It will be discussed in the next section. Up to this point,
the ascertainment is that those AST coefficients that exhibit high loadings
on the declarative knowledge factor correlate with an outside criterion that
measures performance in a task that is based on declarative knowledge. This
argument is supported by findings by Rothe and Ceglarek (2006). They found
that the number of associated concepts in word association tasks (compare
Section 3.3.1) correlate with performance measures in a variety of different
tasks that are mainly based on declarative knowledge reproduction.
AST and verbal IQ
The comparison of AST scores with WST-elicited verbal IQ scores reveals
overlap between two AST coefficients loading on the explicit factor and WST
IQ-scores. The correlation between AST and grades falls below significant
levels if controlled for WST scores. Note that the two coefficients that ex-
hibit the highest loadings on the declarative knowledge factor, the number
of associated concepts and the number of clusters, also exhibit the highest
correlation with WST scores, while the weighted density measure shows the
lowest correlation with WST scores. Explicit knowledge and verbal IQ scores
are thus highly correlated, AST-elicited structural knowledge that includes
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unlabeled edges and verbal IQ are not.
In this particular experiment, the AST is unable to provide an additional
significant variance explanation of the exam grade beyond the correlation be-
tween WST scores and exam grades. This could be due to the characteristics
of the employed sample. In their theory of expertise and intelligence, Horn
and Masunaga (2006) argued that non-experts’ performance is primarily de-
termined by application of abilities from the domain of general intelligence
to the current situation, while experts’ performance in their field of expertise
is largely uncorrelated with scores of general intelligence. The fact that the
average grade of the sample was rather poor indicates that the participants
are not experts in the surveyed domain. Thus, their performance scores are
quite possibly influenced by their general level of intelligence, whose sample
mean is one standard deviation below the expected population mean. This
indicates that the relatively poor performance in terms of grades might have
been completely determined by subjects’ below-average intelligence. Horn
and Masunaga (2006) also state that the ability to acquire knowledge is
highly correlated with cognitive abilities (see also Jäger et al., 1997, in Sec-
tion 2.5). Taken together, the students in the sample might have had very
little acquired knowledge (indicated by poor grades and low IQ scores) and
the performance that they did exhibit might have been primarily been a
function of their intelligence. Under this condition, it is not surprising that
additional explanation of variance delivered by the AST is low.
Generally, an overlap between AST-elicited explicit knowledge scores and
intelligence is not surprising, as knowledge and intelligence are overlapping
concepts (compare Section 2.5). Reber (1996) argues that this is due to
similar underlying processes of learning (knowledge acquisition) and cognitive
processes: “The basic principles of cognitive induction and abstraction on one
hand and conditioning and associative learning on the other share a common
process – the detection of covariation between events” (p. 4).
In summary, the correlation between the AST coefficients that load on
the factor explicit knowledge and an external criterion supports the AST’s
convergent validity in a rather explicit task while discriminant validity has
not been fully established due to sample issues. These results so far allow no
conclusion with regard to the proposed ability of the AST to elicit implicit
knowledge as all knowledge domains in the past four experiments were of a
predominantly verbal and explicit kind. However, the findings so far indicate
that the AST could be used as a tool for knowledge elicitation and knowledge
diagnosis in declarative fields. One could of course argue that the same level
of predictive performance can be achieved with a simpler tool such as the
WST, but the AST allows a further level of analysis beyond the descriptive
level as so far employed in this thesis: It is suited for an analysis of the content
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and structure of individual associations on a qualitative level: Teachers and
trainers can use the tool to assess what concepts their students remember,
and how they are interrelated. On top of that, they can obtain parameters
that allow a classification of students and performance prediction for explicit
tasks. The AST’s ability for performance predictions in tasks that rely on
implicit knowledge is discussed in the next subsection.
9.1.6 AST-elicited structural knowledge in complex prob-
lem solving
After the preliminary tests delivered some indications that the AST could
be suitable for knowledge elicitation purposes, its use for performance pre-
diction in a complex problem solving setting is discussed. The integration
of findings from Section 8.2 will establish whether the elicitation of uncon-
sciously available structural knowledge is a suitable measure for individual
implicit knowledge used in complex problem solving (CPS).
This assumption was tested in a laboratory experiment involving a com-
plex problem-solving task. The first challenge of this experiment lay in the
identification of a suitable measure for complex problem solving, as both
Funke (1983) and Süß (1996) encountered various methodological issues when
trying to use the profit measure provided by the here-employed TAYLOR-
SHOP scenario: Funke was unable to find correlations with the IQ scores
he employed, and the scenario was too difficult for Süß’s subjects who were
unable to achieve a profit in the simulation. In the present study, these issues
were not encountered, as the profit measure correlates with BIS-elicited rea-
soning scores and several participants were able to obtain a profit; the over-
whelming majority of participants performed better than they would have
performed if they had not made any changes to the system. Two reasons
might have played a role in the establishment of suitability of the profit vari-
able: Firstly, participants in the present study were considerably older than
the high-school pupils who participated in Süß’s experiment. As the develop-
ment of individual expertise and skills reaches its full blossom in adulthood
(Horn & Masunaga, 2006), the older participants might have been more skill-
ful complex problem solvers than the pupils. Secondly, computer experience
might have played a smaller role than ten years ago: In Süß’s sample of
pupils (Süß, 1996), computer experience was a strong predictor for scenario
performance, whereas it does not show significant correlations with CPS per-
formance in the present study. This could be due to a generally higher level
of computer experience in today’s student population.
The second challenge after the establishment of a valid measure for CPS
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performance lay in the induction of implicit knowledge. The fact that an
exposure to the dynamic system during learning led to an increased per-
formance in system control but not to an increased amount of verbalizable
knowledge compared to those participants who only learned from texts in-
dicates a dissociation between performance increase and explicit knowledge
during practical scenario experience. As such dissociations have been treated
as proof for the occurrence of implicit knowledge in system control by Berry
and Broadbent (Berry, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry, 1991; Berry
& Broadbent, 1995; Broadbent et al., 1986), its occurrence is taken as such
in this experiment.
Since a valid measure of CPS performance and the occurrence of implicit
knowledge can be assumed, AST-elicited structural knowledge parameters
can be put in relation with the dissociation between performance and verbal-
izable knowledge. The practical experience with the system during learning
did not only lead to implicit knowledge, but also to a higher weighted density
of the AST-elicited structural knowledge graph. The fact that weighted den-
sity also correlates with complex problem solving performance and provides
a small but visible unique contribution to the regression of all measurement
variables on complex problem solving performance (compare Section 8.2.6)
suggests that the weighted density measure of the AST seems to capture
a certain although small amount of implicit knowledge. At the same time,
the weighted density does not mirror explicit learning, because it does not
correlate with tests for declarative scenario knowledge (compare Table 8.13).
In the only experiment of the thesis where the presence of implicit knowl-
edge can be assumed due to the observation of a dissociation between verbal-
izable knowledge and performance among experience learners, the weighted
density mirrors this dissociation by exhibiting marginally significantly higher
values for experience learners. The weighted density measure is at the same
time the only AST parameter that correlates with CPS performance and
does not correlate with BIS scores for intelligence.
Given the positive correlation between the weighted density measure and
CPS performance, the logical structure of the AST coefficients conditions a
negative correlation between the profit on one side and the number of graph
nodes and edges on the other. The number of nodes does show a negative
correlation with the profit, while the number of edges exhibits a near-zero
correlation with the profit variable. Both correlations do not reach levels of
statistical significance, which is only caused by the small correlation between
the weighted density and the profit. If this correlation had been higher,
a negative correlation between the edges, the number of nodes, and profit
would have been observed.
Despite this problematic relationship between the weighted density and
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nodes and edges (compare Section 9.1.1), the results from the laboratory
experiment support the assumption that the weighted density measure is an
indicator for structural knowledge including structural implictness as con-
ceptualized previously. This would explain a number of reported findings
in connection with that parameter: The small but present correlations with
performance scores in the TAYLORSHOP scenario might be small because
implicit knowledge only appears to play a small role in CPS performance
in the reported results, and the AST is in turn supposed to only measure
a fraction of it. The dissociation between experience and performance is
rather small (compare Table 8.12), which could be seen as as an indication
for the small importance of implicit knowledge in CPS. Furthermore, the
small amount of available time for practice (ten minutes) might have also
reduced the amount of available implicit knowledge. This will be discussed
further in Section 9.2.3.
If these assertions should hold true, the connection between AST-elicited
weighted density scores and performance-relevant implicit access to struc-
tural knowledge is very weak. The effect is only visible for one of the two
performance indicators of CPS (profit), it is only visible on individual level,
the effect size is very small (compare the lasso analysis in Section 8.2.6),
and it only occurs in experience learning (not in discussion with experience).
The effect of learning by doing on structural knowledge density might be so
small that it only occurs in individual practice. In the discussions, group
processes could have obstructed this effect. Such an obstruction would be in
line with findings by Endres and Putz-Osterloh (1994), where different lev-
els and styles of group interaction in complex problem solving did not have
an effect other than an increase of the probability to perform poorer than
individuals – an indication that group processes can interfere with problem
solving strategies on the individual level.
In summary, one has to ascertain that the link between the AST-elicited
weighted density of knowledge graphs and performance-relevant structural
knowledge is weak. Whether this weakness is caused by a conceptually weak
connection between the AST coefficients and implicit knowledge or by the
small role of implicit knowledge in the experiment cannot be determined.
However, the research assumption that a fraction of individual implicit knowl-
edge can be psychometrically assessed through structural knowledge elicita-
tion techniques has received some support by the body of evidence.
9.1.7 Overall assessment of AST validity
Despite some encouraging results from the sensitivity experiment (compare
Section 9.1.3), the overall validity of the AST as a whole with regard to the
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general claims of the method (assessment of explicit knowledge and struc-
tural implicitness regardless of knowledge domain) can be questioned for two
reasons.
Firstly, the four AST coefficients that load the factor explicit knowledge
do not show a uniform pattern of significant correlations with measures that
elicit explicit knowledge in the TAYLORSHOP experiment. Only the diame-
ter shows a small significant correlation with the WISpost test for declarative
scenario knowledge (compare Table 8.13), but the diameter measure is not
loading on the explicit knowledge factor to a large extent (compare table Ta-
ble 8.2). The four AST-coefficients nodes, edges, cluster, and RMPL do not
capture specific explicit knowledge in the TAYLORSHOP experiment. The
only coefficient that displays a consistent and expected pattern in the context
of the TAYLORSHOP experiment is the weighted density measure: it only
correlates significantly with scenario performance and might thus actually
tap into the structural implicitness. The diameter is the only AST parame-
ter that exhibits a significant correlation with specific declarative knowledge
scores in the TAYLORSHOP experiment, yet it is the only AST-parameter
that does not load substantially on the two identified factors. It is thus not
clear what exactly the diameter measures.
Secondly, the weighted density measure displays a negative correlation
with exam grades in the vocational school experiment; poor grades and high
densities co-occur. This behavior is rooted in the logical structure of the AST:
The significant correlation between the number of nodes and exam grades
conditions this counterintuitive negative correlation. This logical connection
explains the odd behavior of the weighted density measure in the school
experiment quite well, but it also underlines the fact that in this specific
context, the weighted density measure is useless.
However, four of the other five AST-variables apart from the weighted
density measure displayed significant correlations with exam scores as ex-
pected. Thus, where the weighted density variable resulted in useless corre-
lations, the other variables produced reasonable measures, while this pattern
was reversed in the TAYLORSHOP experiment (see above).
In summary, the results indicate that the AST is not the general-purpose
tool that it was designed to be, but some of its indicators can be of predictive
use in specific contexts. The question which variables are useful in what con-
texts, and, more interestingly, which processes moderate these connections,
has been only slightly tapped. The logical structure of the AST’s coefficients
however leads to a situation where the usefulness of one coefficient, i.e. a
positive correlation between explicit knowledge scores and exam grades, con-
ditions the uselessness of another (the weighted density) and vice versa: The
weighted density proofed to be a significant predictor in the TAYLORSHOP
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experiment, where the number of nodes and edges turned out to be without
any predictive value. The resolution of this contradiction has to be in the
focus of further research. In its present state, the AST may be an imperfect
tool, but results are also encouraging.
9.1.8 Methodological issues
The attempt to capture different types of individual knowledge with the AST
is not without methodological problems. The small effect of AST-elicited
structural knowledge scores on CPS performance is difficult to interpret,
because three weak links (or any combination of them) in the underlying
argumentation are possible: Firstly, unconscious access to structural knowl-
edge may not be a part of implicit knowledge in the strict sense. Secondly,
a method that relies on verbal stimuli may be unable to capture anything
that is not explicitly available. Thirdly, implicit knowledge may play a less
prominent role in complex problem solving performance than expected. The
small effect of AST-elicited structural knowledge scores on CPS performance
is thus difficult to interpret.
Furthermore, the AST’s internal structure proved to be problematic due
to certain logical dependencies as described in the previous sections of this
chapter.
Apart from this conceptional problem, there were issues in the planning
and conduction of experiments. Throughout all of the validation experi-
ments, very little attention was placed on an analysis of the type of acquired
knowledge. None of the experiments took place in a domain where the im-
portance of implicit knowledge was established. Their suitability for the
validation of an instrument which is primarily aimed at implicit knowledge
elicitation is thus questionable. Participant feedback in these experiments
also revealed that the AST is seen as a very tiring procedure, especially
the second part of pairwise concept ratings. Due to this negative feedback,
the AST was not implemented twice in the complex problem solving experi-
ment, because it was feared that participants would not maintain the level of
concentration and motivation necessary for successful AST completion twice
during the same experiment. This led to a lack of retest reliability analy-
sis which in turn prevented a monomethod analysis of validity as requested
by Campbell and Fiske (1959). On the other hand, individual knowledge is
hardly a stable construct over time, and a method for its elicitation will thus
hardly display high retest reliability over time.
The poor quality of the sample in the vocational school experiment as
outlined in Section 9.1.6 was another unanticipated issue that rendered some
results with regard to the validity of the weighted density measure difficult
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to interpret (compare Section 9.1.7).
Another methodological issue lies in the complex problem solving experi-
ment that aimed at establishing a connection between unconscious access to
structural knowledge (structural implicitness) and complex problem solving
performance (Hypotheses 4.6.1 – 4.6.3). The AST’s weighted density mea-
sure is a mixture of both consciously and unconsciously available structural
knowledge, as edges with consciously available labels and edges without con-
sciously available edges enter its calculation (compare Section 8.1.2). The
two constructs are thus confounded and a thorough test of the hypothesis
would have involved a further experimental condition, in which the explicit
mode of the AST had been employed. If the explicit weighted density showed
no correlation with CPS performance, but the one elicited under standard
conditions did, only then one could accept the hypothesis without any doubt.
As such a design would have added another factor to the already complex
experimental design, this was not feasible in the scope of the study.
The complex and long experimental design also prevented the inclusion
of other scales that would have increased variance explanation of complex
problem solving. For example, participants’ motivation was not surveyed,
although it is known to play an important part in task performance in a
variety of tasks (Locke & Latham, 1990), also on group level (Schauenburg,
2004).
In the same experiment, two other methodological flaws become apparent.
Firstly, the gender of participants was not intentionally balanced over experi-
mental conditions. The fact that gender affects performance could have been
anticipated due to earlier findings by Wittman and Süß (Süß, 1996; Witt-
mann et al., 1996). Although it turned out that male and female participants
were not distributed over conditions in a significantly disproportional way,
the small effects of structural knowledge on CPS performance could have
been influenced by this artifact.
Finally, the available time span of ten minutes for learning and practicing
might have been much too short for proper formation of implicit knowledge.
Participants in the experience condition had to read the text on successful
scenario control and experiment with the scenario during this time. That was
probably too little and could have led to contrary effects, as short periods of
scenario experience can lead to confusion instead of solid experience (Kluwe,
Haider, & Misiak, 1990). This will be discussed further in Section 9.2.3.
9.1.9 Implications for research
The findings on the individual level with regard to implicit and structural
knowledge and with regard to complex problem solving can be integrated
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with several existing bodies of research: With complex problem solving re-
search, with works on structural knowledge, and with works in the field of
knowledge and cognitive psychology.
First of all, the results replicate the known findings on the connection be-
tween complex problem solving (CPS) performance and its established pre-
dictors: CPS performance correlates with reasoning scores, elicited with the
Berlin Intelligence Structure Test (BIS), and with scenario-specific declar-
ative knowledge as in other studies (J. Funke, 1992; Kersting, 1999; Süß,
1996). The lasso procedure (compare Section 8.2.6) extended the state of
research by delivering a rank order of the independent variables, sorted by
relevance. According to those results, scenario-specific knowledge (WISpost)
has the strongest influence on CPS performance, followed by reasoning (BIS-
K) and the self-assessment of prior economic knowledge. These predictors
are followed by a knowledge increase through learning as the next relevant in-
dependent variable, which indicates that the ability to acquire new scenario-
specific knowledge, the participants’ ability to learn, also plays an important
role in CPS performance. The weighted density of AST-elicited structural
knowledge is the last independent variable to enter the lasso, which indicates
that it has the smallest influence on CPS performance among the set of pre-
dictors. However, all these predictors together only account for less then a
quarter of the overall variance of the dependent variable. This indicates that
there are further determinants of complex problem solving abilities beyond
the scope of this thesis. The strong tie between computer experience and
TAYLORSHOP performance that Süß (1996) observed was not visible in
the data. As discussed earlier, the generally high level of computer experi-
ence among today’s’ university students may have evened out CPS-relevant
differences present more than ten years ago.
Secondly, the results support the assumption that implicit knowledge
plays a part in CPS performance. Broadbent and Berry (1984; 1984) were
the first to assume that implicit knowledge is responsible for their observed
dissociation between CPS performance increase through scenario experience
and no visible increase in verbalizable knowledge. Their argument has been
challenged repeatedly (J. Funke, 1995). One of the main criticisms was that
their employed systems were simple finite state automata (J. Funke, 2001a)
that require only simple strategies for successful control (compare Section
4.2.2). If a small “path” through the several finite stages on the system is
sufficient for its successful control, so the argument, than the other states
of the system off this path do not need to be examined and no further ver-
balizable knowledge of the system will develop during its control. Thus, the
dissociation between performance and verbalizable knowledge is an effect of
the system’s structure. The present results did discover a small dissociation
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between CPS performance and verbalizable knowledge after (little) scenario
experience in some conditions. This effect was obtained with the TAYLOR-
SHOP system that cannot be modeled as a finite state automat, but as a
linear structural model (J. Funke, 2001a). Thus, dissociation between CPS
performance and verbalizable knowledge cannot solely be explained as an
artifact of the use of finite state automata systems.
Thirdly, with regard to the concepts from knowledge psychology, the find-
ings provide weak support for one assumption of the dimensional model of
knowledge types presented in Chapter 2: It is possible to attribute uncon-
scious access to structural knowledge to the domain of implicit knowledge.
Especially the ascertainment that implicit memory is not a different storage
in memory, but a specific kind of access to memory contents (Markowitsch,
1999, p. 25) has proven to be viable in the development of the AST and
its application in complex problem solving. The fact that the two underly-
ing factors beneath the AST-elicited constructs correlate at a moderate level
also supports the notion that implicit and explicit knowledge are intertwined
(Nonaka & Konno, 1998).
On top of that, the presented results are in line with some of the aspects of
Dienes and Perner’s theory of implicit and explicit knowledge (1999). They
postulated that the structure between explicit knowledge elements can be
implicit and referred to this as structural implicitness. The finding that
participants place conceptual links between explicit knowledge elements that
they cannot label (compare Section 8.1.2) supports this claim.
Finally, this study provides further support for the usefulness of graph-
based structural knowledge approaches in knowledge assessment that were
previously proposed by Eckert (1998a) and Bonato (1990). Their results
showed moderate success in performance prediction with graph based coeffi-
cients on small samples; it has been possible to extend the usefulness of such
approaches to a larger setting in the context of the presented experiments.
9.1.10 Implications with regard to practice
Davis, Curtis, and Tschetter (2003) suggested the use of structural assess-
ment techniques for the evaluation of cognitive training outcomes; Beatty
and Gerace (2002; 2002) suggested computer-based word association tasks
for student assessment, and both studies called for further research in their
respective fields. The presented results support these suggestions by provid-
ing further proof for the usefulness of both approaches. As the experiments in
this thesis have shown, AST-elicited structural assessment parameters cor-
relate with grades among students, and with simulation performance in a
staged assessment center (although correlations are small in the latter set-
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ting and correlations with verbal IQ scores were observed in the former).
Based on these results, the use of the AST in recruitment processes could
be considered: It delivers not only quantitative measures describing individ-
ual knowledge quantity and organization, but also allows a qualitative view
of an individual knowledge structure by providing a unique visualization of
someone’s knowledge and its internal connectedness. The benefit of the AST
test system in this regard is its context-independent structure: The tool re-
mains the same regardless of the knowledge domain in question. With classic
pen-and-pencil tests that aim at knowledge assessment, e.g. multiple choice
exams, each knowledge domain requires the design of a specific test, which
can be costly and time consuming. The AST does not require such efforts
and may be employed as a universal test for knowledge structures. This
benefit may outweigh the fact that AST administration is a rather time-
consuming process, and that participant acceptance of the test procedure
during pairwise comparison declines if the test is too long.
Furthermore, the elicitation of implicit constructs, such as personal con-
struct systems and/or mental models is seen as an important task in or-
ganizational knowledge management by some researchers (Clases, 2007), as
it allows to make views of the organization underlying organizational work
practice explicit. The AST could provide another tool for this task, assisting
practitioners in a comprehensive diagnosis of the organization’s state.
With further efforts in AST design, especially in the development of an
analysis module, the AST could be introduced into personnel screening and
selection processes, e.g. during assessment centers, given that the abovemen-
tioned problems are overcome and the mediating factors that determine the
predictive use of AST coefficients in specific contexts are further investigated
and understood. Then, the AST could prove to be useful in organizational
and instructional practice as computer-based personnel selection methods
tend to have high acceptance among participants (Kersting, 1999).
9.2 Laboratory Experiment Results on the
Group Level
After the results on the individual level with regard to the AST and the
connections between structural knowledge, implicit knowledge and complex
problem solving performance have been discussed in the previous section,
this section focuses on discussing the results on group level: The connection
between the knowledge distribution in the dyad and its complex problem
solving performance, and the possibility of predicting group performance
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based on group self-assessment with the skillMap system. As in the previous
section, the results will be integrated across several hypotheses, and issues
and implications will be discussed.
9.2.1 Data considerations
The established suitability of the dependent variable profit (compare Section
9.1.6) is even more visible when averaged on the dyadic level (dProfit): It not
only exhibits the same features in terms of satisfactory correlations with out-
side criteria and statisfactory levels of difficulty, but it also displays a normal
distribution which allows the use of parametric statistics in its analysis.
Experiment participants experienced the manipulation of knowledge over-
lap as expected: the Euclidian distances of knowledge-self assessment clearly
show the anticipated pattern. The use of the skillMap similarity measure
for a treatment check was not advised at this point, because the measure
had not been validated so far and relies on the semantic relations between
stimulus concepts for calculation.
Self-assessment of expertise can be highly unstable, depending on the
context of the self assessment. For example, a meta-analysis of studies on
self-assessment of medical doctors revealed “that in a majority of the rel-
evant studies, physicians do not appear to accurately self-assess. Weak or
no associations between physicians’ self-rated assessments and external as-
sessments were observed” (D. A. Davis et al., 2006, p. 1100). In the ex-
periment described in Chapter 7, students were required to assess their skill
level with regard to their expertise in the TAYLORSHOP scenario. Stu-
dents exhibit a medium correlation between self assessment capabilities in
intellectual tasks and external rating; a meta-analysis of 51 studies compar-
ing students self-assessment with teacher assessment resulted in an average
r of .39 (Falchikov & Boud, 1989, p. 420). It was thus assumed that at least
for the current experimental setting, an appropriate level of validity could
be assumed for self-assessment scales. This turned out to be true and false
at the same time: With regard to the calculation of knowledge similarity
inside the dyads with the Euclidian distance, the self-assessment proved to
be a viable measure, judged by its predicted distribution. However, the ag-
gregated self-assessment score of the dyads did not correlate with scenario
performance, and the skillMap similarity measure, which is based on the
self-assessment scores, did not exhibit the predicted quadratic relation with
CPS performance (compare Section 8.3.7). On the other side, its use in
the skillMap similarity calculation delivered valid prognostic results as the
skillMap similarity predicted average performance of groups under the dif-
ferent experimental conditions and correlated with CPS performance (more
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on this in Section 9.2.5).
The finding that the aggregated self-assessment does not exhibit signifi-
cant correlations with the participants’ performance is in contrast with the
correlations expected from Falchikov’s meta-analysis (1989). A possible ex-
planation for this can be seen in the nature of the tasks: The studies included
in the meta analysis surveyed students who made self-assessments on mate-
rial they had studied for a longer period of time. Adequate self-assessment of
knowledge requires a feeling of knowing and a judgment of learning (Nelson,
1996), both of which are more accurate if the learned material resides fully
in long-term memory and tends to be biased if learned content is still ac-
tive in short-term memory (ibid), which might have been the case in this
experiment.
9.2.2 Knowledge distribution and group CPS perfor-
mance
In dyads where each member receives seven learning items with varying over-
lap, the degree of scenario-specific knowledge overlap inside the dyad exhibits
a curvilinear n-shaped (i.e. quadratic) effect on the average dyad’s complex
problem solving performance. The degree of scenario-specific knowledge over-
lap exhibits a similar but weaker effect on the average knowledge increase
inside the dyad, which correlates with the dyad’s pooled performance. The
degree of overlap, which is confounded with the number learning items inside
the dyad, also displays a linear effect on CPS performance, but the quadratic
polynomial effect dominates over the linear effect as visible in the higher effect
sizes of the polynomial analyses of variance. The effect of knowledge overlap
on performance is n-shaped in the way that partial overlap leads to higher
performance values than complete overlap or almost no overlap. Dyads with
no overlap containing twelve knowledge elements performed better than fully
overlapping dyads containing only seven elements, but fell short of dyads with
partially overlapping knowledge containing a total of ten elements. Note that
a constant number of knowledge elements were assigned to each individual
participant. Thus, the obtained effects can be explained with the observation
of a higher knowledge increase inside the dyad through discussion in the par-
tially overlapping condition. It is the degree of heterogeneity among group
members that leads to broader knowledge within the group, but an increase
in heterogeneity will also ultimately lead to an increase of process losses.
The results show that the average group performance in this experiment
is not primarily a function of the amount of knowledge inherent in the dyad.
However, the observation that dyads operating under the unshared condi-
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tion outperformed dyads working under the shared condition indicates that
the amount of knowledge contained in the dyad is not negligible. Since the
number of knowledge elements in the unshared groups was almost twice the
number of elements compared to the groups under the shared condition,
this is not surprising. The simultaneous alteration of knowledge overlap and
amount of knowledge per dyad does not allow an exact comparison between
the strength of these two effects but it seems obvious that the curvilinear
overlap effect is stronger because the highest amount of knowledge cannot
equalize the n-shaped curvilinear effect in the no overlap versus the partial
overlap condition. In numbers: the curvilinear effect of knowledge distribu-
tion on CPS performance (η2 = .080) is medium (.05 < η2 < .013, cf. Cohen,
1988, 1992) and is almost twice as large as the corresponding small linear
effect (η2 = .045).
For complex problem solving, these results are in line with the findings
from the domain of simple problem solving or memory tasks that identified
a superiority of partially overlapping items for group performance over full
overlap (Ohtsubo, 2005; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002): as for simple problems,
a partial overlap of knowledge in the group is superior to no and full over-
lap. Thus, when discussing complex problem solving strategies, partially
overlapping knowledge is superior to fully overlapping knowledge – under
the condition that the amount of individual knowledge of group members is
roughly equal, as established in Section 8.2.2.
The clear visibility of the n-shaped relationship between knowledge over-
lap in the group and the group’s complex problem solving performance is
remarkable for two reasons. First, the scale for knowledge overlap was very
small; it only ranged between two and twelve overlapping items. A visi-
ble drop in performance between different levels of knowledge overlap might
have occurred outside of the scope of the experiment. Secondly, experiment
participants were not supposed to combine knowledge from different fields
of expertise, but from a common domain (TAYLORSHOP scenario control).
This might have created a similarity between knowledge elements conceived
as being different from each other in the design of the experiment. The
fact that an effect was observed despite these two reasons can be seen as an
indication of the robustness of the effect.
However, this effect is only partially visible in average dyadic knowledge
increase after discussion (compare Figure 8.8) where the curvilinear effect is
only marginally significant. This may be due to a feature of the experiment:
In order to maintain comparability between pre- and post-discussion knowl-
edge tests, subjects were not allowed to use their notes in the post-discussion
knowledge test, but they were allowed to use their notes in the TAYLOR-
SHOP microworld task. In this way, individual cognitive limitations might
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have prevented the use of all knowledge exchanged in the discussion in the
unshared condition. If this was the case, dyads from the unshared condition
should exhibit a high performance when allowed to use their notes. They
were allowed to do so during the scenario control. Since – counterintuitively
– dyads in the unshared condition performed significantly poorer than those
from the shared condition, a performance decrease in the WIS post-discussion
test due to the unavailability of notes does not seem to be the case.
9.2.3 Implicit knowledge on group level
The finding that neither trial-and-error experiences during learning nor the
availability of a scenario during discussion for strategy evaluation influenced
average group scenario performance in any measurable way is not in line with
the findings on the individual level (compare Sections 9.1.6 and 9.1.9). The
small magnitude of the effect on the individual level probably led to its sta-
tistical disappearance in the process of averaging results on dyadic level. The
available time for scenario experience during learning and interaction might
have been too limited to allow the formation of implicit knowledge to larger
extents. Despite the ascertainment that the influence of implicit knowledge
on scenario control may be smaller than originally expected (Kluge, 2004),
the time issue appears to be of high importance. According to Kluwe, Haider
and Misiak (Kluwe et al., 1990), contrary effects – i.e. a performance decrease
after experience with a scenario – can occur if the scenario was presented too
briefly. As Süß (1996) found effects only for male participants after 30 min-
utes of scenario exposure, the here-employed interval of ten minutes might
have been too short. The significantly decreased amount of verbalizable
knowledge in those dyads that learned from texts and from scenario experi-
ence during the initial learning period (see Figures 8.10 and 8.11) compared
to those who learned from texts only indicates that ten minutes was not
enough for text reading and scenario elaboration.
Finally, there are no previous studies that explicitly analyzed implicit
knowledge in TAYLORSHOP control. Thus, it may be possible that implicit
knowledge plays a smaller role in this paticular microworld than in the control
of others. A combination of the above-mentioned aspects may have led to
the findings, but a satisfactory answer cannot be drawn from the reported
findings.
9.2.4 Gender effects
The effect of gender composition of the dyad on complex problem solving
performance is surprising in its magnitude, both on the individual level (com-
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pare Section 8.2.7) and when averaged on the group level (compare Section
8.3.8). Gender effects in CPS performance have also been reported elsewhere:
Wittman and colleagues (1996) were able to identify higher prior economic
knowledge of male participants and their superior computer experience as
causes for the effect. In the present study, this does not seem to be the
case: Average prior economic knowledge self-assessment and average com-
puter experience self assessment do not show a significant correlation with
dyadic CPS performance. Furthermore, a partial correlation of gender and
performance, controlled for all other measurement variables, still leads to a
significant correlation between gender and CPS performance. Thus, none
of the measured variables were able to explain the differences completely.
Possible reasons on the individual and the group level, such as influences of
personal traits (e. g. Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000) or less concurrence seeking
of men (which leads to increased group performance, compare Schulz-Hardt,
Jochims, & Frey, 2002; Smith, Petersen, Johnson, & Johnson, 1986) due to
more fights for rank order (Buss, 2003), are speculative but worthwhile to
follow up. A recent stream of research has identified the so-called stereotype
threat as responsible for gender-specific differences in performance in chal-
lenging mathematical and/or technical tasks (Martens, Johns, Greenberg,
& Schimel, 2006; Marx & Stapel, 2006). The Stereotype-Threat paradigm
assumes that members of a subgroup or minority will perform poor in tasks
they perceive as especially difficult for members of their respective group,
as this perception conditions feelings of anxiety and frustration which again
impair task performance (Marx & Stapel, 2006). It appears plausible that
the rather technical display of the TAYLORSHOP scenario (compare Fig-
ure 7.1) along with its rather technical content (operating machinery) has
caused stereotype threat among the female participants. Stereotype threat
in complex problem solving might thus be of interest in future research.
9.2.5 skillMap similarity algorithm
The results with reference to complex problem solving and the skillMap sim-
ilarity measure contain a peculiarity that requires further discussion: The
similarity measure was intended to deliver a measure between 0 and 1 in-
creasing in proportion to the similarity between two individuals represented
in the skillMap system (compare Section 6.2.2). It was assumed that this
similarity measure would display an n-shaped connection with CPS perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 6.3.1), which was not the case. However, the similar-
ity measure displayed the same distribution over experimental conditions as
the CPS performance: Those groups that scored high on complex problem
solving performance also exhibit a high similarity measure. This finding is
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mirrored by the significant correlation between CPS performance and the
similarity measure. While the correlation coefficient might be inflated due
to some groups that exhibited no similarity at all, the n-shaped distribution
of the similarity value over experimental conditions is very clear both in the
error bar plot (compare Figure 8.12) and in the following variance analysis
with quadratic contrasts.
The similarity measure and CPS performance do not exhibit an n-shaped
relation, but a linear relation. This finding implies that groups operating un-
der the shared condition received a higher skillMap similarity measure than
those under the fully shared condition. Contrary to that, the Euclidian dis-
tance, which does not take the semantic structure of expertise concepts into
account, exhibited a linear relation to the experimental condition (compare
Section 8.3.3), while the similarity measure exhibits an n-shaped relation.
Note that the Euclidian distance and the similarity measure are calculated
from the same data (self-assessment scores on ten items with reference to
TAYLORSHOP expertise). Thus, the different trajectories displayed by the
two measures can only be explained by the underlying calculations. The
similarity measure seems to overestimate similarity values at medium over-
lap while it seems to underestimate similarity values under high overlap when
operating on the experimental data. This cannot be due to technical flaws in
the calculations, as test calculations (compare Section 6.2.2) did not exhibit
any abnormalities. Thus, the reason for the overestimation of similarities and
the deviation from the trajectory of the Euclidian distance must be rooted
in the semantic structure of the employed expertise graph connecting the
skill nodes: A medium overlap in self-assessment led to more paths than
equal or different assessments and presumably to inflated similarity values.
Thus, for this specific instance, the theory of an n-shaped connection between
performance and heterogeneity was “built in” to the skillMap similarity cal-
culation, while it did not occur in the calculation of the Euclidian distance.
This finding indicates a conceptional flaw in the similarity measure, because
it does not measure similarity of knowledge self-assessment as it is supposed
to. Its calculation does not seem to capture similarity in a linear proportional
way, but delivers an n-shaped distribution. Unintentionally, it is thus a mea-
sure for the mediocracy of overlap; a linear measure for the propitiousness
of overlap and thus a linear logarithmic scale for the increasing trajectory of
knowledge growth in Scholl’s model of team effectiveness (compare Figure
5.1). Thus, higher values of the similarity measure denote a more favorable
position towards the maximum of the parabola.
In this way, the skillMap did provide a prediction of group performance
on an aggregated level as it predicted which of the three experimental con-
ditions would produce the highest average complex problem solving perfor-
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mance. Thus, the elicitation, visualization and analysis of competencies of
group members with an IT system have proven to be of value as they al-
low performance prediction of groups – at least in the employed context and
contrary to the originally assumed way. This is in line with findings from
Trier (2005) who also pointed out the use of such systems. His findings are
somewhat augmented by the current results because the system he proposed
relies on data mining for the establishment of competencies whereas the cur-
rent project has demonstrated that the use of self-assessments can serve as a
viable source for predictions as well.
The proposed similarity measure employs a simple, path-based similarity
measure. In graph theory, much more sophisticated ways of similarity identi-
fication based on structural similarities exist (e. g. Le et al., 2003). It would
be desirable to develop more accurate similarity measures for future appli-
cations that rely on such algorithms that take further structural information
into account.
It is however questionable whether the findings from the present study
can be generalized to domains other than complex problem solving. The em-
ployed skillMap uses a very task-specific vocabulary, which might not neces-
sarily be present in other tasks. Generally, the quality of prediction relies on
the accuracy of self-assessment and on the accuracy and precision of the un-
derlying semantic structure. In the presented experiment, the experimenter
specified the latter. It is however possible to attribute the task of generat-
ing a semantic structure of expertise or knowledge elements to the users of
such a system, as proposed in the skillMap architecture (compare Section
6.1.6). Such jointly user-generated structures are referred to as folksonomies
(Catutto et al., in print) and have proven to be both highly accurate and
practical (ibid). However, one has to bear in mind that this accuracy has
not been tested in the present experiment.
The performance prediction that the skillMap delivered is also a further
indicator of the usefulness of graph-based knowledge management systems
aiming at facilitating linkage between knowledge elements (Trier, 2005). In
the broader perspective, the success of such systems, which all include a social
networking feature and belong to the category of third generation knowledge
management systems (Schütt, 2003), is in line with findings from a Delphi-
study on the future of knowledge management (Scholl, König, Meyer, &
Heisig, 2004) that predicted a success of such systems.
Another issue challenging the generalizability of the laboratory experi-
ment’s results is the laboratory setting itself: Skill self-assessment and prob-
lem solving took place under artificial conditions during a very short time
span, which is especially unlikely in real-world project work. Therefore, fur-
ther field studies need to establish the accuracy of the employed similarity
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measure. Apart from the conceptional and practical issues, the similarity al-
gorithm was able to deliver useful predictions based on these self-assessments.
This encourages further studies.
9.2.6 Methodological issues
On the group level, the study faces some methodological issues that should
not remain unaddressed. Firstly, the findings on group level with regard to
the influence of knowledge distribution on group performance can be ques-
tioned due to the fact that the nominal group technique was employed.
Measures for group performance consisted of average individual scores of
participants who had engaged in a group task, the discussion, but who had
performed the CPS task on their own. The group was thus not totally arti-
ficial, but it is questionable whether an average score of coacting individuals
represents the same as a score of a task that was jointly carried out by all
group members together. Examples from research on brainstorming (Diehl
& Stroebe, 1987; Gallupe et al., 1992) indicate that nominal group perfor-
mance and actual group performance can differ and further research has to
establish whether the identified results hold also true for joint acting on com-
plex problems. Nominal group technique however had to be employed in this
particular setting, as specific hypotheses on the influence of group informa-
tion exchange processes on group performance had been put forward. It was
thus necessary to separate information exchange and task performance. The
observed strong effect of information overlap on group performance justifies
this procedure, but future studies should avoid such artificial separation of
group processes.
The analysis of hypotheses on the individual and the group level in the
same experiment is another issue faced in the study. Although the experi-
ment was designed in a way that would keep hypotheses on the two levels
separate, the discovery of a few nonindependencies between individual and
group measures (compare Section 8.2.3) shows that embedding individuals in
discussing dyads did not leave the results on the individual level untouched.
Despite the fact that individual scores cannot be exclusively represented as
effects on individual level, the subtraction of group level effects shows that the
remaining individual-level effects are in the same scope as the non-adjusted
values (compare Table 8.10).
9.2.7 Implications with regard to research
Despite the above issues, this study indicates that group performance in
complex problem solving varies with knowledge overlap inside the group and
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that a partial overlap is more beneficial for group performance than full or no
overlap. This corroborates Scholl’s theory of team effectiveness (1996, 2005)
in that respect.
The results of the laboratory experiment have implications for research
on team mental models (compare Section 5.2.2). In an experiment by Math-
ieu et al., dyads had to perform a computer-simulated air-combat simulation
that classifies as a complex problem. At several points in time, participants’
task mental model was assessed through similarity ratings of expert-identified
concepts representing task knowledge (note that this operationalization is al-
most identical to the operationalization of structural knowledge as employed
in this thesis). The similarity of the group members’ structural knowledge
was assessed with a simple graph-theoretic measure; contrary to the authors’
expectation, it did not exhibit a significant positive correlation with task
performance.
This finding can be explained by the results presented in this study: The
authors upheld the implicit underlying hypothesis that cognitive homogene-
ity, i.e. homogeneity of structural task knowledge and task performance in a
computer-simulated complex task, displays a linear relationship, whereas the
results presented in the previous chapter suggest that an n-shaped relation
exists between the two. Generally, the findings presented in the previous
chapter contradict the notion of a linear relation between task mental model
homogeneity and team performance. Instead, they can be seen as an answer
to van Knippenberg’s (2007) request for further studies on curvilinear effects
in (informational) group diversity.
9.2.8 Implications with regard to practice
This study indicates that with regard to the influence of knowledge, group
performance in complex problem solving varies with knowledge overlap inside
the group and that a partial overlap is more beneficial for group performance
than full or no overlap. This has practical implications for the assembly
of groups and teams in organizational practice that are supposed to deal
with complex problems: If the team members are from similar domains and
are thought to possess a comparable magnitude of individual expertise, e.g.
due to similar length of employment or similar careers, a partial overlap
of knowledge and expertise among team members will be likely to produce
better results than teams of persons with identical backgrounds and teams
with greater differences in individual knowledge. If a project should require
participants with very different backgrounds, a larger time horizon for seeking
mutual understanding could be helpful as well as a facilitator for increasing
effective exchange (Schimansky, 2006).
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The skillMap could prove to be a valuable tool for organizational practice
and offers various uses in knowledge management. For example, a human
resource department could use the similarity measure in the process of as-
sembling project teams or work groups for certain complex tasks. Since
“work groups are increasingly used to complete a variety of organizational
tasks“(Levesque, Wilson, & Wholey, 2001, p. 135), this could be of value in
management. The system could also be used to visualize the organizational
context of employees, which could potentially increase understanding and
knowledge exchange among organizational members, because context aware-
ness is a key factor for successful knowledge sharing (Nonaka & Konno, 1998).
Furthermore, the results of the similarity identification could be extended
to other practical uses. For example, groups with a high average similarity
measure and strong ties among all members who originate from different
organizational departments or teams could be automatically classified as
communities of practice. Since the leverage of such communities in orga-
nization is seen as a key strategic advantage (Saint-Onge & Wallace, 2003),
their identification and support with automatic means could lead to business
advantages.
9.3 Outlook
The attempt to construct a computer-based test system for the elicitation
of individual structural knowledge that also captures structural implicitness,
the AST, can be viewed as partially successful. Although AST-scores corre-
late with knowledge-related performance indices such as as exam grades and
complex problem solving performance in certain contexts, these correlations
do not appear to apply universally. In explicit knowledge domains, some
measures correlate better than others, wheras in complex problem solving,
only one measure delivered small correlations with only one of two avail-
able outside criteria. The results indicate that knowledge elicitation with a
context-free structural elicitation technique is possible, but many questions
remain open that require further research.
First of all, the predictiveness of the different AST measures has to be
clarified; the validity of the AST is not fully established and further exper-
iments appear necessary in order to assess the stability of knowledge struc-
tures over a certain period of time. Although knowledge cannot be seen as
a stable trait like personality dimensions, a certain amount of stability be-
tween two measurements can be expected if no learning or forgetting has
taken place. Re-test assessments need to be performed in order to establish
retest reliability.
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Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the AST can only be viewed as measurig
implicit knowledge in CPS if explicitely available edges are excluded from
the set of edges contained in the elicited PFNET. The results reported in
this thesis contained a mixure of labeled and unlabeled edges. A further
experiment, contrasting standard AST-scores with labeled AST scores in
CPS performance, is required to fully assess the role of implicitly available
edges in complex problem solving and their effect.
The fact that correlations between the AST weighted density measure
and CPS performance were dominated by dyad-level (shared) effects requires
further research on the individual level. A replication of the AST-experiment
in complex problem solving with a strict individual design, two instances of
AST-use (for retest assessment) and the contrasting of the unlabeled with the
force-labeled AST version (in order to subtract explicit structural knowledge
from the elicited mixture of structural implicitness and explict structural
knowledge) could address all above-mentioned issues.
With regard to results on the group level, the degree of scenario-specific
knowledge overlap in dyads in which a constant number of knowledge ele-
ments was assigned to each individual participant had a larger effect on the
average dyad members’ performance in a complex scenario than the amount
of knowledge inside the dyad. The effect of knowledge overlap on performance
is n-shaped (cf. 9.2.2); it seems to be partially due to a higher knowledge
increase inside the dyad through discussion in the partially overlapping con-
dition. For the domain of complex problem solving, these results do not con-
tradict the findings from studies from the domain of simple problem solving
or memory tasks that identified a superiority of partially overlapping items
for group performance (Ohtsubo, 2005; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002). Further
studies can now analyze whether there exists a similar connection between
knowledge overlap and performance in complex problem solving as predicted
in Zajonc’s model of group performance (Zajonc & Smoke, 1959). The role
of gender effects and the role of implicit knowledge also require further anal-
yses, as the role of implicit knowledge and the mechanisms underlying the
observed gender differences in performance remained unclear in this study.
As team mental model research assumes that certain aspects of team
mental models are of a procedural type which partly belongs to the category
of non-explicit knowledge in the conceptual model presented in Chapter 2,
it can be reasoned that team mental models include implicit aspects that
are partly measured with the AST. It would thus be a promising endeavor
to try and assess team mental models with the AST, because AST-elicited
models would be broader than those elicited by Mathieu et al. (2000) as
they include less consciously available concept relations. Predictions of team
performance could then incorporate the findings from the group level by as-
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suming an n-shaped relation between group member homogeneity and team
performance. If the homogeneity was to be accessed with the AST instead of
the skillMap, this requires the development and/or employment of more com-
plex similarity measures than those employed in Pathfinder scaling, because
AST-elicited networks differ in number of nods, node labels, and structure,
while Pathfinder-elicited networks differ in structure only. The use of such
similarity measures to AST-elicited graphs and their application to shared
team mental models is thus one of the promising future projects.
Another possible continuation of the studies presented in this thesis lies
in the conversion of the two separate computer tools that were presented
(AST and skillMap). The AST elicits individual knowledge elements via
term association and concept comparisons. The skillMap visualizes and ana-
lyzes the skills and knowledge of several individuals and connects individuals
and knowledge elements. However, the assignment of knowledge elements to
individuals is purely based on subjective self-assessment; a method delivering
results of varying accuracy (see above). These self-assessments could be re-
placed by AST-elicited concepts and the skillMap similarity algorithm could
be extended to calculating the similarity between AST-elicited knowledge
structures, combining the two methods into one powerful device for knowl-
edge analysis, visualization, and management on both the individual and the
group level.
9.4 Summary
This thesis has dealt with the concept of knowledge, its forms, its represen-
tation, possibilities of its elicitation on the individual and the group level,
and with its influence on both individual and group performance in complex
problem solving.
In the first and second chapter, the importance of knowledge for todays’
complex economies has been outlined, as knowledge creation and exchange
are seen as key drivers for organizational innovation, which drives organi-
zational success. Based on this ascertainment, the concept of knowledge
was analyzed, shaped and defined. Broadly, it can be conceptualized as
structural connectivity patters whose contents have proven to be viable for
the attainment of certain goals. On a more specific level, findings from the
field of memory science and cognitive psychology were linked, which resulted
in a two-dimensional model of knowledge types with the dimensions con-
sciousness of use and ‘codifiability’. Based on this model, it was argued that
structural implicitness, the implicit connection between explicit concepts, is
a part of individual implicit knowledge, which is seen as an important factor
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in organizational knowledge creation by some scholars. The second chap-
ter concluded with the research assumption that the elicitation of individual
structural knowledge could provide an opportunity to psychometrically as-
sess a portion of individual structural knowledge, which could in turn be
employed for performance prediction.
The third chapter discussed multiple methods for structural knowledge
elicitation. One technique, Pathfinder-scaled networks, was assessed to be of
high usefulness for structural knowledge assessment, but it was also argued
that this method contains two weaknesses: It relies on expert referent struc-
tures of questionable validity and presents participants with concepts that
the participants are supposed to ‘know’ without checking this assumption.
Thus, a new computer-based structural knowledge assessment technique is
presented: The Association Structure Test (AST). It employes participants’
free term associations to a stimulus concept, recording of thinking times
between associations, and quick, intuitive, and unlabeled similarity ratings
between previously associated concepts for the construction of a Pathfinder-
adjusted minimum spanning tree of the participants’ knowledge structure.
Each participant’s knowledge structure is quantified with six graph-theoretic
variables, thought to represent different aspects of explicit knowledge and
structural implicitness.
It was then argued that the AST must be employed in a task domain
where implicit knowledge acquisition and application is important for task
performance in order to assess its usefulness for performance prediction. One
area of problem solving research in which the role of implicit knowledge has
been debated extensively is complex problem solving (CPS), which was in-
troduced in the fourth chapter, along with established determinants of CPS
performance. Complex problems are characterized by their ill-definedness
(the goal state of the system is not clear), their complexity and connected-
ness (different interconnected variables need to be considered), their opaque-
ness (variable interconnections are unclear), and their dynamics (the system
autonomously changes over time). Real-world problems faced by managers
and politicians are classified as complex problems. In laboratory research,
complex problems are modeled with dynamic computer scenarios that adhere
to the above criteria. General knowledge, scenario-specific knowledge and in-
telligence, especially reasoning, are known to determine individual complex
problem solving, and one strand of research also sees implicit knowledge as
an important determinant in complex problem solving, and CPS was thus
identified as task domain for AST use.
The fifth chapter shifted the focus from the individual level to the group
level. It was argued that the assignment of complex problems to groups is
seen as a way to overcome individual information processing limitations in to-
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day’s knowledge-intensive organizations. Research on information exchange
among groups and on team mental models has come up with two competing
theories on how knowledge distribution in groups effects the groups’ general
performance. Information exchange researchers claim that a certain degree
of cognitive heterogeneity increases team performance, wheras team men-
tal model researchers advocate cognitive homogeneity as a success factor for
group performance. The effect of cognitive heterogeneity in groups on group
complex problem solving performance is thus not clear. However, a spe-
cific model of team effectiveness assumes a quadratic relation between group
heterogeneity and group performance and it was thus argued that such an
n-shaped relationship will be discovered in a complex problem solving exper-
iment.
The sixth chapter described the skillMap IT-system for organizational
knowledge management that stores and visualizes employees’ knowledge self-
assessment and the semantic structure of the knowledge elements (referred
to as skills). For this system, a similarity algorithm was suggested that
calculates knowledge similarity (i.e., the level of homogeneity of knowledge
self-assessment) that takes the semantic structure between knowledge ele-
ments into account. The algorithm is supposed to deliver a discrete measure
of group cognitive heterogeneity, based on self-assessment.
The seventh chapter presented a methodology for testing the various hy-
potheses that were put forward in the preceding chapters: Four small experi-
ments aimed at validating some of the AST’s central claims, and a laboratory
experiment aimed at testing whether (a) individual implicit knowledge plays
a part in CPS, operationalized with the TAYLORSHOP scenario, (b) AST-
elicited structural knowledge predicts CPS performance, (c) group knowledge
overlap and group CPS performance exhibit an n-shaped quadratic relation,
and (d) the skillMap’s similarity measure also displays a curvilinear relation-
ship with group CPS performance.
The results as presented in the eighth chapter indicated that the AST does
capture concept-relations that participants are unable to label explicitely,
supporting the research assumption put forward in the second chapter. Some
of the AST’s coefficients exhibit sensitivity to learning, and four AST coeffi-
cients correlate with a knowledge-based outside performance criteria (exam
grades). These results appear to be somewhat unstable, as AST scores also
correlate with IQ-scres elicited with the WST vocabulary test. The AST’s
weighted density parameter, which is thought to capture structural implicit-
ness to the strongest extent, loads a different factor than the other explicit-
knowledge-based AST-coefficients, supporting the original claim that struc-
tural implicitness correlates with CPS performance.
In the CPS experiment, a slight dissociation between CPS performance in-
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crease through scenario experience and CPS performance indicates a (small)
influence of AST-elicited structural implicitness on CPS performance, but
the connection is weak: It only occurs under certain conditions and is only
visible on the individual level, but not on the group level. Thus, implicit
knowledge plays a small role in TAYLORSHOP scenario performance and
its mode of action seems to be influenced by situational and contextual fac-
tors. AST-elicited weighted density measures correlate weakly with complex
problem solving performance indicators. However, the AST-coefficients that
were thought to capture explicit knowledge do not correlate with measures
of explicit CPS scenario knowledge, the influence of the weighted density on
CPS performance is primarily due to dyad-level (shared) effects and probably
influenced by gender effects. In summary, the results indicate that implicit
knowledge assessment is theoretically possible under certain conditions, but
most probably not in the general context free way as intended. Further
research appears necessary.
In order to test the hypotheses with regard to the influence of knowledge
distribution in groups on group CPS performance, the score of coacting dyads
that stemmed from the same experiment as the AST results were obtained.
The dyads learned and worked on the CPS scenario under three different con-
ditions with regard to knowledge overlap: In the overlapping condition, both
group members received the same information on scenario control, in the
partially shared condition, they received partially overlapping information
and completely divergent information in the non-overlap condition. Partici-
pants’ individual cognitive load was equal under all conditions. As expected,
dyads working under the partially shared condition outperformed the other
dyads, both in terms of CPS performance and in knowledge acquisition.
Contrary to expectations, the skillMap similarity measure did not exhibit
a curvilinear relation with group performance, but a linear one. It turned
out that proposed the similarity measure has a built-in bias delivering in-
creased similarity values for medium-similar persons. The results indicate
that performance-predictions with IT-systems are generally possible, but the
employed similarity measure requires further revision before practical imple-
mentation. The curvilinear relationship between knowledge overlap in a dyad
and the dyad’s complex problem solving performance is probably the most
resilient finding of this thesis. It has both theoretical and practical implica-
tions: With regard to shared information research, it extends known findings
on the curvilinear relation between group information overlap and group per-
formance for simple problems to complex problem solving. The findings of
this thesis can also explain why in team mental model research, cognitive
homogeneity did not correlate with team performance in some studies. With
regard to organizational practice, the findings indicate that project teams
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that have to tackle real complex problems will probably be most effective if a
certain amount of knowledge heterogeneity is present among team members.
Further research appears necessary in order to extend the current findings
from the laboratory into the organizational environment, and to further clar-
ify the relationship between the amount of knowledge inside a group on the
one hand and knowledge overlap on the other hand on group performance,
as the amount of knowledge inside the group was not completely controlled
in the conducted experiment.
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Figure A.1: German TAYLORSHOP scenario variable interconnection
scheme (reprinted with permission from Süß, 1996, p. 102)
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A.2 German TAYLORSHOP Knowledge El-
ements
Table A.1: Knowledge elements for TAYLORSHOP scenario control that
were embedded in instructional texts based on Klocke (2004) in the original
German language version
Element Title Content
G1 Stabiles Sys-
tem
Im Vergleich zu anderen computersimulierten Aufgaben ist
die Hemdenfabrik ein relativ stabiles System. Kleine Ein-
griffe bewirken auch nur kleine Effekte. Man braucht also
bei seinen Maßnahmen nicht zu vorsichtig vorzugehen, da
die Fabrik nicht so leicht aus den Fugen gerät. Die Bank
gewährt der Fabrik großzügigen Kredit. Wenn das Geld
gewinnbringend investiert wird, ist es daher unproblema-
tisch, Schulden zu machen. Verkaufsstellen oder Maschi-
nen sollte man also nicht verkaufen, bloß weil man einen
negativen Kontostand hat.
G2 Geichge-
wichtszu-
stand
um das Gesamtvermögen zu maximieren, ist es einerseits
sinnvoll, das System in einen Gleichgewichtszustand zu
bekommen. Das erreicht man z. B., indem man dafür
sorgt, dass sich Nachfrage und Angebot an Hemden bzw.
Anzahl an Maschinen und Arbeitern entsprechen. Ander-
erseits sollte man versuchen, den Betrieb zu vergrößern und
den Verkauf zu steigern.
A Rohmaterial
und Lager
Der Rohmaterialpreis ist von sämtlichen Systemvariablen
unabhängig. Er unterliegt allerdings deutlichen, marktbe-
dingten Schwankungen. Man sollte darauf achten, dass im-
mer ausreichend Rohmaerial vorhanden ist, um die Produk-
tion sicherzustellen. Ein häufiger Fehler besteht darin, das
Rohmateriallager nicht wieder aufzufüllen.
B Hemden im
Lager
Die Lagerhaltung ist mit Kosten verbunden. Deshalb soll-
ten nicht zu viele Hemden auf Halde produziert werden.
Gleichzeitig sollte aber soviel produziert werden, dass die
Nachfrage befriedigt werden kann.
C Angebot und
Nachfrage
Die Anzahl der fertigen Hemden im Lager und die Menge
Rohmaterial im Lager müssen zusammen mindestens so
hoch sein wie die Nachfrage. Wenn Angebot und Nach-
frage auseinander klaffen, ist es sinnvoller, eines von beiden
zu steigern als eines von beiden zu senken.
D Allgemeines Damit sich die Investitionen in in Maschinen und Personal
rentieren, sollte sowohl die Arbeitsauslastung als auch die
Maschinenauslastung möglichst hoch sein.
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Table A.1: (continued)
Element Title Content
E Maschinen-
auslastung
Die Maschinenauslastung gibt an, wie viel Prozent der
Hemden, die mit der Maschine produziert werden können,
auch tatsächlich produziert werden. Wenn Sie z. B. vier
100er Maschinen besitzen und tatsächlich etwa 400 Hem-
den produzieren, dann ist die Maschinenauslastung 100
%. Wenn die Maschinenauslastung deutlich unter 100%
ist, werden Ihre Investitionen nicht optimal genutzt. Der
Grund könnte sein, dass Sie zu wenig Arbeiter (2) für Ihre
Maschinen (3) eingestellt haben, dass Ihre Arbeiter un-
motiviert (1) sind oder dass die Maschinen Schäden (7)
aufweisen. Vielleicht haben Sie auch einfach vergessen,
genug Rohmaterial einzukaufen (12).
F Arbeitsaus-
lastung
Die Arbeitsauslastung gibt an, wie viel Prozent der Hem-
den, die die Arbeiter produzieren können, sie tatsächlich
produzieren. Wenn Sie drei Arbeiter für drei 100er Maschi-
nen eingestellt haben und diese auch etwa 300 Hemden pro-
duzieren, dann ist die Arbeitsauslastung 100 %. Wenn die
Arbeitsauslastung niedriger ist, dann beschäftigen sich Ihre
Arbeiter (2) womöglich mit anderen Dingen als dem Her-
stellen von Hemden. Vielleicht haben Sie es versäumt, ih-
nen genug intakte Maschinen (3) oder Rohmaterial (9) zur
Verfügung zu stellen oder sie sollten sich um ihre Motiva-
tion (1) kümmern. Man sollte also nicht mehr Arbeiter
als Maschinen haben. Wenn es mehr Arbeiter als Maschi-
nen gibt, ist es jedoch besser, Maschinen zu kaufen (3) als
Arbeiter zu entlassen (2). Schließlich wollen Sie Hemden
verkaufen (17), um Ihr Gesamtvermögen zu steigern und
dazu brauchen Sie Ihre Arbeiter. Die Arbeitsmotivation
ist vom Lohn und von den Sozialausgaben abhängig. Bei-
des zusammen erhöht aber auch die Kosten pro Arbeiter.
Ein weiterer Grund dafür, warum Sie nur 100er-Maschinen
betreiben sollten.
G Investitions-
zeitpunkt
Maschinen sollten Sie in den ersten Monaten kaufen, damit
sich die Anschaffung lohnt. Sie sollten nur 100er Maschi-
nen betreiben, um die vorhandene Arbeitskraft optimal zu
nutzen.
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Table A.1: (continued)
Element Title Content
H Maschinen-
schäden
Maschinenschäden (7) reduzieren die Produktionskapazität
(6) und damit die tatsächliche Produktion (8). Durch Aus-
gaben für Wartung und Reparatur (5) können Schäden un-
abhängig vom Alter der Maschinen wirksam reduziert wer-
den. Die Wartungsausgaben sollte man nie auf Null setzen.
Wenn die Maschinenschäden mehr als 10 % betragen, sollte
man die Wartungsausgaben erhöhen. Je mehr Maschinen
man hat, desto mehr Geld muss man für Reparaturen aus-
geben, da die Wartungsausgaben pro Maschine (4) dann ab-
nehmen. Die Maschinenschäden (7) werden ausschließlich
durch die Wartungsausgaben pro Maschine beeinflusst. Die
Arbeitsmotivation (1) hat keinen Einfluss auf die Maschi-
nenschäden.
I Nachfrage Die Nachfrage bestimmt, wie viele Hemben Sie pro Monat
am Markt absetzen können. Die Ausgaben für Werbung er-
höhen die Nachfrage, ebenso die Anzahl der Verkaufsstellen
und die Anzahl der Handelsvertreter. Ein höherer Hemden-
preis senkt die Nachfrage. Der Preis hat einen stärkeren
Einfluss auf die Nachfrage als jeweils Werbung, Verkauf-
sstellen und Vertreter.
J Kosten Die Posten Werbung, Anzahl der Verkaufsstellen und
die Anzahl der Handelsvertreter erhöhen die monatlichen
Kosten. Die monatlichen Kosten werden auch durch
Rohmaterial-Lagerkosten, Kosten pro Arbeiter (Lohn- und
Sozialaufwendungen) und durch evtl. Sollzinsen erhöht.
A.3 TAYLORSHOP Instructions (Example)
Die Hemdenfabrik
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie hätten sich für den Managerposten in einer Hem-
denfabrik in Berlin beworben und nun tatsächlich die Aufgabe bekommen,
dieses unternehmen ein Jahr lang zu leiten. Ihre Leistung wird am Ende der
Dienstzeit an der Höhe des Gesamtvermögens gemessen. Das Gesamtvermö-
gen setzt sich zusammen aus dem Geld, das auf dem Firmenkonto bei der
Bank liegt (Kontostand) und dem Wert der Maschinen, der Verkaufsstellen,
des Rohmaterials und der Hemden im Lager.
Zur Leitung des Unternehmens stehen Ihnen über die Tastatur des Com-
puters verschiedene Eingriffsmöglichkeiten zur Verfügung.
Das Unternehmen befindet sich in einem schlechten Zustand. Ohne Ihre
Eingriffe ginge es bankrott. Es bleibt also Ihrem Managertalent überlassen,
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es vor dem Ruin zu retten.
Auf dem Bildschirm werden Sie eine Zustandsbeschreibung des Unterneh-
mens und eine Aufstellung Ihrer Handlungsmöglichkeiten sehen.
In der obersten Zeile sehen Sie, in welchemMonat Sie sich gerade befinden.
Darunter folgt auf dem Bildschirm die Beschreibung des Zustandes Ihrer
Firma. An allen Variablen auf der linken Seite können Sie direkte Eingriffe
vornehmen:
Sie können Rohmaterial einkaufen, den Hemdenpreis verändern, die Aus-
gaben für Werbung verändern, Verkaufsstellen neu eröffnen oder schließen,
Maschinen kaufen oder verkaufen, und anderes mehr.
Falls Sie Maschinen kaufen oder Verkaufsstellen eröffnen wollen und das
notwendige Geld nicht mehr auf dem Konto haben, müssen Sie einen Kredit
aufnehmen. Der Kredit ist begrenzt, er hängt ab von der Kreditwürdigkeit
Ihres unternehmens. Wenn Sie keinen Kredit mehr bekommen, wird dies am
Bildschirm angezeigt. Sie müssen dann versuchen, ohne Neuanschaffungen
Gewinne zu erzielen. unbegrenzten Kredit erhalten Sie allerdings weiterhin
für die laufenden Kosten, wie Löhne, Sozialausgaben und Werbungskosten,
da dies ja keine Neuanschaffungen sind.
Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie in einem Monat treffen, werden zunächst
nur als Planungen am Bildschirm angezeigt, ohne dass etwas berechnet wird.
Erst wenn Sie der Meinung sind, alle notwendigen Entscheidungen getroffen
zu haben und den Monat abschließen wollen, werden die Entscheidungen
verwirklicht.
Auf der rechten Seite sehen Sie dann, wie sich die Eingriffe am Ende
des Monats auf Ihre Firma ausgewirkt haben. Diese Variablen können Sie
natürlich nicht direkt verändern.
234 Additional Taylorshop Experimental Material
Ganz oben sehen Sie das Gesamtvermögen, das am Ende des 12. Monats
Ihrer Tätigkeit als Firmenchef möglichst hoch sein soll. Darunter werden
weitere wichtige Angaben über Ihren Betrieb angezeigt.
In dem Kästchen unten rechts sehen Sie, welche Tasten Ihnen für Ihre
Eingriffe zur Verfügung stehen. Mit den Pfeiltasten nach oben und unten
können Sie einen Menüpunkt auswählen. Als Menüpunkt bezeichnen wir jede
der besprochenen Eingriffsmöglichkeiten auf der linken Bildschirmhälfte, also
Rohmaterial, Hemdenpreis, Werbung usw. Im Augenblick ist der Menüpunkt
“Rohmaterial” ausgewählt. Sie erkennen dies daran, dass oben links das Wort
“Rohmaterial” durch einen farblich veränderten Hintergrund hervorgehoben
wird.
Bevor Sie mit der Simulation beginnen, erhalten Sie noch zusätzliches
Wissen darüber, wie man die Hemdenfabrik erfolgreich steuert. Zudem
ist in der Graphik oben der Anfangszustand der nächsten Hemdenfabrik
dargestellt. Wenn es für Sie hilfreich ist, können Sie diese Graphik beim
Lesen des Textes heranziehen, um ihn besser zu verstehen. Wenn Sie sie
nicht als hilfreich empfinden, konzentrieren Sie sich ausschließlich auf den
Text.
Nach 10 Minuten müssen Sie diese Informationen wieder abgeben. Ver-
suchen Sie sich in dieser Zeit möglichst viel davon einzuprägen. Wenn Sie
möchten, können Sie sich beim Lesen Notizen auf dem bereitliegenden No-
tizpapier machen. Ihre eigenen Notizen dürfen Sie auch während der Auf-
gabenbearbeitung behalten.
Wenn keine Fragen mehr bestehen blättern Sie bitte jetzt um und fangen
an zu lernen.
A.3 TAYLORSHOP Instructions (Example) 235
Im Vergleich zu anderen computersimulierten Aufgaben ist die Hemden-
fabrik ein relativ stabiles System. Kleine Eingriffe bewirken auch nur kleine
Effekte. Man braucht also bei seinen Maßnahmen nicht zu vorsichtig vorzuge-
hen, da die Fabrik nicht so leicht aus den Fugen gerät. Die Bank gewährt der
Fabrik großzügigen Kredit. Wenn das Geld gewinnbringend investiert wird,
ist es daher unproblematisch, Schulden zu machen. Verkaufsstellen oder
Maschinen sollte man also nicht verkaufen, bloß weil man einen negativen
Kontostand hat.
um das Gesamtvermögen zu maximieren, ist es einerseits sinnvoll, das
System in einen Gleichgewichtszustand zu bekommen. Das erreicht man
z. B., indem man dafür sorgt, dass sich Nachfrage und Angebot an Hemden
bzw. Anzahl an Maschinen und Arbeitern entsprechen. Andererseits sollte
man versuchen, den Betrieb zu vergrößern und den Verkauf zu steigern.
Der Rohmaterialpreis ist von sämtlichen Systemvariablen unabhängig.
Er unterliegt allerdings deutlichen, marktbedingten Schwankungen. Man
sollte darauf achten, dass immer ausreichend Rohmaterial vorhanden ist,
um die Produktion sicherzustellen. Ein häufiger Fehler besteht darin, das
Rohmateriallager nicht wieder aufzufüllen.
Die Lagerhaltung ist mit Kosten verbunden. Deshalb sollten nicht zu
viele Hemden auf Halde produziert werden. Gleichzeitig sollte aber soviel
produziert werden, dass die Nachfrage befriedigt werden kann.
Die Anzahl der fertigen Hemden im Lager und die Menge Rohmaterial im
Lager müssen zusammen mindestens so hoch sein wie die Nachfrage. Wenn
Angebot und Nachfrage auseinander klaffen, ist es sinnvoller, eines von bei-
den zu steigern als eines von beiden zu senken.
Die Nachfrage bestimmt, wie viele Hemden Sie pro Monat am Markt
absetzen können. Die Ausgaben für Werbung erhöhen die Nachfrage, ebenso
die Anzahl der Verkaufsstellen und die Anzahl der Handelsvertreter.
Ein höherer Hemdenpreis senkt die Nachfrage. Der Preis hat einen stärk-
eren Einfluss auf die Nachfrage als jeweils Werbung, Verkaufsstellen und
Vertreter. Die Posten Werbung, Anzahl der Verkaufsstellen und die An-
zahl der Handelsvertreter erhöhen die monatlichen Kosten. Die monatlichen
Kosten werden auch durch Rohmaterial-Lagerkosten, Kosten pro Arbeiter
(Lohn- und Sozialaufwendungen) und durch evtl. Sollzinsen erhöht.
Während der verbleibenden Lernzeit steht Ihnen auch eine Hemdenfabrik
zur Verfügung, bei der Sie die ersten fünf Variablen Rohmaterial, Hemden-
preis, Werbung, Verkaufsstellen und Handelsvertreter probeweise variieren
dürfen. Bitte verändern Sie die anderen Variablen nicht, wir werden dies
überwachen.
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Anfangszustand der nächsten Hemdenfabrik
Hier sehen Sie den Anfangszustand der Hemdenfabrik, die Sie am Ende der
Simulation leiten sollen. Die Variablen, die auch in der Abbildung auf-
tauchen, sind durchnummeriert. Wenn Sie möchten, können Sie sich bereits
Maßnahmen für die ersten Monate Ihrer Leitung überlegen.
Eingriffsvariablen Nicht (direkt) beeinflussbare
Variablen
Nr. Nr.
9 Rohmaterial 583 Gesamtvermögen (DM) 112139
Hemdpreis (DM) 84 11 Kontostand (DM) 30 119
Werbung (DM) 1 850 14 Rohmaterialpreis (DM) 4.00
Verkaufsstellen 1 Nachfrage 129
Handelsvertreter 2 16 Hemden am Lager 417
3 50er-Maschinen 6 7 Verkaufte Hemden 129
3 100er-Maschinen 3 8 Produktion 465
5 Wartung (DM) 630 Produktionsausfall (%) 42
2 Arbeiter an 50er 3 7 Maschinenschäden (%) 8
2 Arbeiter an 100er 4 Maschinenauslastung (%) 78
Lohn (DM) 1 530 Arbeitsauslastung (%) 85
Sozialkosten (DM) 35 1 Arbeitsmotivation (%) 75
Appendix B
Additional Tables
Table B.1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution of AST mea-
surement variables for Section 8.1.3 (pretest)
# of Concepts Edges Cluster Weighted Diameter RMPL
Density
x¯ 10.79 27.48 4.68 1.08 2.50 .34
σ 4.71 21.04 2.14 .65 .95 .24
Z .552 .649 .667 .763 1.613 1.511
p(Z) .921 .798 .766 .606 .011 .021
Table B.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution of AST mea-
surement variables for Section 8.1.3 (posttest)
# of Concepts Edges Cluster Weighted Diameter RMPL
Density
x¯ 15.71 53.09 6.38 .97 2.86 .22
σ 7.36 34.37 2.89 .58 1.062 .10
Z .739 .728 .866 .518 1.220 .585
p(Z) .646 .664 .442 .951 .102 .884
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Table B.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for normal distribution of AST mea-
surement variables for Section 8.1.4
# of Concepts Edges Cluster Weighted Diameter RMPL
Density
x¯ 21.50 50.64 8.14 .60 3.21 .19
σ 13.38 30.55 4.622 .42 1.12 .07
Z .812 .868 .900 .527 1.352 .36
p(Z) .525 .439 .393 .944 .052 .999
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